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DRAGON ROUGE (U)
NOV - DEC 1964

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

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DRAGON ROUGE (U)
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1964

Prepared by
H. H. LUMPKIN
COMMAND HISTORIAN
USEUCOM

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS COMMAND
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331-0301

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AS-OPS-MRA (380-5w)

July 29, 1987


MEMORANDUM FOR: Commandant, USACGSG, ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L (classified), Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6600

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review

This is in response to your Request for/or Notification of Regrading Action (DA Form 1575) dated June 5, 1985, requesting mandatory declassification review of the enclosed (one) document from your holdings. Enclosed is the downgrading authority and the document remarked as unclassified.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Encls


J. R. Edgington
Chief, Information Access
Section

*Action Completed
10 Aug 87/RS*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
WASHINGTON, DC 20310 - 04

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

21 APR 1987

DAMO-ODSO

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review of "DRAGON ROUGE"

Headquarters, Department of the Army
Mandatory Declassification Review
Room 1114, Hoffman I
Washington, D. C. 22331


1. Reference:

a. DAAG Form 282, Mandatory Declassification Review Referral, Control No. 85062, dated 8 Jan 86.

b. USEUCOM Monograph DRAGON ROUGE, Nov - Dec 64 (U).

2. Per your request, Headquarters, Department of Army has reviewed and has no objection to the declassification of DRAGON ROUGE in its entirety.

3. DAMO-ODSO POC is LTC Jerome, AV 225-7449, STU II 03859.


WILLIAM C. MOORE
Major General, GS
Director of Operations,
Readiness and Mobilization

CONRAD J. McHUGH
Lieutenant Colonel, GS
Executive, Operations,
Readiness and Mobilization

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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(UNCLASSIFIED WHEN REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT)

FOI Case No. 8603415

TO: Mr. J.R. Edgington
Chief, Information Access Branch
Mandatory Declassification Review
HQDA (DAIM-FAR-RA)
Room 1146, Hoff I
Washington, D.C. 22331

FROM: *[Signature]* John R. Burke
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Classification/Declassification Center
Bureau of Administration

SUBJECT: FOI Review of One Document requested by US Army
Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth,
Kansas (#85062)

As requested in your memorandum of July 16, 1986, my colleagues and I have reviewed the document in the case which you forwarded to the Department of State for recommendation on declassification/release.

Following the review, we have no objection to the declassification and release of the document in its entirety.

Future inquiries regarding this material should refer to the Freedom of Information number shown above.

Attachment:
One document.

MAR 2 - 6 38 AM '87

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

19 DEC 1985

Ref: 85-MDR-191
(85062)

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION
HQDA (DAAG-AMR-D)

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review of "Dragon Rouge,"

In response to your July 2, 1985 referral, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has reviewed the attached document and has no objection to its declassification and release, subject to the concurrence of USEUCOM and Department of State.

W. M. McDonald
Director, Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Attachments

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FROM [illegible]



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO NEW YORK 09128-4209

IN REPLY REFER TO

ECJ1-A

85062

3 JUL 1986

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review of USEUCOM
Monograph Dragon Rouge, Nov-Dec 1964 (U)

HQDA (DAIM-RMS-D)
Mandatory Declassification Review
Rm 1114, Hoff I
Washington, DC 22331

1. (U) Reference:

a. (U) DAAG Form 282, Mandatory Declassification Review Referral, Control No. 85062, dated 8 Jan 86 (encl 1).


b. (U) USEUCOM Monograph Dragon Rouge, Nov-Dec 1964 (U) (encl 2).

2. (U) Per your request, the HQ USEUCOM staff has reviewed the referenced document for declassification. From the HQ USEUCOM standpoint, there is no objection to the declassification of this document in its entirety. However, references to other nations and the individual decision makers within those nations make it essential that the Department of State review the document before declassification can be rendered final.

3. (U) We request that this Headquarters be notified of the results of the Department of State review so that we can properly mark our record copy of the document and notify the holders of this document of the final determination.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

2 Encls


JOHN H. HUBER
LTC, USA
Adjutant General

CF (wo/encls):
Cdr, USAREUR

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DATE

5 June 1985

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TO: (Include ZIP Code)

HQDA (DAAG-AMR-D)
Hoffman I
Alexandria, VA 22331

85062

FROM: (Include ZIP Code)

Commandant
USACGSC
ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L (Classified)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

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		OLD	NEW
B85-8	Document, Dragon Rouge (U), Nov-Dec 1964 EUCOM TSC #76-00483, EUCOM TSC #85 00157. Cy 3 of 50 copies. NOTE: If entire document cannot be down- graded or declassified, request Chapter IX be declassified.	TS EXCL	UNCLASS
FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDANT:			

PRINTED OR TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICER

STEWART R. KIDD
Colonel, Armor
Secretary

SIGNATURE



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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR US/BELGIAN HOSTAGE

EVACUATION OPERATION IN THE CONGO

(U) On 24 November 1964 the First Belgian Paratroop Battalion and a company of paracommandos were transported from Belgium to the Republic of the Congo by United States C-130E aircraft of the 322d Air Division, US European Command. Between 24 and 26 November these troops successfully rescued approximately 1,950 civilians of eighteen nations who had been held as hostages of the Congolese rebels in Stanleyville and Paulis.¹


(U) The entire effort was conceived and carried out by the United States and Belgian governments as a limited and humanitarian combined operation to achieve a specific objective - the saving of lives directly threatened by rebel action. It was authorized by the Government of the Republic of the Congo, and all Belgian and United States military personnel directly concerned were withdrawn immediately after its completion.²

(U) The concept of this mission evolved against a background of constantly mounting physical danger to the civilians of the several nationalities resident in rebel-held areas. A telegram sent on 21 August 1964 to the American Ambassador in Leopoldville, purportedly signed by the captive American Consul in Stanleyville, noted the threat to all Americans held as hostages if United States military assistance to the Congolese Central Government did not cease immediately. The consul and his staff had been the first to be placed in detention by the rebels.³

(U) On 31 August an announcement by the rebel Stanleyville radio was heard by missionaries and reported to the American Embassy. This stated that Americans and Europeans would be held as hostages until Tshombe stopped using American and European mercenaries. The rebel "Minister of Defense" on 5 October threatened to bury twelve Americans with each Congolese killed if "the Americans continued killing men, women, and children." Two days later (7 October) one of the rebel leaders, "General" Olenga, instructed his listeners on Radio Kindu to kill one foreigner for each Congolese killed "if NATO aircraft bombed and killed the Congolese civilian population."⁴

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(U) The Congolese Central Government intercepted on 15 October a message to Olenga from the rebel "Chief of Staff," "Colonel" Joseph Opepe, which sought permission to execute "a certain number" of Europeans and Americans held at Stanleyville. Two weeks later Opepe ordered the arrest of foreigners, including Belgians. The same day a message received in Leopoldville and signed by the Belgian Consul at Stanleyville said that all Belgian and American subjects at Stanleyville, including the consulate staffs, were under house arrest.⁵

(U) On 29 October another rebel leader, Gbenye, answered that "the people's army of liberation has always protected foreigners, but it will no longer do so for the subjects of certain countries...." Gbenye also sent a message to King Baudoin of Belgium which stated that since Belgians were attacking the Congolese, the security of Belgian subjects and their properties no longer could be guaranteed.⁶

(U) (S) The taking of hostages by the rebels, which began with five members of the American consular staff at Stanleyville, was speeded up with the approach of the ANC (Armee Nationale de Congo) forces toward the rebel capital. Discussions held by International Red Cross officials with rebel authorities in September of 1964 demonstrated unequivocally that the rebels, in stepping up the taking of hostages, did so with full knowledge that they were breaking internationally respected conventions to which the Congo Government was signatory.⁷

(U) On 15 October Prime Minister Tshombe begged the rebels not to kill hostages, since that act would dishonor the Congo and the rebels in the eyes of all mankind. That same day President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya appealed to the rebels in humanitarian terms not to kill foreign hostages. On 21 October Prime Minister Tshombe invited International Red Cross observers to come to the Congo to verify compliance with the Geneva Conventions, particularly with respect to the treatment of prisoners and the ban on taking hostages.⁸

(U) Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 2 November met in New York with Mr. U. Thant, United Nations Secretary General, and suggested United Nations' action on behalf of the civilian hostages at Stanleyville and on 6 November Mr. Tshombe called for the liberation and protection of all foreigners held in rebel territory.⁹

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(U) The rebels announced on 13 November that an American missionary, Dr. Paul Carlson, who had stayed behind voluntarily in rebel country to tend the sick, including rebel wounded, would be executed on 16 November. A message dated 16 November from the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, to Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya and chairman of an ad hoc commission on the Congo of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), informed Mr. Kenyatta of the rebel leaders' announcement concerning Dr. Carlson and protested the false accusations of Dr. Carlson's espionage and service as a major in the United States Army.¹⁰

(U) Mr. Rusk said that the United States Government declared "unequivocally" that Dr. Carlson was not in any way connected with the US military and was engaged only in his activities as a medical missionary. His execution on patently false charges therefore would be "an outrageous violation of international law and accepted standards of humanitarian conduct." The United States Government therefore placed direct responsibility on the rebels for the safety of Dr. Carlson and all other American citizens in those areas controlled by the rebels.¹¹

(U) Prime Minister Kenyatta was urged further by Secretary Rusk to use his influence to prevent an act of atrocity against an innocent human being and to intervene at once with the rebel authorities to permit the entry into Stanleyville of the International Red Cross "to assure the safety of all foreigners in rebel held territory." Mr. Rusk urged in the same message that representatives of the OAU ad hoc commission accompany these Red Cross personnel.¹²

(U) A message to the rebels from the American Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo, dated 17 November, informed the rebel leadership that the United States Government had instructed him to say again that it held the authorities at Stanleyville directly and personally responsible for the safety of Dr. Carlson and of all American citizens in areas under rebel control.¹³

(U) The ambassador further stated that, as the rebel leadership knew, the United States Government had supported fully the unsuccessful attempt of the International Red Cross and the OAU ad hoc commission to obtain rebel agreement for a Red Cross humanitarian mission to enter Stanleyville for the protection and evacuation of innocent civilians. The United States Government still remained ready to cooperate fully in such humanitarian efforts and would discuss arrangements through the above organizations. The chairman of the OAU was being advised of this and rebel leadership therefore was urged to communicate with Mr. Kenyatta in this matter.¹⁴

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(U) A message dated 18 November from Gbenye, in answer to a telegram from Mr. Kenyatta, said that the rebel leaders held American authorities responsible for the Congo massacres. Major Paul Carlson had been sentenced to death and the sentence was confirmed by a popular meeting held that morning. Through OAU intervention, however, that execution would be postponed to await the outcome of negotiations. The rebels also were prepared to cooperate in all humanitarian efforts to reach any arrangement through the "sole intermediary" of the OAU, for which purpose Thomas Kanza was detailed.¹⁵

(U) The American Ambassador, in response to a message received from Gbenye on 19 November, replied on the same day that the United States Government had instructed him to advise the rebel leader that "we stand ready at any time for discussions to insure the safety of United States nationals now in the Stanleyville area." Gbenye answered on 20 November that Thomas Kanza, assisted by Jomo Kenyatta, President of the ad hoc commission for the Congo, and Diallo Tello, Secretary General of the OAU, were charged by him and his associates with carrying out at Nairobi the preliminary negotiations on prisoners of war. The United States then was asked to fix the date. The ambassador's reply, also on 20 November, informed Gbenye that the American Ambassador to Kenya had been directed to propose such a meeting with Prime Minister Kenyatta, Mr. Kanza, and such other persons as they might designate for noon, Nairobi time, 21 November.¹⁶

(U) Following continued press rumors concerning the transfer of the Belgian unit, the spokesmen for the Belgian Foreign Ministry on 20 November issued a public statement that the First Paratroop Battalion had been transported by US aircraft to Ascension Island, where it was quartered with the authorization of the British Government. The Belgian and American governments had considered it their duty, in view of the threat to their nationals and civilians in general in the region of Stanleyville, to take preparatory measures to carry out, if necessary, a humanitarian rescue operation. Under current circumstances this was only a precautionary measure. The Belgian Government firmly hoped that Stanleyville authorities would safeguard the lives of Belgian nationals residing in that city.¹⁷

(U) Gbenye's representative, Thomas Kanza, failed to keep his 21 November appointment in Nairobi with the American Ambassador to Kenya, who waited for him at Prime Minister Kenyatta's home. On 23 November the ambassador met with Kanza and the OAU Secretary General Mr. Diallo Telli, but these discussions proved to be completely fruitless.¹⁸

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(U) Thirteen countries (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States) joined later by Ireland and Niger, issued an appeal on 21 November to facilitate an immediate and safe arrival at Stanleyville of International Red Cross personnel. These states, speaking as the signatories to the Geneva Convention of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, noted that it had become increasingly clear that the lives of civilians in Stanleyville were in grave danger. This remained true in spite of the steps taken by Prime Minister Kenyatta and the assurances of safety for foreigners which had been made to him from Stanleyville.¹⁹

(U) Although the rebels arbitrarily refused to permit impartial observers to remain in the occupied zone, escapees brought eye-witness accounts which confirmed the reports of wanton slaughter of Congolese and the fact that foreign nationals were mistreated and held as hostages. These reports also revealed a pattern of deterioration in the rebel camp with a concomitant loss of control by the leaders.²⁰

(U)(S) As central government forces pushed on Stanleyville, evidence thus mounted that the rebels were taking vengeance on unarmed hostages. Reports were received from reliable sources that foreign hostages already had been murdered (in Boende, Kibombo, and elsewhere). It was evident in those towns already liberated by ANC forces that many hostages had escaped execution narrowly and uncertain control was exercised by the rebel command over the "simbas" and especially over the so-called jeunesse, teen-age gangs of "unemployed and discontented" youths. By 23 November evidence mounted that the situation in Stanleyville was increasingly grave, with strong indications that the rebels would murder all hostages or carry them away. If the rebel leaders fled, there was equal danger that bands of the "jeunesse" left behind would systematically murder all Congolese political enemies and all foreigners under their control.²¹

(U) A letter from Mr. Tshombe to the American Ambassador in Leopoldville, also dated 21 November, reviewed the situation - the mistreatment and murder of many Congolese and foreigners, the appeals to the rebels made by the Government of the Congo and international agencies. He stated, accordingly, that in view of the deteriorating situation in Stanleyville, the failure of all humanitarian efforts, and the "odious

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blackmail" conducted by the rebel leaders on that city, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had decided to authorize the Government of Belgium to send an adequate rescue force to evacuate hostages held by the rebels. In the same message the United States Government was authorized to furnish the necessary transport for this humanitarian mission. Mr. Tshombe said that he fully appreciated the American and Belgian governments' desires to withdraw their forces as soon as the mission was accomplished.²²

(U) In a press release (499) dated 24 November 1964, the US State Department announced that the United States Government had just received confirmation that early in the morning of 24 November a unit of Belgian paratroopers, carried by United States military transport planes, had landed at Stanleyville, in the Congo. This landing had been made, "(1) with the authorization of the Government of the Congo, (2) in conformity with our adherence to the Geneva Conventions, and (3) in exercise of our clear responsibility to protect US citizens under the circumstances existing in the Stanleyville area."²³

(U) Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations in a letter of 24 November to the President of the UN Security Council, said that at the request of the Government of Belgium and with the authorization of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States Government had provided air transport for a mission of mercy to effect the release of over 1,000 civilian hostages from eighteen nations held in and around Stanleyville, "in clear violation of the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Victims of War." For more than three months attempts had been made by the several national governments concerned and by various international agencies to secure release of these prisoners. Those efforts all had been rejected by the rebel leadership.²⁴

(U) The United States Government had persisted in its attempts to secure the release of these hostages until 23 November. On that day a representative from Stanleyville, meeting with the Ambassador to Kenya in Nairobi, had refused to discuss release of the hostages except under conditions which the United States Government did not possess the moral or legal right to consider. These discussions also made it clear that the Stanleyville representative was attempting to bargain with the hostages' lives for political and military purposes.²⁵

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(U) Mr. Stevenson informed the Security Council that the United States therefore had supplied the transport aircraft to help accomplish the rescue mission. The sole purpose of that humanitarian mission was to liberate hostages whose lives were in danger, and the force would be withdrawn upon completion of that task.

(U) It was within this historical pattern of developing events that the United States European Command accomplished planning and provided personnel and aircraft for these combined operations.

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CHAPTER II
PLANNING

(u)(TS) At the invitation of the United States Government, the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Paul Henri Spaak, visited Washington on 8 and 9 November 1964 for informal talks on the critical Congo situation. During his visit the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Averell Harriman, and the American Ambassador to Belgium, Mr. Douglas MacArthur II, proposed that consideration be given to joint Belgian/United States TOP SECRET contingency planning which would involve using Belgian paracommando troops transported by US aircraft to carry out rescue operations in the Congo, should this become necessary to save the lives of the many foreign hostages there. The Government of the Republic of the Congo must give its concurrence to any such operation.²⁶


(u)(TS) M. Spaak and Ambassador MacArthur returned to Brussels on 9 November. M. Spaak informed the ambassador on 10 November of his government's agreement to carry out such TOP SECRET contingency planning; Ambassador MacArthur so informed US authorities. That evening the Director of the US Joint Staff established by telephone with the Director, J-3 Division, Headquarters USEUCOM, a requirement for a three-man planning group to go to Brussels to work out details for a small airborne operation; he requested receipt by telephone of the names of this group.²⁷

(u)(TS) Subsequent telephone calls the same evening by Headquarters USEUCOM with US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and US Army Europe (USAREUR) established a requirement for planning participation of the component commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then were advised concerning the composition of the planning team; i. e., one representative each from Headquarters USEUCOM, USAFE, and USAREUR.²⁸

(u)(TS) A message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 11 November confirmed the telephone calls and authorized USCINCEUR to send without delay Brigadier General Russell Dougherty, Deputy Director

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for plans, J-3 Division; Lt Colonel J. L. Gray, of the Operations Division, USAFE; and Captain Brashears, of USAREUR. The mission of these officers was to plan with appropriate Belgian officials for the employment of US aircraft in the transport of approximately one company of Belgian paratroopers. These troops were to be used for a possible emergency parachute assault on Stanleyville, Republic of the Congo, to free United States and European hostages held there by the rebels. The JCS instructed USCINCEUR to draw the necessary C-130 aircraft from those available to him in the theater. It also was possible that the Belgians might request a small airlift capability in addition to that required for the assault drop in order to evacuate Europeans and Americans from the Stanleyville area. ²⁹


(U)S The message also said that Colonel James E. Dunn was designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to join the planning group. His mission would be to keep the JCS and the Secretary of Defense informed and also to provide required assistance. The JCS stressed that maximum discretion in carrying out the mission was mandatory and the purpose of the group was for planning only. Any decision to initiate the operation would be reserved to the highest US governmental level. ³⁰

(U)S Prior to 10 November the planning and intelligence staff of USEUCOM had not been involved directly in Congo emergency planning. The continued involvement of theater airlift in transporting material and supplies from Belgium to the Congo, however, had caused the staff to maintain an awareness of the situation and an informational intelligence watch over events in that area. With this running cognizance and information derived from the US Strike Command operation plan, plus pertinent intelligence summaries, USEUCOM already possessed a sound general knowledge of the situation to meet the urgent requirement for participation in combined planning at Brussels. ³¹

(U)S The USEUCOM planning team went to Brussels on 11 November and met immediately with Mr. Beaudry, the Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs. Initial contacts also were made on the same day with appropriate Belgian representatives of the Ministry of Defense. On 12 November talks continued among US and Belgian planning representatives, preliminary discussions being completed on 13 November. ³²

(U)S As General Dougherty states in his comments on the planning phases of the Congo operation, the urgency of achieving agreement on a

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basic US/Belgian plan was clear from the outset. The planned movement of the Congolese National Army column (commanded by Belgian Colonel Vanderwalle) north to Stanleyville along the right bank of the Congo made 23 November 1964 the initial date for any hostage rescue attempt in the Stanleyville area. Initial planning with the Belgians therefore was approached with the primary objective of establishing a basic concept of action with minimum force and equipment.³³

(u)(s) The original planning guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to General Dougherty's comments, was adequate except for the size of the force to be employed. Thus it became clear quite early in the planning discussions that a company-sized force would not be sufficient, and at least a battalion might be necessary. To eliminate any delay in waiting for revised instructions, the US planning team therefore proceeded with the concept of supporting an airborne battalion. Ambassador MacArthur in Brussels stated to the US military planners that no political agreement existed at government level which would restrict such planning to a company-sized paratroop force. He also communicated this problem to the State Department and authorized planning to continue on the basis of an airborne battalion.³⁴

(u)(s) The intentions of the United States to support Belgium in this operation were a matter of extreme sensitivity and necessitated a limited distribution of information. For that reason USCINCEUR decided that a single operational plan would be drafted by a USEUCOM team, then coordinated with the Belgian planning staff and submitted for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both governments thus would have a "reasonably detailed scenario" of the agreed planning concept. It was considered that once approved, the plan would be executed by "normal fragmentary orders" of both governments without any requirement for additional formal planning at other military levels. This approach was adopted by the United States military planners since it facilitated for all concerned both understanding and processing and permitted a timely decision on the execution. As no combined US/Belgian doctrine existed for this type of operation, US planners made the basic decision to follow the Belgian lead and adapt to their capabilities.³⁵

(u)(TS) The mission would be a parachute/air-land assault by one battalion (approximately 600 troops) to seize the Stanleyville airfield, rescue and evacuate all foreign personnel, and withdraw. There was no

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planned link-up with the Congolese Army column commanded by Colonel Vanderwalle, which was to move on Stanleyville along the right bank of the Congo. The time of withdrawal also was left open and would not be considered as part of the air support plan.³⁶

(u)(TS) The original concept of the Belgian/US planners was for one company (approximately 150 troops) to drop at 0400Z on the golf course in the vicinity of the airfield at Stanleyville. These troops were to seize and clear the airfield, after which the remainder of the force would air-land. Beginning at Drop plus 1:30 hours the paracommandos would move into Stanleyville to locate foreign personnel and assist in their evacuation. Although the primary plan was to air-land the second company, it also would have parachute capability. There was to be no pre-assault bombardment planned. This decision was based on Belgian experience in the Congo, since it was known that the sight of aircraft over an area promptly panicked the rebels who then probably would murder systematically all available hostages. The B-26s attached to the Congolese Air Force, however, were to rendezvous with the assault aircraft, fly column cover to Stanleyville, and provide supporting fire as required, while additional cover by T-28s and B-26s was to be present in the area throughout the air-landing operations.³⁷

(u)(TS) The deployment route, as first conceived by the US/Belgian planning team on 12 November, would be Kleine-Brogel, Belgium; Wheelus Air Base, Libya; and Stanleyville, with approximately 14 hours for refueling and crew rest at Wheelus. The air-landed sorties would conduct initial evacuation of the hostages. After off-loading all aircraft would recover and refuel at Leopoldville and prepare to return to Stanleyville for the final evacuation of civilians.³⁸

(u)(TS) Within the area of command arrangements, the United States would retain command of the US airlift and responsibility for delivery of Belgian forces to the objective area; the Belgian commander would make the "Go No-Go" decision over the objective area and retain control of the evacuation operation at Stanleyville. Evacuees were to be delivered to their appropriate diplomatic representatives at Leopoldville. The Belgians had assigned the code name DRAGON ROUGE for the overall operation. When and if the decision to execute occurred, the Belgian Government offered to consult and obtain overflight clearances as necessary with France and make contact with the Congo. The Belgians then asked the United States to obtain other African clearances, while the problem of using Wheelus Air Base in Libya was brought to the attention of Ambassador MacArthur.³⁹

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(u)(TS) General Dougherty also reported that it was planned to continue discussions with the Belgians on 13 November. The British had expressed on 12 November their desire to participate in any actions completed with respect to the Congo; and the Belgians therefore suggested that current discussions be enlarged to include British participation, to which the US Government posed no objections.⁴⁰

(u)(TS) A message from Ambassador MacArthur to the Department of State on 12 November said that an excellent meeting had taken place between the US team and their Belgian associates. Contingency planning would continue on 13 November, presumably with British participation. The Belgians also had made it clear that a force of some 600 men would be necessary for a successful air-drop assault and evacuation of hostages. General Dougherty and Colonel Dunn both had agreed that this was a minimum force for an operation of such magnitude. In view of Belgian insistence that staging be from outside the Congo, it was felt by US planners that it would be necessary to utilize Wheelus Air Base as the operations staging base.⁴¹

(u)(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State on 12 November informed USCINCEUR and the American Embassy, Brussels, that in view of overriding political considerations Wheelus would not be used as a staging area, and all planning should proceed on the basis of the use of Ascension Island, the Canaries, or fields in the Congo.⁴²

(u)(TS) The Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this message also expressed puzzlement as to why the Belgians had discarded the view expressed on the previous weekend (8 November) that a paratroop operation against Stanleyville could be staged from within the Congo. It was asked if it would not be militarily feasible to continue planning on that basis with a relatively small assault force positioned at Kitina, Kamina, or Kindu. A small force taking off from fields in the Congo would be the least objectionable operation from a political point of view. C-130 flights to effect positioning of an assault parachute company under such a plan could be relatively inconspicuous. If paratroopers were positioned only a day or two in advance of the assault, the chances of maintaining security also would remain relatively good.⁴³

(u)(TS) Ambassador MacArthur's answer to the Department of State, dated 13 November, pointed out that he too was somewhat puzzled by the reference in the preceding telegram that the Belgians had discarded the view expressed on the previous weekend. As far as he knew, Spaak never

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had indicated from whence the operation should be staged. The overriding considerations which led the Belgians to express a desire for staging from outside the Congo basically were problems of security and a need for complete surprise for the assault phase at Stanleyville. This was important from the military viewpoint as well as the international political viewpoint, as a premature disclosure might lead to pressures from the Afro-Asian group to block the operations. ⁴⁴

(U)TS) Ambassador MacArthur further said that he would go back to the Belgians immediately and explain that Wheelus was not available as a staging area. Planning then would proceed on the basis of Ascension Island, the Canaries, or fields in the Congo. In his opinion, only one battalion for the assault, clearing the airfield, and evacuating foreign residents, the Belgian concept, was an absolute minimum force. The problem was not simply a matter of assault but of attempting to assure at the same time the security and well-being, plus evacuation, of American hostages and hostages of other nationalities. The airfield must be held and communications kept open from Stanleyville to the airfield during the entire evacuation phase. For those purposes a battalion clearly was required. ⁴⁵

(U)TS) General Dougherty dispatched a second report message to USCINCEUR at 2203Z, 13 November, which stated that joint planning with the Belgian military for Operation DRAGON ROUGE had been concluded on that day. Planning still was based on a battalion-sized airborne force and air-landed operations involving twelve C-130E aircraft, with support by incountry B-26s, T-28s, and US Joint Task Force Leopoldville aircraft. USCINCEUR was informed further that the Belgian military had been advised of the non-availability of Wheelus Air Base as a staging base for the operation. Subsequent discussion of this problem therefore had focused on in-country security problems and refueling capabilities, which at planners' level were agreed as follows: DRAGON ROUGE aircraft would proceed Kleine-Brogel, Belgium; Torrejon/Moron Spain (as selected by USAFE); Las Palmas, Canary Islands; Kamina, and then Stanleyville, in the Republic of the Congo. ⁴⁶

(U)TS) In order to meet the 0400Z drop time requested by the Belgians, establish maximum security by arriving and launching at Kamina after dark, and ensure daylight arrival and crew rest at Ascension, the initial launch from Belgium must be at 1840Z of any given day no matter what governmental decision was made to execute the operation. The Belgians had advised that a minimum of twelve hours would be required to assemble and load troops at Kleine-Brogel. ⁴⁷

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(U)TS Plans were for the initial aircraft to arrive at Kleine-Brogel at 1640Z and launch at 1840Z, with the remaining eleven aircraft arriving and launching at fifteen-minute intervals. This would permit the arrival of all aircraft at Ascension during daylight hours and a minimum of twelve hours of ground time for crew rest and refueling. The aircraft then would launch from Ascension at thirty-minute intervals beginning at 0630Z, arrive at Kamina after dark for final refueling, and launch beginning at 0100Z for an 0400Z drop at Stanleyville. ⁴⁸

(U)TS The critical factor was the refueling capability at Kamina. The Belgians reported to the planning group that sufficient aviation gas was available, but mobile dispensers were limited to two "bowsers" with a forty-gallon-per-minute pump rate, plus drum refueling. This problem would be studied at Headquarters USEUCOM, and it might be necessary to send a US fuel truck to Kamina by C-124. Individual loads also were agreed upon on the 13th, and the Belgian troops would be prepared to use sleeping bags and tents at Ascension, if required. ⁴⁹

(U)TS USCINCEUR was informed that the Belgian military planners had been advised on 13 November by their foreign office that there could be no decision to execute which would permit a launch from Belgium prior to 1840Z on any given day. This recommendation to execute was to come first from the Belgian Embassy in Leopoldville. The Belgian military also indicated their assumption that this would involve consultation between the Belgian and American ambassadors on the scene and a simultaneous communication to their respective governments for a final decision (this point would be clarified by the American Embassy with the Belgian Foreign Office). ⁵⁰

(U)TS CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA on 13 November recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that USSTRICOM participate in planning for the US/Belgian airborne operation in the Congo. It was pointed out that STRICOM had furnished USCINCEUR with pertinent intelligence and other data concerning operation planning accomplished by that headquarters. It was believed that STRICOM could make an active contribution to the current planning if two planners were sent to Brussels and Headquarters USEUCOM. ⁵¹

(U)TS This request was vetoed the same day by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that the operation was purely Belgian, with US participation limited to the provision of aircraft. USCINCEUR had been directed

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to provide that lift because of the availability of these aircraft in the European theater. The dispatch of STRICOM planners to Brussels therefore was considered unnecessary.⁵²

(u)(TS) During the night and early morning of 13/14 November the American planning team in Brussels produced the draft plan. This was brought back to Headquarters USEUCOM on 14 November and sent, with no major changes, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, CINCSTRIKE, and USAF. (The Belgian Government also was on distribution on a need-to-know basis.) The plan, USCINCEUR Special Operations Plan 319/64 (Appendix A), established the mission, situation, concept of operations, assault phase, air-landing/evacuation phase, friendly forces, assigned tasks, general considerations, special instructions, command and control, approval, and execution. The plan also included four appendices: (A) Outline Time/Distance Planning Table, (B) Deployment Time Table, (C) Employment Time Table - Assault Phase, (D) Estimated En Route Support Requirements, and (E) Support Concept.⁵³

(u)(TS) The concept of operations, as outlined in the plan, was as follows: In the en route phase the United States would employ twelve (12) C-130E aircraft to transport a Belgian airborne battalion of approximately 545 Belgian paratroopers, 8 jeeps, and 12 AS-24 motorized tricycles from Kleine-Brogel, Belgium, to Stanleyville in accordance with the detailed schedule in Appendices B and C as cited. The USEUCOM C-130s were to proceed from Evreux Air Base, France, to Kleine-Brogel, Belgium. All motorized equipment would be loaded for air-landing, while only troops and light weapons were to be air-dropped. The aircraft would not remain at Kleine-Brogel but would proceed through en route refueling bases, allowing two hours on the ground for refueling at a Spanish base (Torrejon or Moron at USAFE option) and at Las Palmas, Canary Islands. The arrival of all aircraft at Ascension was to be timed to occur during daylight hours.⁵⁴

(u)(TS) The original DRAGON ROUGE plan also provided for a twelve-hour or more refueling crew and paratrooper rest at Ascension. The aircraft then would depart Ascension during the hours of darkness and refuel at Kamina prior to departure for the assault phase. This refueling would be accomplished through a combination of two small pump trucks (bowzers) shuttling from bulk storage tanks, plus drum-pumped fuel as feasible. To supplement these existing refueling facilities USAFE would make available one US fuel truck for expedited airlift to Kamina via C-124. (It was decided later to send two truckers.)⁵⁵

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(4)TS The assault element was to proceed from Kamina to an initial point approximately one hundred miles down river (west) from Stanleyville at Basoko. At that point a B-26 (or two B-26s, if available) would rendezvous with the assault element and provide a report on weather in the Stanleyville area. This would be based on a wide peripheral reconnaissance run around Stanleyville, well out of earshot of the city. The B-26s then were to escort Chalk One to the drop zone and remain in the immediate area of that zone throughout air-drop operations. The B-26 pilots were to be instructed to withhold offensive fire unless ground weapons posed a threat to transports or paratroopers, in which case they would be instructed to fire for immediate effect on the source of rebel fire. The B-26s also were to provide random suppressive fires on suspected areas if they could not determine the exact source. The B-26s would be supplemented by T-28s, as available, throughout the assault phase. These aircraft again were to be instructed to avoid the immediate environs of Stanleyville until the assault phase was over, but to be available immediately for suppressive fire in the area thereafter. ⁵⁶

(4)TS The Belgian paratroop commander planned to drop on the Stanleyville golf course just north and east of the airfield. It was planned that the run-in would be up river, from west to east. From the initial point described above, the Chalks would be in trail, with a one-minute interval between aircraft and a planned drop altitude of 1200 feet above the terrain (minimum Belgian air-drop altitude was 700 feet in emergency). Air speed would be 120 knots. It was estimated that the drop zone could accommodate a 10- to 12-man stick through each C-130E door; thus, three passes over the drop zone would be conducted by each air-drop Chalk number. The airlift commander in Chalk One would remain airborne in the immediate area and throughout subsequent airborne/air-landing operations. ⁵⁷

(4)TS The plan envisaged US and Belgian forces remaining under their respective national command at all times during the operation. USCINCEUR was to pass operational control of the assault airlift force to CINCSRIKE/CINCMEAFSA upon arrival at Kamina, who in turn would pass operational command of assault airlift force to USCINCEUR upon redeployment from Leopoldville. ⁵⁸

(4)TS General Lemnitzer, SACEUR/USCINCEUR, on 15 November informed Ambassador MacArthur that he had reviewed the draft operational plan for Operation DRAGON ROUGE and found it comprehensive and

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generally satisfactory. He felt that two points required clarification, however: (1) Was the operation considered to be a Belgian operation or a joint Belgian/US operation? (2) Who was the operational commander responsible for making the decision (go or no-go, timing, etc.) from Kamina onward to Stanleyville? He personally recommended that this operational commander be a Belgian.⁵⁹

(u)(TS) Ambassador MacArthur's answer on 16 November stated that it was their understanding that DRAGON ROUGE was considered to be a Belgian operation designed as a humanitarian rescue of foreign hostages in Stanleyville. The United States would provide transport for the Belgian troops from their home country to the drop site and evacuation of hostages from Stanleyville. It was agreed, however, that for political and other reasons it would be desirable to have a Belgian command the actual assault. The ambassador and his advisors also understood that the decision to launch from Stanleyville would be a joint decision of the Belgian and United States governments. Any pre-assault decision to abort the mission was to be made by agreement between the United States air unit commander (based on weather and the condition of the aircraft) and the Belgian paratroop commander, who would consider drop conditions, etc. Once the drop had occurred, the Belgians were to hold operational command of the assault and rescue operation.⁶⁰

(u)(TS) CINCSRIKE, also on 16 November, forwarded his comments on the plan to the JCS and USEUCOM. In these, he stated first that the principle of mass which always was considered vital in joint airborne operations had not been fully observed. Dribbling in parachutes in 12-man sticks would require three passes by each aircraft with concomitant delay. The principle of making the "go-no-go" decision by a parachute officer in the cockpit of each aircraft as stated in the plan also violated the principles of command related to joint airborne operations. It was suggested that a better scheme would be to have a single person charged with this responsibility, either the battalion commander or a designated officer of the battalion.⁶¹

(u)(TS) CINCSRIKE also felt that the plan did not state clearly the arrangements for reforming the air stream in case the aircraft carrying the vehicles could not air-land. It appeared sounder to him to deliver all possible personnel by parachute and place the aircraft carrying vehicles at the tail of the air stream.⁶²

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(u)(TS) It was questioned in the same message whether surprise could be retained using the track proposed which involved four en route stops before the assault. If timing did not evolve favorably, the possibility of a 24-hour delay at Kamina could not be ignored, thus weakening further the possibility of a surprise.⁶³

(u)(TS) STRICOM had not been permitted to participate in the planning for DRAGON ROUGE (although such a request had been made). In view, therefore, of the current planning arrangements and the importance of a detailed understanding with the Belgians as to respective US and Belgian responsibilities and authorities, it was recommended by CINCSRIKE that USCINCEUR retain operational command of the US airlift forces throughout the entire operation, including the airborne assault.⁶⁴

(u)(TS) A message from USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 November (1914Z) further delineated the USCINCEUR concept of Operation DRAGON ROUGE. This pointed out that if the political decision were taken to proceed with Operation DRAGON ROUGE, deployment on 17 November was considered the prudent course in view of the possibility of unplanned delays and rebel reactions. It also entailed the lesser risk of being too late when needed. Reports also had indicated that Ascension facilities would be adequate to accommodate the force involved for up to a week, if sleeping bags were carried and shelter from rain made available. USCINCEUR would provide a Talking Bird to Ascension in order to maintain communication with all involved.⁶⁵

(u)(TS) USCINCEUR informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the same message that responsibility for the operational decision concerning the launch of the air assault phase of DRAGON ROUGE from Kamina onward should be vested in one operational commander on the spot. Under the given circumstances, that individual should be a Belgian. As USCINCEUR said, this was a Belgian operation with the United States providing only airlift support. Current assault planning had conformed entirely to the desires of the Belgian military, who possessed extensive experience in the Stanleyville area.⁶⁶

(u)(TS) In USCINCEUR opinion, the possibility of further evacuation requirements with subsequent paradrops on communities such as Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa must be recognized. Responsive in-country planning and operational control should be provided for these contingencies.

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USCINCEUR considered that CINCSTRIKE's Joint Task Force Leopoldville (JTFLEO), with its going relationships with Belgian and Congolese military authorities, afforded just such a capability. It was believed, therefore, that CINCSTRIKE should assume US operational control of the DRAGON ROUGE airlift force at Kamina (or Ascension) and retain such control through the as yet unplanned contingencies. The above responsibilities, as well as CINCSTRIKE's in-country capabilities, recommended participation by CINCSTRIKE representatives at any future planning conference. ⁶⁷

(u)(TS) The same USCINCEUR message further pointed out that the American Embassy, Leopoldville, and various others had talked of mounting an assault on Stanleyville direct from Ascension without in-Congo staging. The unified commander reminded the JCS that on-board fuel capability did not make such an assault feasible, following a long flight. The desire for surprise necessitated an assault without prior weather reconnaissance, preliminary air attack, or normal airborne pathfinding techniques. These facts, combined with the time required for joining with Congo based B-26s, possible adverse winds en route, requirement for weather "loiter" in the drop area, distance to suitable recovery base, and other unforeseen contingencies, stressed the need for a flexibility afforded by ample fuel reserve. ⁶⁸

(u)(TS) A pre-assault coordination with in-country forces at Kamina, prior to the assault phase, also would be highly desirable. It therefore was recommended to the JCS by USCINCEUR that all concerned accept the fact that staging must be at Kamina prior to the assault. ⁶⁹

(u)(S) The Department of State informed the American Embassies in Brussels and Leopoldville on 16 November (received at Headquarters USEUCOM, 1943Z) that the President and the Secretary of State had agreed to the prepositioning of DRAGON ROUGE at Ascension and that deployment should take place on 17 November as M. Spaak had requested. The US military commands were being instructed accordingly. ⁷⁰

(u)(TS) USCINCEUR at 2311Z, 16 November, sent to CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR an execution order for a selected portion of the en route phase of the DRAGON ROUGE operation plan. CINCUSAFE was directed to dispatch required C-130E aircraft to the on-load base on 17 November and airlift the DRAGON ROUGE force to Ascension Island via Moron, Spain. As recommended by USAFE, a stop at Las Palmas would be eliminated. There was to be no deployment beyond Ascension until ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ⁷¹

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(U)TS CINCUSAFE, using C-124 aircraft (with C-130 augmentation if necessary) also would airlift to Ascension by the most expeditious route two refueling trucks, rations for the refugees, approximately 750 cots, and 80 GP tents. A USAFE Talking Bird communications package would be sent by the most expeditious route to provide communication support to the DRAGON ROUGE force through the termination of the operation. CINCUSAREUR, in turn, was to provide from in-theater resources the rations for evacuees and the necessary cots and tents.⁷²

(U)TS The two component commanders were informed in the same message that authority had been granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the best and most current intelligence information on the Stanleyville area situation to the assault airlift and paratroop commanders on their arrival at Ascension Island. The JCS had authorized granting of a waiver on classification as required.⁷³

(U)TS The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 November (2325Z) informed USCINCEUR that the Belgians had indicated to the American Ambassador in Brussels their concern for the safety of foreigners in rebel-held territory other than in the immediate vicinity of Stanleyville. Apparently they had in mind a need for planning concerning various operations in Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa, to include special air drops. The Belgians might desire to talk to US planners, who should be prepared on short notice to go to Brussels on the request of the American Ambassador in that country and meet with their Belgian counterparts. This is an interesting note, since the USEUCOM planners already had foreseen this eventuality and USCINCEUR had so informed the JCS on the same day.⁷⁴

(U)TS The US Secretary of State also agreed with the importance of further contingency planning. He thus pointed out in a message of 17 November (0005Z) to the American Ambassador that the DRAGON ROUGE plan made no provision for the evacuation of Belgian paratroops from Stanleyville after the mission was completed. If the government of Belgium had in mind using the paratroopers for missions other than the rescue of foreign nationals, the State Department also wished to be advised immediately. In the absence of overriding considerations the Secretary of State felt it desirable that the C-130 force evacuate the Belgian troops as soon as possible on completion of the evacuation mission. This would preserve the most defensible public record, that the mission was strictly confined to evacuation, without military or political overtones. If the Belgians were in agreement, USCINCEUR planners were prepared to work out the necessary plan modifications.⁷⁵

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(u)(TS) At 0136Z, 17 November, USCINCEUR instructed CINCUSAFE that after political clearance was available and aircraft clearances processed the DRAGON ROUGE operation would be handled in two packages; i. e., assault aircraft carrying the paratroops and support aircraft with the refueling units, rations, tents and cots, etc.⁷⁶

(u)(TS) Support aircraft need not pass through the assault on-load point at Kleine-Brogel and therefore were not limited by the darkness arrival restriction applicable to the assault aircraft leaving from Kleine-Brogel. Deployment speed of support aircraft through Spain to Ascension therefore could be regulated to minimize the density through en route stops. To relieve the load on Moron and avoid an apparent density of operations, CINCUSAFE might consider an option of using en route bases in Spain such as Torrejon and Rota for the support aircraft.⁷⁷

(u)(TS) A Joint State/Defense message of 17 November (received by USCINCEUR at 0337Z) stated that the revised operational requirement for DRAGON ROUGE eliminated the use of Las Palmas by the C-130Es carrying the troops. The slower support aircraft which carried equipment still would utilize Torrejon and also Las Palmas.⁷⁸

(u)(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff at 0458Z, 17 November, approved USCINCEUR Special Operations Plan 319/64 for DRAGON ROUGE but informed the US European commander that execution of the move from Ascension to Kamina would be directed by separate JCS orders. When such execution was directed by the United States and Belgian governments, the final decision as to "go-no-go" from Kamina to the objective would rest with the Belgian assault commander. Withdrawal for the C-130s was to be planned via Ascension since Wheelus, in Libya, would not be used unless approved specifically by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁷⁹

(u)(TS) The American Ambassador in Brussels informed USCINCEUR (1710Z, 17 November) that the Government of Belgium had no intention of using the paratroopers for other than rescue of the foreign nations. Foreign Minister Spaak also thought it desirable for the US C-130s to airlift Belgian forces from Stanleyville as soon as the evacuation was completed. He had requested, therefore, that USCINCEUR send planners to Brussels as soon as possible to modify the plan for the above purpose and to engage in further contingency planning for other areas.⁸⁰

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(U)TS USCINCEUR on the same day (1745Z) received a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send two planners to Brussels to participate in further contingency planning. CINCSTRIKE was instructed to send one planner, and both USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE were instructed that no reference was to be made to any United States unilateral plans for the Congo. No indications would be given to the Belgians at any time that the United States was planning to or would commit US ground forces to the Congo.⁸¹

(U)TS Within the basic USCINCEUR DRAGON ROUGE plan of 14 November CINCUSAFE was given the task of assuming overall mission responsibility for the Congo operation. He also would designate the airlift force commander for the conduct of the en route airlift support operations described within the plan (Appendix A).⁸²

(U)S On Saturday evening, 14 November, after his return from Brussels, Lt Colonel J. C. Gray, USAFE representative on the DRAGON ROUGE planning team, called Headquarters 322d Air Division by secure line with the information that a major operation was impending. Arrangements were made at the same time for the Commander of the 322d Air Division, the Director of Operations, and the Commander of 322d Air Division Detachment 1 to meet with USAFE Operations personnel for a briefing at Rhein-Main Air Base on the afternoon of 15 November 1964.⁸³

(U)S Severe weather delayed aircraft movement in Europe, and the meeting at Rhein-Main was adjusted to 16 November. At 1100Z, 15 November, USCINCEUR advised the 322d that Special Operations Plan 319/64 was en route by automobile; it arrived at Chateauroux at 1605Z and was reviewed immediately by the commander and key staff personnel. The designated airlift commander was ordered to Chateauroux from Evreux Air Base and arrived⁸⁴ at 1830Z to review the basic plan and discuss its operational concept.

(U)S Preparatory actions initiated by the 322d Air Division included (1) placing personnel to be deployed on a four-hour alert, (2) advising Detachment 1 at Evreux Air Base to expedite maintenance on "E" model C-130 aircraft to provide a maximum alert posture, (3) changing theater airlift missions scheduled for "E" model C-130 aircraft to "A" model C-130 aircraft, and (4) instructing "E" model aircraft away from home station to expedite their return. Twenty-four hours' crew duty, minimum

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crew rest, and operating without scheduled loads also were authorized during the same time period by the Commander, 322d Air Division. By Sunday morning, 15 November, the entire "E" model C-130 squadron had returned to Evreux Air Base in full commission and with fuel capability. This had taken place several hours before the 322d had received the Operational Directive.⁸⁵

(u)(s) On 16 November (1000Z) USAFE representatives met at Rhein-Main Air Base with the Commander, 322d Air Division; Director of Operations, 322d Air Division; and the airlift commander. The Commander of the 1602 Air Transport Group and the Commander of the 52d Air Transport Squadron also were present and received briefings on aircraft and personnel alert posture required. A request for approval to move C-124 support aircraft in advance of the mission execution order was denied by USCINCEUR (for security reasons). The basic OPLAN 319 was reviewed, tentative decisions taken, and planning begun for the operation. It was noted that the quality of the original plan was such that only a few points required discussion and clarification. USAFE was tasked in the primary mission with twelve C-130E aircraft, plus a maintenance aircraft and a spare aircraft. (USAFE also was tasked by USCINCEUR to provide a Talking Bird.)⁸⁶

(u)(s) By direction of Brigadier General Dougherty, twenty-five sets of Tactical Commanders' Terrain Analysis Maps (TCTA) were driven to Rhein-Main from USAREUR for delivery to Lt Colonel Gray during these discussions. The maps were distributed to the 322d Air Division (one for each C-130E aircraft commander), with copies later provided to the Belgians. These proved to be most useful during the employment phase of the operations.⁸⁷

(u)(s) The 322d Air Division planners returned to station on 16 November; by that evening the DRAGON ROUGE battle staff of the 322d Air Division was in full operation. Approval had been received from CINCUSAFE to load tents and cots, but approval to preposition aircraft to Evreux for on-load of refueling units again had been denied. Authority to waive crew duty time was requested and actions to augment the C-124 crew begun, while loading of tents and rations at Rhein-Main had been approved. A request to position an aircraft control team into on-load station was refused, however, again for security reasons.⁸⁸

(u)(s) On 17 November, the morning of the day when the primary mission was launched, a representative of the 322d Air Division was sent to Torrejon

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to brief the 1620th Commander and the 16th Air Force on support requirements at Torrejon and Moron. A MATS representative and the 16th AF DCS/OPS also were dispatched to Moron to brief the base commander.⁸⁹

(u)(s) Planning at Evreux, Chateauroux, and Rhein-Main continued. To keep the airlift commander properly informed on the constant flow of classified instructions, it was necessary to run a courier aircraft from Chateauroux to Evreux as KY-9 (secure telephone) capability at Evreux had been discontinued.⁹⁰

(u)(s) At 1235Z, 17 November, USAFE requested the 322d Air Division to obtain normal clearance for Talking Bird through Las Palmas, Canary Islands; and at 1300Z that clearance was so requested through Joint US Military Aid Group Spain (JUSMG), at Torrejon. Clearance was received, and the Talking Bird was airborne to Ascension Island via Las Palmas. After receiving the order from the command duty officer, Headquarters USEUCOM, by secure telephone, at 1500Z USAFE authorized the 322d Air Division to launch the primary mission. Because of short notification, deployment to Kleine-Brogel began slightly off schedule, the first C-130E being airborne at 1655Z.⁹¹

Supplementary Rescue Operations, 17-21 November

(u)(s) With the departure of the DRAGON ROUGE airlift from Kleine-Brogel to Ascension Island on 17 November, planning for supplemental operations in the Congo continued in Brussels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 November forwarded to the US planning team its new guidance for the conduct of these sessions with the Belgians. The team was informed that no reference would be made to any US unilateral plans for the Congo nor would any indication be given at any time that the United States was planning to or would commit forces to the Congo. Every effort should be made, however, to insure that Belgian planning provided for the expeditious rescue and evacuation of United States citizens held as hostages by the rebels. Details also should be worked out at these sessions for the withdrawal of the Belgian battalion from Stanleyville and its earliest redeployment to Belgium in the DRAGON ROUGE airlift.

(u)(s) Operations therefore would be planned, as desired by the Belgians, for the rescue or protection of foreigners in other areas in

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rebel territory such as the towns of Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa. It should be understood clearly that the planning did not commit the United States in any way to provision or employment of US forces for these additional operations.⁹²

(U) (TS) The supplemental plan (Appendix B), based on combined planning sessions with the Belgians on 18 and 19 November, was submitted by USCINCEUR to the JCS on 21 November. Under "Mission" was outlined the plan for an assault and evacuation airlift in support of Belgian paratroop attacks on rebel forces in Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa or other objective areas as might be designated. These assaults were designed to secure the airfields at Bunia and Paulis and secure the city of Watsa. The assaults would locate and liberate non-Congolese residents held hostage by rebel forces in these areas and escort these foreign hostages to evacuation points from whence they could be evacuated safely to Leopoldville for further dispatch.⁹³

(U) (TS) The Bunia assault concept (nickname, DRAGON BLANC) was considered by the planners to be the prime target area because of the number of hostages reputedly confined at Mongbwalu, just north of the city. Bunia had a 6,000-foot, hard-surface runway (currently obstructed by oil drums) which would permit the air-landing of motorized equipment and rapid evacuation of hostages via air once it was secured and cleared. If only one company-sized attack were mounted from Stanleyville the planners felt that it should be against the airfield and city of Bunia. This assault would be conducted a minimum of 48 hours after the DRAGON ROUGE drop at Stanleyville if additional parachutes and jeeps were available.⁹⁴

(U) (TS) The Paulis assault concept (nickname, DRAGON NOIR) was given second priority in the plan because of a concentration of hostages in this area and a capability to air drop personnel on the airfield. There also existed a possibility of air-landing armored and radio jeeps in a sequence identical to the assault concept of Bunia. With the known factors of airfield condition, rail and road access, and rebel deployment, a Paulis airborne/air-landed operation might be feasible. A sufficient number of parachutes (estimated at 200) and six jeeps (four armored and two radio) therefore should be provided from Belgium to take advantage of this possibility.⁹⁵

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(U)(TS) The Watsa assault concept (nickname, DRAGON VERT) was based on the fact that a group of male hostages (women and children reportedly had been moved to the Bunia area) were in considerable danger of reprisal actions. It was not possible to conduct air-landed operations since the airport was only 2,400 feet in length, with an earthen runway and a 3,000-foot elevation. An airborne assault would require the air drop of personnel and mechanized equipment plus a continuing aerial resupply. An immediate hostage evacuation by air also was impossible in that area. ⁹⁶

(U)(TS) Since the planners judged that a completely air-dropped assault with vehicles probably would not be feasible, an alternative course of action to liberate the hostages at Watsa would be to provide a sufficient number of three-ton Belgian lorries to the Bunia assault company and thus permit an overland movement to Watsa (approximately 125 miles). After Bunia had been assaulted and secured, the Bunia company reinforced by a platoon from Stanleyville could send a force to Watsa by lorry. With a mobile column en route to Watsa, a personnel air drop then might be conducted on Watsa to secure the town, liberate hostages, and await the column for evacuation via lorry to the air-head at Bunia. A capability of aerial resupply for the lorry-transported element by C-130E aircraft would be established at Kamina or Stanleyville and be available as required. ⁹⁷

(U)(TS) Supplemental planning also established an agreed concept for the redeployment of the Belgian battalion. In-country recovery first would be to Kamina Air Base. Here the battalion could be maintained with minimum adverse political effects and exposure to urban areas. Upon request of the paratroop commander, following the liberation and evacuation of hostages, this in-country recovery would be effected by JTFLEO from whatever dispersal areas the paratroop battalion had entered. After all elements had been recovered to Kamina, the administrative airlift for Belgian paratroop personnel whenever possible would be accomplished by Sabena Charter. Redeployment to Belgium would commence on request of the Belgian Government. The supplemental plan also established airlift priorities for DRAGON ROUGE and DRAGONS BLANC, NOIR, and VERT; outlined the tasks of "friendly forces"; and established command and control for the entire operation. ⁹⁸

(U)(S) The supplemental plans for DRAGON VERT, DRAGON BLANC, and DRAGON NOIR completed USCINCEUR participation in the initial planning phases. Command of DRAGON ROUGE, and thus responsibility for

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additional planning during the employment phase, was assumed by CINC-STRIKE/CINCMEAFSA at Ascension Island on 20 November, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following observations made by Brigadier General Russell Dougherty, USAF, senior member of the USEUCOM DRAGON ROUGE planning team therefore are most important:⁹⁹

(u)(s) "US participants (in DRAGON ROUGE planning) adopted the role of supporting planners and let the Belgian staff take the lead in determining the operational scheme to be followed. This proved effective and enhanced acceptance of US suggestions.

(u)(s) "The availability of the American Ambassador and his principal staff for informal, succinct consultation was a key factor in expeditious planning with the Belgian General Staff. Because of the diplomatic overtones of the operation and the need for speed of agreement, this was indispensable in obtaining access and in establishing unreserved cooperation from all concerned.

(u)(s) "The technical qualifications of the planning representatives from the Joint Staff, USAFE, and USAREUR were high, thus enabling comprehensive planning without the necessity of seeking detailed information from other sources - an indispensable asset in view of the sensitive nature of the initial planning. It would have been desirable for one planner from USSTRICOM to participate in the 12-13 November planning phase due to the US command relationships among the deployment, redeployment, and execution phases. Planning for the transition of US command authority, even though normal in this operation, could have been facilitated if a CINCSTRIKE representative had participated in the initial combined planning-

(u)(s) "The rapid combined planning accomplished and the harmonious agreements achieved on techniques, doctrine, and equipment handling were possible only because of the extent of previous military association, combined training, and mutual respect of our two military establishments. This was an excellent illustration of the effectiveness and unity of NATO allies, the MAP program, and past cooperative military endeavors involving similar equipment.

(u)(s) "The need for and utility of a single point of decision once a military operation is under way was evident throughout the planning. Since the primary combatant force was Belgian and the US was in a supporting role, it was obvious that ultimate 'go-no-go' decisions should be

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the responsibility of the senior Belgian commander. This is a fundamental point in the combined military operation and has applications throughout the political/military decision-making process. In this operation, once the basic US decision was made to support the Belgian paratroop force, the US could have agreed to let the Belgian Government decide the time of execution, thus eliminating extensive message traffic among various echelons of both governments.

(u)(s) "The necessity for having an authoritative European US military contact point for the Belgian military planners at their national level validated the JCS direction to USEUCOM to participate in this planning, even though execution of the support force was accomplished under the command cognizance of CINCSRIKE. Lacking extensive international communications networks, it was essential for the Belgian military planners to rely on a local US military headquarters for continuous support and coordination. As indicated, CINCSRIKE planning participating was desirable, but could not have eliminated the USEUCOM requirement.

(u)(s) "Having a Joint Staff representative participate in this planning was useful and greatly facilitated subsequent actions and coordination."

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CHAPTER III

COVER PLAN


(U)TS In the first plan for DRAGON ROUGE, published on 14 November 1964, Belgian and American planners both considered too weak the Belgian cover story which had been developed for use in the event of premature compromise or unintentional disclosure. This cover plan presented the operation as a "joint US/Belgian long-range airborne training exercise." Since security was an absolute necessity in a sensitive international operation of this nature, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 November directed USCINCEUR to prepare a cover plan for the preparation and possible subsequent deployment of the C-130 aircraft to Kleine-Brogel, Belgium. A message on the same subject from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador in Brussels on 16 November said that the State Department feared the proposed Belgian cover story was so transparent that it might "blow" the security of the whole operation. Alternate proposals therefore were being forwarded, and it was believed vital that an agreed position be reached before a cover story could be used. 100

(U)TS USCINCEUR, in answer to the JCS message of 15 November, forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposed cover plan for DRAGON ROUGE at 2055Z on 16 November. As set forth in the original planning of 14 November, maximum use of darkness was to be made in originating and staging this operation. The basic cover story would be that this constituted a "no-notice strategic mobility exercise, details of which were classified." US and Belgian participation would be admitted only if Belgian involvement were discovered. All requests for additional information must be referred to Headquarters USEUCOM. No participating military personnel, other than those having an absolute need to know, would be told the true purpose of the operation until after the arrival of the force at Ascension Island, and then only on receipt of the order to proceed beyond Ascension. During the intervening period participating personnel were to be told that the operation was a classified mobility exercise involving Belgian troops. If the stay at Ascension were prolonged beyond crew rest time, this delay would be explained as an exercise at "bare base existence" after a long over-water flight. 101

(U)TS Troops therefore were to be confined at all stops to those areas over which security could be maintained; this would include staying in the aircraft, if necessary. Routing was not to be divulged except when it

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became absolutely necessary to file flight plans. Security at Kleine-Brogel rested primarily with the Belgian Government, while the US held primary responsibility at Moron, Spain.

(U)(TS) If a diversion were required en route the aircraft commander might divulge his takeoff point and next destination but not reveal the fact that he was part of a larger operation. His explanation would be that "he was on a classified training exercise."

(U)(TS) A delay at Ascension again would be explained, with British cooperation, as a strategic mobility and bare base existence exercise, and no other information was to be divulged. Since all further details were classified, no unauthorized or unclassified information would leave Ascension Island.

(U)(TS) The Belgian Government held primary responsibility for the security of the operation at Kamina, or in the Congo, but the US airlift commander was to insure the maintenance of maximum security by all US personnel involved, and would keep at a minimum all contact with personnel outside the operation. ¹⁰²

(U)(S) In a commentary prepared by the Deputy Director of J-3 Division, Headquarters USEUCOM, it was stated that a timely surprise attack within a matter of days was fundamental to the safety of the hostages and to the effectiveness of the lightly armed battalions. This factor generally precluded extensive cover and deception planning with multiple governments and agencies. ¹⁰³


(U)(S) With this in mind, Belgian and US military planners had rejected the concepts of prior force dispersal, fictitious flight plans, or complicated deception devices: instead, military discipline of the forces involved would be used to prevent unintentional leaks. As demonstrated in the cited plan, mission planning by the combined US/Belgian team was carried out on the basis of maximum use of darkness, remote base areas, avoidance of public areas, and reliance on moving the force rapidly to Ascension Island with a minimum of rest. ¹⁰⁴

(U)(TS) The Secretary of State informed USCINCEUR at 2343Z, 16 November, that the basic US/Belgian decision to order the paradrop from a prepositioned location at Ascension had not been taken, but the State Department was considering possible cover stories, including a false flight plan. This would be sent as soon as possible, and USCINCEUR was

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instructed that his approach to the Government of Spain for base and over-flight arrangements should include a request for Spanish cooperation with a cover plan. The civilian nature of the Las Palmas base made this a particularly serious security problem, if the paratroopers were to deplane during the refueling stop. Close Spanish cooperation to maintain minimum visibility thus would be needed, and USCINCEUR was requested to obtain Spanish views on necessary security measures at Las Palmas. ¹⁰⁵

(4)(S) USCINCEUR at 0250Z on 17 November received from the Department of State its proposals concerning the DRAGON ROUGE cover story. In view of the time problem, since the departure of the mission was scheduled for that evening, this message requested that the State Department be informed as soon as possible by telephone what the reactions of the several addressees were to the cover concept. There was no indication on the message of concurrence by the JCS, however, nor were they among the addressees. ¹⁰⁶

(4)(S) The declared purpose of the State Department cover plan was to reduce to a minimum the possibility that Stanleyville would hear and believe stories of DRAGON ROUGE. It was proposed, therefore, that Belgian paratroop cover stories and US airlift cover stories be completely unrelated. All stories should be confined to answering questions. If rumors persisted, the several US agencies involved must stick to the agreed story while attempting to introduce additional elements of confusion. ¹⁰⁷

(4)(S) It was proposed that six or more British transports land and depart from Kleine-Brogel in the daylight hours preceding DRAGON ROUGE to lay the basis for a story that Belgian paratroopers were engaged in a joint training exercise with the British in a European locale. If time were too short to permit the British flights to take place on the 17th, it was felt in Washington that the cover plan still should be used unsupported. It also was believed that the details should be worked out directly between the British and Belgians on an urgent basis. ¹⁰⁸

(4)(S) As to the basic airlift, the State Department proposed to say that the C-130s were departing Kleine-Brogel for England and thus provide a basis for a false flight plan from the United Kingdom via Spain, to Ascension Island, as a further cover story for C-130s flying electronic equipment from the United Kingdom to Ascension. ¹⁰⁹

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(U)(S) The C-130s were not to land in the United Kingdom, however, but would proceed from Kleine-Brogel to Spain. This of course would require cooperation on false stories by the governments concerned. For example, the C-130s might file a plan from Evreux Air Base, France, for an air base in the United Kingdom but in reality stop at Kleine-Brogel. It was suggested that the United Kingdom file for the next stop after Kleine-Brogel, as if the aircraft actually had been in the United Kingdom. Exact details of clearance were left to USCINCEUR, in coordination with the United Kingdom, when the United States and Belgium came to an agreement in this matter. ¹¹⁰

(U)(TS) The American Embassy, Brussels, in a message received at 1341Z, 17 November, informed USCINCEUR that the reaction of M. Davignon (of the Belgian Foreign Office) to the State Department cover story was good. His only question had been whether the United Kingdom would be able to provide the subject six flights before the departure of the paratroops that same night. M. Davignon also believed that M. Spaak would approve the concept and would discuss the cover story with the British at 1030 that morning; the French ambassador would be "clued in" by M. Spaak at 11 o'clock. ¹¹¹

(U)(TS) USCINCEUR at 1350Z informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with information to the Secretary of State; the American Embassies in London, Leopoldville, Brussels, and Madrid; and CINCSRIKE) that considerable conflict existed between the USCINCEUR cover plan of 16 November and the State Department plan. It was pointed out that only a limited time existed for planning with the countries involved. Flight plans for the movement phase of DRAGON ROUGE already had been filed, but a political decision as yet had not been received. Since the time element for processing and approval of valid flight clearances now had become critical, it was considered that the portion of the State Department plan which called for a false flight plan of C-130s from Kleine-Brogel to the United Kingdom was impractical. Any attempt to execute this planned deception, in USCINCEUR opinion, might compromise US intentions more than no cover at all because of the critical time factor and the number of agencies or governments involved.

(U)(TS) In view of that critical time factor for the execution movement phase, USCINCEUR requested expeditious action from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the USCINCEUR cover plan of 16 November and on the necessary political clearances. ¹¹²

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(U)S Between 1500 and 1530Z, 17 November, the DRAGON ROUGE action officer at Headquarters USEUCOM received a telephone call from the Assistant J-3 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who advised him that USEUCOM should plan to follow the provisions of the USCINCEUR cover plan. It was stated in the same call that discussions still continued concerning the possibility of doing part of the State Department cover plan. A message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, received at 1644Z, validated this call.¹¹³

(U)S On 17 November at 1700Z, the action officer at Headquarters USEUCOM again received a call from the JCS (NMCC), with information that the State Department cover plan should be followed from Kleine-Brogel onward. The State Department was working through its channels, and the American Embassy in London would call Headquarters USEUCOM shortly to give a point of contact. The action officer for this headquarters was instructed to prepare for the contact the necessary information which would allow him to file the false flight plans involved.¹¹⁴

(U)TS At approximately 1745Z the American Embassy, London, called and advised the unified headquarters that the British point of contact was the British Air Attache in Paris who had been briefed fully on the plan and would know exactly what to do.

(U)TS The Headquarters USEUCOM action officer made repeated attempts to make contact with the British Air Attache, who was not available immediately either at his home or office, while the Assistant Attache knew nothing of DRAGON ROUGE. It also proved impossible to establish contact again with the proper person in the American Embassy in London and thus obtain another British contact. NMCC therefore was advised by telephone at 1820Z, and guidance was requested. At 1830Z NMCC directed that take-off from Kleine-Brogel be held until further guidance was received. The USAFE Command Post, when so informed by Headquarters USEUCOM, was able to reach the airlift commander at Kleine-Brogel at 1858Z (using uncontrolled commercial telephone as the best and quickest channel) with orders to stop the flow - no reasons given. The first aircraft was recalled as it taxied for takeoff, while the inbound flow from Evreux continued.¹¹⁵

(U)TS The British Air Attache already had called from his home at 1850Z. He was not well informed on the DRAGON ROUGE plan and apparently knew nothing about filing any false flight plans for aircraft, but said that he would call London and request clarification. The Air Attache did know that he was to instruct the British Air Traffic Control System to treat false flight plans as if they were real. The information concerning the British contact was

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passed immediately by telephone to NMCC who then asked how long the aircraft could hold at Kleine-Brogel and still meet the darkness arrival and departure requirement in Moron. This was relayed to Command Post USAFE, which queried the airlift commander at 1933Z; his reply was 2 plus 40 hours. USAFE informed the action officer at Headquarters USEUCOM who promptly relayed this to NMCC. ¹¹⁶

(U)TS At 1945Z, 17 November, NMCC called the unified headquarters with the following instructions: Headquarters USEUCOM was to insure that false flight plans were filed from the destination base in England (Mildenhall) to Moron, Spain. On receipt of confirmation that these false flight plans had been introduced into the British Air Traffic Control System, and only on receipt of such confirmation, the DRAGON ROUGE airlift would be launched from Kleine-Brogel to Moron. ¹¹⁷

(U)TS The action officer at Headquarters USEUCOM called the US base commander of Mildenhall Air Base at 1955Z and requested his cooperation in a matter which could not be divulged on the telephone. The base commander was asked to file the flight plans with his base operations and notify the unified headquarters by return call when these were introduced into the British Air Traffic Control System. NMCC telephoned Headquarters USEUCOM immediately after this call and asked, "How do you propose to take care of the log from Kleine-Brogel to Mildenhall?" ¹¹⁸

(U)TS The USAFE Command Post was called by the action officer, Headquarters USEUCOM (2020Z), with instructions to file false flight plans from Kleine-Brogel to Mildenhall. Since the latest launch time from Kleine-Brogel of 2050Z was approaching, the action officer notified NMCC that confirmation from the US base commander in Mildenhall had not been received. Unless instructed to the contrary, USCINCEUR therefore planned to launch on schedule, without receipt of confirmation that the false flight plans had been introduced into the British ATC system. NMCC agreed and USAFE was given clearance by telephone to launch the aircraft at approximately 2040Z, 17 November. ¹¹⁹

(U)TS At 2050Z USAFE advised the airlift commander that the flow could be resumed subject to the following requirements: Each aircraft was to file two flight plans. One would be to Moron, Spain, via Mildenhall and around France, which was not to be flown; and the second would be standard routing over France. This being accomplished, the first aircraft was airborne at 2130Z. Confirmation from the US base commander at

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Mildenhall that false flight plans had been introduced into the British ATC system was not received at Headquarters USEUCOM until 2115Z, fifteen minutes before final launching.¹²⁰

(u)(s) As the airlift commander points out in his report, the poor communications with USAFE from Kleine-Brogel was a definite hardship. He commented further that the hold and departure from Belgium being without incident was "an excellent demonstration of leadership and crew discipline."¹²¹

(u)(s) The DRAGON ROUGE action officer at USAFE stated, in an interview with the Command Historian, in his opinion it was impossible to deploy in peacetime Europe that many aircraft into a non-American base, load troops, etc., and hide the fact of such an operation taking place. Considering the crowded air lanes of Europe, it was necessary always to report a flight plan to the proper authorities. With the two flight plans demanded by the State Department Cover Plan, fourteen aircraft arrived in Kleine-Brogel and twenty-eight apparently were registered out. The rationale escaped him.¹²²

(u)(s) In discussing this subject in his commentary on DRAGON ROUGE, Brigadier General Dougherty (Deputy Director, J-3, HQ USEUCOM) pointed out that "The resultant confusion caused by these completely conflicting plans created uncertainty and fear of major compromise of the operation to the extent that the unified headquarters requested the JCS to resolve the direction of the cover and deception activities. . . . The effect of these two obstacles; i. e., confusion over Cover and Deception Plans, and last-minute scramble for diplomatic flight clearances, was to delay planned departure of the C-130s for 60 minutes from Evreux; 2 hours and 30 minutes from Kleine-Brogel."¹²³

(u)(s) He further adds in his comments that "Cover and deception planning - through vital to an operation such as this - easily can be counter-productive if introduced too late or accomplished in an environment that invites exposure. Under the circumstances of this operation the attempts at deception almost compromised the cover and confused our own forces as well as our allies."¹²⁴

(u)(s) Further comment on the cover plan is found in a report which the USAFE intelligence representative assigned to DRAGON ROUGE transmitted to USCINCEUR on 11 January 1965. This states his impression that the 17 November radio announcements in Belgium of the paracommandos' departure for an "ACE air mobility exercise" were not successful as a cover.

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According to many of the Belgian paratroops assigned to the same C-130E as the intelligence representative en route to Ascension Island, it was the general assumption of the Belgian public at the time of the unit's departure that these troops were to be used in the Congo. ¹²⁵

(u)(s) Comments and recommendations concerning DRAGON ROUGE (see Appendix C) submitted by USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 January state that "the rationale for filing false flight plans is unknown; however, false aircraft clearances cannot be filed without, at the same time, filing live flight plans for the actual route. Air traffic congestion over Western Europe and safety of flight for our own and other aircraft demand that valid flight plans be acted upon by air traffic control agencies. The existence of conflicting cover plans and last-minute direction from the JCS not to proceed until fictitious flight plans called for in the State Department plan were filed, resulted in confusion and a delay in takeoff from Kleine-Brogel." ¹²⁶

Press Reaction

✓ (u)(c) Reuters, in La Dernière Heure (Brussels) of 17 November, carried a denial by the Belgian Ministry of Defense that Belgian paratroops were being sent to the Congo to rescue foreign nationals held hostage in Stanleyville. The Reuters story said that the Belgian Ministry of Defense, while confirming that a long-distance NATO exercise for Belgian paratroops was under way, denied that the ultimate destination of the men was continental Africa. The MOD statement explained that the exercise, similar to ones held in Greece and Norway, involved surprise alert, embarkation, and long-range transport. On the basis of this story, Secretary of State Rusk instructed all US addressees to reply by pointing to the Belgian denial and disclaim any further knowledge. ¹²⁷

✓ (u)(c) The London Morning Times (page twelve) on the same day headlined a Belgian troop move as "an exercise" and stated that La Dernière Heure reported Belgian paratroopers on their way to Africa to attempt the rescue of 800 whites, including 500 Belgians, held as hostages in Stanleyville. The same edition said that the Belgian Ministry of Defense, while confirming a current long-distance NATO exercise, denied that the ultimate destination of the troops was Africa. ¹²⁸

✓ (u)(c) The American Embassy, London, informed the Secretary of State that the press officers of the British Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense had been instructed to reply to press questioning that the operation

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was a joint US/Belgian exercise for which the United Kingdom had agreed to provide certain requested facilities. 129

(u)(c) In a communique published on 17 November, the Belgian Ministry of Defense said, in part, "Within the range of missions required of the paratroops are operations like those which have been carried out many times in Greece and Norway, within the framework of NATO. The exercise which began today is a training one, consisting of an alert, disembarking, and transport of long duration. To insure a realistic character, the exercise has to be launched by surprise. Maintenance of secrecy is an equally important element." 130

(u)(s) USCINCEUR on 18 November informed the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, USAFE, the American Embassy in Brussels, CINCSTRIKE, and Commander US Joint Task Force Leopoldville that parallel articles had appeared in the morning edition of Agence France Presse and France Soir. These both said that a mystery existed over the movements of Belgian paratroop commandos who had left their country. A Belgian Foreign Ministry speaker, however, had stated categorically only that morning that there was no question of those troops' being sent to the Congo to save the European hostages held at Stanleyville. The Belgian Ministry of Defense had said that the paratroops were moved within the framework of a NATO exercise and, according to these articles, refused to give any information about the destination of that force. These newspapers stated that according to a "reliable source," the troops did not leave in the direction of Africa. To insure a maximum security for the operation, American aircraft being employed were using a remote air base at Limbourg, Belgium. 131

(u)(s) According to this USCINCEUR message, the Belgian press, on the morning of the 18th, favorably reported the Defense Ministry's denial that the paratroops had not been sent to Stanleyville and was pleased that no interference would occur in Congo affairs. Only La Libre Belgique (Catholic Conservative) regretted that it was not thought desirable to send troops to protect the Europeans at Stanleyville. This paper wondered how much longer Belgium would leave its nationals at the mercy of the rebels and whether nothing was to be done to rescue the hostages in the immediate future. All other Belgian papers, from moderate to extreme left, emphasized, as in the case of La Cite (Christian Democrat), that the Defense Ministry communique happily put an end to rumors circulating around a military exercise without political significance. 132

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(U)TS By 18 November no queries on the subject had been received by Headquarters USEUCOM or by USAFE, and the unified commander reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a general public interest appeared low. 133

(U)TS The American Embassy, London, dispatched a cable to USCINCEUR (1546Z, 19 November) which said that the London Times had published on November 19 an article dated Brussels, November 18. This headlined "Big Attack on Congo Rebels Imminent; Hopes of Saving 700 Hostages; Belgians Deny They Are Taking Part." The article itself reported that Congolese government forces were preparing to launch a general assault on Stanleyville either Thursday or Friday. The Belgians denied that paratroops had been sent to Africa to rescue the hostages. The troops which were flown from Belgium yesterday (17 November) were taking part in a very secret, long-distance NATO exercise.

(U)TS As of noon London time, 19 November, the American Embassy had received no queries on the subject. 134

(U)TS USCINCEUR, also on 19 November (1835Z), informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense that the SHAPE Deputy PAO had been called by UPI London via UPI Paris during that afternoon. Several questions were asked concerning the NATO AIRCENT Air Defense Exercise, CO-OP, 64/3, which had been announced by a press release on 15 November. The exercise was scheduled for 17 November but had been cancelled by AIRCENT on 16 November. This routine exercise was to involve several NATO nations, including Belgium and the United States. Among the questions posed was one asking if Ascension Island were involved in the exercise. UPI was advised by SHAPE Deputy PAO that Ascension was far out of the NATO area. The point was not pressed, but this was the first such specific reference made by local media. 135

(U)TS The Associated Press of Paris on 19 November also queried SHAPE in regard to a reference concerning US aircraft which had appeared in an Agence France Presse release of 18 November. AP Paris was advised that no knowledge existed of such aircraft. 136

(U)TS The Information Office at USAFE (Wiesbaden, Germany) received a query at 1900 (local), 19 November, from AP Brussels via AP Bureau Chief, Frankfurt, concerning a report that US aircraft had been used to lift Belgian paratroopers to Ascension Island. The basis of the report was alleged

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to be a Brussels newspaper whose identity was not known in USAFE. Upon denial of any knowledge of such a lift, the Associated Press stated that SHAPE would be asked the same question.

(u)(TS) On the same date the British agreed to follow US guidance in replying to any questions concerning the operations. This course of action would be adopted instead of their earlier proposed statement that the movement was a joint US/Belgian exercise, with the United Kingdom providing certain facilities. ¹³⁷

(u)(TS) The Secretary of State on 19 November sent specific guidance on the release of information to the American Embassies in Brussels and Leopoldville, USCINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE. In this he outlined what official spokesmen for the Departments of State and Defense had been instructed to say in response to Reuters and other reports of Belgian paratroop deployment. ¹³⁸

(u)(TS) The Department of State spokesman was instructed in this paper that if questioned on any aspect of a reported movement in the European/African area of US planes capable of providing airlift support for paratroopers, he should say that this was a military matter and questions must be directed to the Department of Defense. These questioners should be referred to DOD only with regard to the US aircraft; questions concerning the movement of Belgian troops were to be raised with Belgian officials.

(u)(TS) If questioned about (1) the Belgian MOD reference to a long-distance NATO exercise for Belgian paratroops as reported by Reuters, (2) a reported NATO denial that any such NATO exercise was taking place, or (3) the deployment of Belgian troops anywhere in the world, the Department of Defense spokesman should say that this was a matter to be raised with Belgian officials.

(u)(TS) If the Department of Defense were asked if an exercise involving a United States lift of Belgian paratroopers was taking place, the spokesman should say that he would look into the matter. (This would be a stall to give time for an answer to be developed.)

(u)(TS) If the questioner specifically wished to know any aspect of a reported lift of Belgian troops to Africa in US planes, the answer must be that no US planes carrying Belgian troops had been deployed to any point for any purpose.

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(U)TS) If the unlikely question were presented about the presence of American planes in the Canaries or Ascension Island, the Department of Defense spokesman should state that American planes regularly used fields in that area. Flights often were connected with US tracking activities or military aid purposes. If questioned on any other subject, the DOD spokesman was to say he would look into the matter.

(U)TS) If a more explicit question were asked of any US official outside Washington which reflected a relatively precise knowledge of DRAGON ROUGE, that official should respond that he had no comment.

(U)TS) All US civilian and military officials who were authorized to deal with members of the press by chiefs of missions or military commanders should respond as provided in the above guidance to any questions raised concerning the current operation.

(U)TS) USCINCEUR, at 1700Z on 20 November, informed the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that as a result of a story in the Antwerp press and in France Soir, both of which made reference to an airlift of Belgian paratroopers by twelve American aircraft based at Chateauroux, Headquarters US European Command, had been queried by Associated Press and the Columbia Broadcasting System. These agencies were informed that the unified headquarters had no knowledge of any such movement. The Associated Press representative admitted to the PAO USEUCOM that SHAPE and Chateauroux had been queried on the same subject, with negative results.

(U)TS) PAO USEUCOM considered that a number of news agencies apparently had information of the movement in the direction of the Congo. Some doubt might remain as to the current location of the forces involved, but the depth of probing, particularly by the CBS representative, who even commented that he had information C-130s were involved, was most indicative. 139

(U)C) Because of increasing press speculations the Government of Belgium on 20 November released a public announcement concerning the operation. 140

"Following certain rumors concerning the transfer of the First Paratroop Battalions, the spokesman for the Department of State has made the following statement:

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"With the aid of American planes, the First Paratroop Battalion has been transported to Ascension Island where it is quartered with the authorization of the British Government."

"The Belgian and American Governments have considered it their duty in view of the threat to their nationals and civilians in general in the region of Stanleyville, to take preparatory measures in order to be able to effect, if necessary, a humanitarian rescue operation. In the present situation, therefore, this is only a precautionary measure. The Belgian Government firmly hopes to see the Stanleyville authorities safeguard the lives of our nationals who are there."

(u)(c) The United States Department of State on the same day issued a supporting background statement and instructed all embassy political sections at the same time through State Department Circular 980 that they should contact the highest available officials in their respective countries immediately and present the necessary information. Circular 980 advised its addressees to stress that the operation was strictly a precautionary, nonpolitical one which it was hoped would not be used. It also was humanitarian and limited to the evacuation of hostages. The forces would be withdrawn as soon as the evacuation was completed. If the move were made, it was hoped that this would be at the request of the Congo Government and after clear evidence of the imminence of disorder and killing in Stanleyville. The United States was providing only airlift and in fact had agreed to a Stanleyville request for discussions with rebel representatives concerning the safe conduct of hostages. Such a meeting had been proposed under Prime Minister Kenyatta's auspices in Nairobi on 21 November.¹⁴¹

(u)(c) The text of the United States background statement, released at 1730Z on 20 November, reads as follows:¹⁴²

(u)(c) "You should realize that there have been repeated messages from Stanleyville indicating the rebel desire to negotiate; and we are presently, as you know, trying to engage them in discussion. This is already a sensitive situation with the safety of a large number of people involved, and it would serve no useful purpose to engage in speculative rumors that suggest an attack on Stanleyville is imminent. No such decision has been taken, and nothing said here would in fact leave such an impression. It would of course require highest level consideration for so serious a decision."

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(U) In a press release dated 24 November, the Department of State announced that "the United States Government has just received information that a short time ago - early morning of November 24 - in the Congo a unit of Belgian paratroopers, carried by United States military transport planes, landed at Stanleyville in the Congo. This landing has been made (1) with the authorization of the Government of the Congo, (2) in conformity with our adherence to the Geneva conventions, and (3) in exercise of our clear responsibility to protect US citizens under the circumstances existing in the Stanleyville area."143

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CHAPTER IV
COMMAND AND CONTROL

(U)TS) The operational planning outlined in Chapter II, which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 November 1964, established the following concepts for command and control of the DRAGON ROUGE operation: The State Department considered DRAGON ROUGE to be a Belgian operation, with US logistical support. Once execution by the US and Belgian Governments was ordered, final decision as to "go-no-go" and operational timing from Kamina, in the Congo, to the objective area at Stanleyville would rest with the Belgian assault commander.¹⁴⁴

(U)TS) En route decisions concerning the mission were to be the responsibility of the airlift commander, but the decision concerning the actual drop would be made by the parachute commander. At Kamina (or Ascension Island) USCINCEUR was to pass operational command of the assault airlift to CINCSRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, who would retain control through DRAGON ROUGE and other still unplanned contingencies.¹⁴⁵

(U)TS) CINCSRIKE, in a message dated 17 November to the Commander of US Joint Task Force Leopoldville (COMUSJTFLEO), gave him operational control of the assault airlift force if that were passed at Kamina. Execution of the forward movement to Kamina from Ascension, however, would be directed by separate JCS orders, if such a move were required. The mission of the C-130Es in support of the paratroop operation would be completed when "all that was to be delivered was delivered and the evacuation of civilians was completed to the satisfaction of US and Belgian political authorities in the country." CINCSRIKE/CINCMEAFSA would return operational command of the assault airlift force to USCINCEUR upon its redeployment from Leopoldville. The support C-124s would remain under USCINCEUR command throughout the operation.¹⁴⁶

(U)TS) A message from CINCSRIKE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 November (0041Z) noted that in USCINCEUR planning for DRAGON ROUGE two courses of action had been considered: (1) a launch from Kamina if operations proceeded according to plan, and (2) a launch from Ascension if an emergency arose which necessitated calling the force forward directly to Stanleyville. USCINCEUR operational planning had provided for passage of operational command of participating US elements at Kamina. It also had stated that the passage of command might be desirable at Ascension.

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(u)TS To simplify command and commander communications arrangements to the maximum extent, CINCSTRIKE recommended that participating US elements be passed to the operational command of CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA on closure at Ascension Island, for further operations in accordance with the plan for DRAGON ROUGE. USCINCEUR concurred with these CINCSTRIKE recommendations at 1133Z, 18 November, but emphasized that an assault launch from Ascension was considered operationally unsound.¹⁴⁷

(u)TS The American Embassy, Brussels, informed the Secretary of State on 18 November that the Belgians wished to initiate DRAGON ROUGE following a recommendation by Colonel Vanderwalle, whose column started its march to Stanleyville on 19 November. When Colonel Vanderwalle advised the Belgian Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo, M. de Kerchove, that DRAGON ROUGE should be launched, M. de Kerchove in turn would inform the American Ambassador, Mr. Godley, who would send a flash message to Washington and the Government of Belgium via US communications channels and the American Embassy in Brussels. This would state that Ambassador de Kerchove was sending the code word "Punch," recommending that DRAGON ROUGE be launched. If the US Government concurred, the code word "Punch" then would be sent through US channels to the Belgian paratroopers at Ascension, with appropriate instructions to the US airlift commander to carry out the onward movement of DRAGON ROUGE.¹⁴⁸

(u)TS The answer from the US Secretary of State to Brussels and CINCMEAFSA, dated 19 November, did not question the Belgian decision to delegate authority to Ambassador de Kerchove for activation of DRAGON ROUGE and accepted his notification to Ambassador Godley of the code word "Punch" as constituting Belgian official decision to effect the DRAGON ROUGE plan. The United States Government, however, reserved the right to make the final decision. The State Department therefore proposed the following "Go" procedure, in order "to preclude misunderstanding or confusion in possibly fast-moving circumstances":¹⁴⁹

1. US channels would be used exclusively for necessary consultations and communications of decisions.
2. Without questioning the Government of Belgium's delegation to the Belgian Ambassador at Leopoldville, the procedures outlined below assumed the Belgian "Punch" signal could come either from Brussels or Leopoldville.

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3. If "Go" originated in Leopoldville, the American Embassy would communicate simultaneously to Washington and Brussels both "Punch" and United States recommendations. If the United States Government concurred, the JCS would be informed and would transmit "Punch" and appropriate instructions to the US force commander through military channels. If the US Government did not concur, it would consult with the Government of Belgium immediately.

4. If "Go" originated with the Government of Belgium in Brussels, and if the United States concurred, the US would signal the DRAGON ROUGE force through the JCS, as in 3, above. If the United States did not concur, it would consult Brussels and Leopoldville at once.

5. If "Go" originated in Washington, the US Government would flash Brussels and Leopoldville and accept "Punch" from either, then proceed with "Go" to the DRAGON ROUGE force through the JCS, as in 3, above. If the Government of Belgium or the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville did not concur, the United States would expect the Government of Belgium or the Belgian Ambassador at Leopoldville to consult immediately with the US Government regarding nonconcurrence and reasons. 150

(U)TS) USCINCEUR, at 1335Z on 20 November, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that based on adherence to the agreed drop time of 0400Z on any given day, a Belgian requirement, the execution order from the JCS must be received at Ascension Island no later than 0230Z on D-minus 1 (also 0230 local). This timing was based on the following schedule:

D-minus 1, 0630Z - first takeoff from Ascension; D-minus 1, 1630Z - first landing at Kamina; D-Day, 0100Z - first takeoff from Kamina; D-Day, 0400Z - begin drop at Stanleyville. To keep this schedule, troops must be awakened at 0230Z on D-minus 1 and begin processing to meet the 0630Z takeoff. 151

(U)TS) It also was assumed by USCINCEUR that the Joint Staff would consider necessary processing and transmission time from the execution decision to receipt of the message at Ascension. As USCINCEUR said, the procedures outlined for joint US/Belgian governmental decision to execute the force would require considerable time and must take into account the military execution time requirements outlined above. In broad terms, a drop could be made two days after a national decision was reached. 152

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(U) (TS) At 1457Z, 20 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCSTRIKE and USCINCEUR that operational control of DRAGON ROUGE forces would pass to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA at Ascension Island upon receipt of the message. USCINCEUR, however, would continue to provide support for the forces at Ascension, as required. This information was passed on 20 November by USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, the 322d Air Division, and the DRAGON ROUGE airlift commander.

(U) (TS) The redeployment of C-124 aircraft which had transported cargo in support of DRAGON ROUGE forces was to continue as directed by CINCUSAFE. AARC aircraft deployed would support CINCSTRIKE search and rescue requirements in accordance with the search and rescue (SAR) agreement between USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 153

(U) (TS) CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA at 0208Z, 21 November, dispatched a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that he had assumed conduct of DRAGON ROUGE airlift assault forces, as directed by the JCS. The US-STRICOM liaison officer at Ascension had been designated as operations officer on the staff of COMUSJTFLIO but would remain at Ascension Island until departure of the DRAGON ROUGE force unless otherwise directed. 154

(U) (TS) The American Ambassador in Brussels wired the Secretary of State at 0450Z, 21 November, that Foreign Minister Spaak had informed him that the United States and Belgian Ambassadors to the Congo had recommended immediate dispatch of Belgian paratroopers from Ascension Island to Kamina. Mr. Spaak fully endorsed these recommendations, since he felt that the now-public knowledge of the presence of Belgian paratroopers at Ascension might endanger the safety of the foreign community at Stanleyville through dangerous rebel repercussions. It was felt by the Ambassador that Mr. Spaak also might be apprehensive of efforts by Algeria and other extremist African states, with full Soviet support, to begin a campaign through the United Nations, or elsewhere, to block the movement of the paratroops to the Congo. Given all these circumstances, Mr. Spaak had urged that a decision to move the troops from Ascension Island to Kamina be made at once so that they could be moved immediately to Kamina and be ready for use if needed to save foreign hostages. 155

(U) (S) The US Secretary of State (0765Z, 21 November) informed the American Ambassadors in Brussels and Leopoldville, CINCSTRIKE, and USCINCEUR that an emergency top-level meeting had been called to consider

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the Spaak recommendations. Preliminary Washington reactions were that deployment to Kamina, unless quickly followed by deployment to Stanleyville, would cause a loss of surprise and promote the danger of panic among rebels in the target area. This could outweigh any advantage gained in reaction time. Any security leak at Kamina also could result in a rebel decision to move hostages from the town and thus complicate the rescue. With the rapid approach on Stanleyville of the Vanderwalle column, it was believed that dangers to the hostages would be minimized by the closest possible coordination with that column. ¹⁵⁶

Employment Phase

(u)TS The JCS, at 1721Z on 21 November, ordered CINCSTRIKE to launch the DRAGON ROUGE force to Kamina as soon as possible, with ten-minute intervals between each aircraft. There would be no deployment beyond Kamina until directed by the Joint Chiefs. CINCSTRIKE, in turn, at 1748Z, 21 November, directed COMUSJTFLEO and the commander of the assault airlift force to proceed to the staging base at Kamina and hold. On arrival, however, preparation should be made for the forward movement, but the execution of the assault on Stanleyville still must be subject to final US Government decision. At Kamina, the airlift force would refuel at once and maintain readiness for the assault phase. This was a combined US/Belgian execution message and applied also to the Belgian paratroop commander. ¹⁵⁷

(u)S Arrival at the Kamina base on 22 November was as planned; and the mission was met by Commander, JTFLEO, who assumed operational control for CINCSTRIKE. All aircraft were refueled and final plans for the air assault completed. The CINCSTRIKE commander did not change or modify the concept of operation already agreed upon by the airlift and airborne commanders. ¹⁵⁸

(u)S Both airlift and airborne commanders realized that their current concept of the air assault might be modified after the task force arrived at Kamina or on receipt of more current intelligence. This concept generally followed the USCINCEUR OPLAN. Since guidance indicated that actions at Kamina basically would be directed by the Belgians, the airlift commander concurred in following the proposals of the airborne commander, although several of these constituted slight departures from the original operations plan. It was agreed that weather reconnaissance along the route to the

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objective area was desirable; however, no flight was to approach the objective area where it could be seen or heard. ¹⁵⁹

(u)(s) If a rendezvous with B-26 fighter support was successful 100 miles west of Stanleyville, the fighter aircraft would provide cover for the transports to the objective area. If not successful, the drop aircraft were to continue to that objective area. Fighter aircraft would leave the transport force and make a pass at the airfield approximately one minute prior to the drop. If rebel activity were noted or manned automatic weapons observed, the fighters would open fire. If no enemy activity took place, there would be no firing. The drops would be made unless the airlift commander noted exceptionally hazardous conditions. ¹⁶⁰

(u)(s) If an initial drop were impossible because of rebel automatic weapons fire, the airlift commander would call for more fighter passes. The airlift and airborne commanders agreed on the desirability of dropping on schedule since the element of surprise outweighed intense predrop fighter strikes. ¹⁶¹

(u)(s) It was determined by the airlift and paratroop commanders that the drop zone would be the airfield at Stanleyville, plus the golf course extension. The length was approximately 2850 yards; the width varied from 250 to 350 yards. It also was determined that the approach would be from west to east, with the impact point 150 yards short of the runway. At a point one half the distance down the runway, the aircraft were to start a slight turn in order to take advantage of the golf course. ¹⁶²

(u)(s) The system described in the Operations Plan, of a Belgian "dispatcher" in the cockpit of each aircraft who could give the drop signal, was discarded by mutual consent of the two commanders. This was not normal procedure for either the United States or Belgium and the airborne commander expressed confidence in the USAF method.

(u)(s) Between 19 November and 21 November the airborne force had been retrained in USAF drop procedures and were considered by the two commanders adequately familiar with the C-130 aircraft. Specific details of the drop were as follows: (1) 20 seconds in trail drop; (2) drop altitude - 700 feet; (3) drop air speed - 125 knots; (4) slight left turn when half the distance down the runway in order to take advantage of the golf course; (5) two passes: first pass - as many troops as can be dropped, and second pass - remaining troops and bundles. The second pass would be made as soon as possible after the first. ¹⁶³

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(u)(S) In the air-landing operation the previously dropped Belgian-operated USAF radios would be the primary control for air-landing aircraft. DRAGON control was to be the ground control call sign on a frequency to be coordinated at Kamina. Control for landing was to be on the following order of priority: (1) DRAGON control radio clearance; (2) T-panel on the east end of the runway; (3) two green flares from the town; (4) Dragon 1 (airlift commander orbiting in Chalk 1).

(u)(S) Clearance from Belgian ground control clearance to land would indicate that the airfield was not a target of organized ground fire and that the runway was free of all obstacles, including parachutes. 164

(u)(S) Some command and control confusion apparently had existed in the deployment of Talking Bird. In the opinion of the USAFE intelligence representatives attached to DRAGON ROUGE, the "log jam and out-of-sequence receipt of messages was responsible for the mixup" on the move of Talking Bird from Ascension to Kamina. The CINCSRIKE message which established the USSTRICOM communications concept for DRAGON ROUGE was received late on 20 November. This did not refer to Talking Bird deployment but specified that three C-130 aircraft zone would be assigned to Ascension and two to Leopoldville. On launch of the force, the An/SC-15/K-53 unit at Ascension was to go with it to Kamina and tie back into Leopoldville. While Talking Bird already had come under the operational control of CINCSRIKE on 20 November, it was presumed that Talking Bird would continue at Ascension as link with higher headquarters and a relay point for intelligence information. 165

(u)(S) At 0330Z, 22 November, a STRIKE message (STRJ6-06064) arrived with orders to move the Talking Bird to Kamina. Its date-time group was 21/1658Z, and thus a transmission time that connected closely with the "Go" order of the JCS. This order to move the Talking Bird, sent by Twilight, was validated by STRIKE message 12507, received at 0342Z, 22 November. 166

(u)(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at 1913Z on 23 November, directed CINCSRIKE/USCINCMEDIAFSA to execute Operation Plan 319/64, DRAGON ROUGE. For the Belgian commander the word was "Punch," with US concurrence. H-hour was set at 0400Z, D-Day, on 24 November. The first aircraft was airborne from Kamina at 0045Z; and the preplanned assault began at 0400, exactly on schedule, with the airlift commander

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and 322d staff assistant on Chalk 1 for command and control purposes. At seven miles out a "slow-up" was started. The B-26s, however, did not slow but continued to Stanleyville airport to strafe targets of opportunity. 167

(u)(s) Five C-130s dropped at 0400Z, 20 seconds in trail. Rifle and machine gun/tracer fire was directed at the formation, and several aircraft were hit. The second pass and drop took place at 0407Z. This completed the drop portion of the mission, with several aircraft hit. Chalk 1 acted as command ship for the air-land operation. The Stanleyville runway was covered with gasoline barrels standing on end, plus automobiles and trucks with their wheels removed. Since previous intelligence reports had indicated that such was the case, the Belgian commander had assigned one platoon to clear the runway; this was accomplished by 0445Z.

(u)(s) During this period a dense layer of fog moved in over the area with a ceiling of approximately 200 to 400 feet. In order to exercise command and control, Chalk 1, with the airlift commander on board, was forced to orbit at tree top level, making frequent passes over the runway at 90-degree angles. At 0450Z the first of seven mission aircraft was cleared to land and discharge vehicles and personnel. Chalk 7 was the first air-land aircraft to land. With one aircraft still remaining to land, Chalk 1, the command aircraft, was hit by machine gun fire in the rudder boost package and number 2 fuel tank, forcing its return to Leopoldville. 168

The Supplemental DRAGON NOIR Operation

(u)(s) USCINCEUR comments on DRAGON ROUGE submitted to the JCS on 15 January 1965 state, in reference to the tactics used, that this operation was believed to be the first combat employment of airborne forces in accordance with the TAC-developed "close look" air-drop procedure involving single ship in-trail delivery. The standard one-minute in-trail spacing was modified to twenty seconds for the DRAGON ROUGE operation. Not only did this tactic prove successful, but it also was well adapted to the restricted drop zone available. The airlift commander reported that if the standard formation of Vs in trail had been flown, one or more aircraft would have been lost and the second and third passes might have aborted. 169

(u)(TS) On 25 November the American Embassy, Leopoldville, informed the Secretary of Defense that Colonel Laurent, the Belgian paratroop commander, wished to limit the next phase to an assault on Paulis (DRAGON

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NOIR). He had stated that his force was small, too tired, and had too few parachutes to attempt the Bunia operation (DRAGON BLANC) at the same time. The Paulis mission would entail two companies of Belgian paracommandos and seven of the C-130s. It was planned that the aircraft would arrive at Stanleyville 0100Z and drop at Paulis 0400Z, both on 26 November. 170

(u)(TS) The JCS at 1757Z, 25 November, requested CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA to make all preparations to execute DRAGON NOIR. This included movement of the aircraft to Stanleyville, as necessary, but the authority to execute was to be transmitted by separate JCS messages. The instructions were that the DRAGON NOIR mission was to seize Paulis airfield, evacuate foreign nations as soon as possible, and withdraw. The withdrawal would be covered by the maximum available tactical air support and take place as soon as the Belgian commander considered it to be operationally feasible. All hostages were to be brought to Stanleyville for later onward movement. 171

(u)(TS) The operational plan for DRAGON NOIR outlined by COMUSJTFLEO called for seven planes to carry 256 Belgian paratroopers, with necessary vehicles. This message of 25 November from the JCS specified that the remainder of the Belgian battalion would stay at Stanleyville during the Paulis operation to insure retention of the Stanleyville airfield and provide a ready reserve if necessary. 172

(u)(S) CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA at 2315Z, 25 November, sent to COMUSJTFLEO the order to execute DRAGON NOIR. D-day would be 26 November and H-hour, as planned, 0400Z. 173

(u)(S) The Secretary of State informed the American Ambassador, Leopoldville, on 26 November that the decision to carry out DRAGON NOIR on that date had been taken in concert with the Government of Belgium. It also was agreed at the same time that DRAGON VERT and DRAGON BLANC should not be initiated because of overriding political interests which, both governments agreed, made imperative the fastest possible withdrawal of the DRAGON ROUGE force from the Congo. 174

(u)(S) The seven aircraft designated for the Paulis operation departed Stanleyville on schedule for the fifty-two-minute run to Paulis. The airlift commander and staff assistants again were on board Chalk 1. The objective area was obscured by a low fog, and programmed fighter aircraft therefore were unable to locate the target. Pre-assault strikes thus were not

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accomplished. With only tree tops and house tops barely visible, the first run was over the 4100-foot dirt strip Paulis airfield. This drop was not made, as identification was impossible until too late, the primary drop being accomplished on the second run through a thin fog. Three passes were completed successfully, however, and the fog dissipated rapidly. Bullet damage again was sustained by Chalk 1 and other aircraft. The air-lift commander, as at Stanleyville, orbited the area as control ship. The Belgian command and central team (CCT) was operational at 0420Z, and the order to land was given at approximately 0435Z. The first aircraft off-loaded and departed, sustaining bullet damage. When the CCT was advised of enemy action at the approach end of the runway, landings were discontinued for 15 minutes while the Belgians cleared the area. The mission then was completed, all hostages evacuated, and aircraft returned to Kamina with the two companies of Belgian paracommandos and their vehicles. 175

Command and Control - Redeployment Phase

(U)TS A message from the Department of State to the American Embassies at Brussels and Leopoldville, sent on 25 November, was forwarded on 26 November by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to USCINCSRIKE and USCINCEUR. This said that with the decision to go ahead on DRAGON NOIR, the US Department of State was anxious to assure with the Belgians that the operation at Paulis would be strictly in and out, lasting no more than 24 hours. This time phasing would be subject to overriding military US/Belgian exigencies affecting the safety of forces. The DRAGON NOIR force, however, could not delay under any circumstances its departure from Paulis to permit the Congo National Army to reoccupy the city. The DRAGON NOIR force also would not take any rebel Congolese prisoners, political or otherwise. When the Paulis evacuees were returned to Stanleyville, the DRAGON ROUGE force would deploy immediately to Kamina and within the shortest possible time thereafter, redeploy from Kamina, via Ascension and Las Palmas, to Belgium. 176

(U)TS The American Ambassador in Brussels was asked to confirm this understanding with M. Spaak as soon as possible; but pending his approval, the above would constitute State Department guidance on DRAGON ROUGE redeployment. M. Spaak agreed to these provisions on 26 November. 177

(U)TS USCINCEUR informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State on 26 November that plans were being developed at the unified

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command for the redeployment of DRAGON ROUGE forces to their home bases in Belgium, France, and Germany. It was estimated that this redeployment could begin as early as 27 November. ¹⁷⁸

(u/s) The Joint Chiefs of Staff during the same day (1724Z, 26 November) dispatched a message to CINCS TRIKE/CINCM EAFSA and USCINCEUR that a decision had been made at highest government levels that Operations DRAGON BLANC and VERT would not be conducted, and return of the paratroops to Belgium would be by C-130. This changed the original planning, which had specified that return would be by Sabena charter, when possible. USCINCEUR was instructed in the same message that operational control of redeployment was to be as mutually agreed. ¹⁷⁹

(u/s) USCINCEUR at 2226Z, 26 November, notified CINCUSAFE that the JCS had directed redeployment of DRAGON ROUGE forces from the Congo by C-130. CINCUSAFE also was instructed to assume operational control of redeploying forces upon their departure from Ascension Island. This was validated again on 27 November when the unified commander informed the USAFE command post that USAFE would exercise movement control of the force from Ascension Island to the several European bases. ¹⁸⁰

(u/s) Prime mission aircraft began deployment from Kamina to Ascension Island at 0500Z, 28 November, at ten-minute intervals, all C-130 aircraft arriving on schedule, in position, and in commission by 1800Z of the same day. ¹⁸¹

(u/s) The DRAGON ROUGE airlift departed Ascension Island with the Belgian paratroop force, commencing 1000Z 30 November for Las Palmas and Brussels, with departures at thirty-minute intervals, in general accordance with the 322d Air Division flow plan. Operational control passed from CINCS TRIKE to USCINCEUR, to be exercised through USAFE and the 322d Air Division, on departure of the aircraft from Ascension Island. ¹⁸²

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CHAPTER V

OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE AND BASE RIGHTS PROBLEMS

British Participation

(u)(TS) Ambassador MacArthur on 12 November 1964 informed the US Department of State that the British Charge d'Affaires had made representations to the Belgian Foreign Ministry regarding a suggested British action to liberate foreign nations at Stanleyville. The British representative said that similar discussions were taking place in Washington. The British apparently had planned to discuss the matter at Leopoldville, but the Belgian Foreign Ministry had persuaded them not to do so. The British proposal involved a unilateral British action, with two battalions of paratroops supported by twenty-seven medium-range and nine long-range aircraft using Leopoldville as its staging point. The British apparently were ready to go at any time. ¹⁸³

(u)(TS) Mr. Davignon, of the Belgian Foreign Office, had expressed the view that British participation in the proposed operation could be beneficial. This included the larger political aspect of better humanitarian coloration, plus British influence in many African countries which could help with clearances and the contribution of qualified forces and aircraft. The Belgians therefore suggested that with US approval the British could be asked to send an officer to Brussels on 13 November to participate in the planning. ¹⁸⁴

(u)(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also on 12 November, stated in a message to USCINCEUR that the British had expressed a desire and readiness to participate in any contemplated action in the Congo crisis. The United States Government had no objection to the Belgian suggestion that the British be included in the Brussels discussions. ¹⁸⁵

(u)(TS) From information available to this study, no further suggestions were made by the British Government concerning active troop or airlift participation in the Congo operation. In an interview with the Command Historian, USEUCOM, an American Embassy representative in Brussels said that British interest in the Congo operation, however, paved the way for the use of Ascension Island as an advance staging base by the DRAGON ROUGE force. In this area the British were both receptive and actively helpful. ¹⁸⁶

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(u)(TS) The original concept developed by the US/Belgian planning team in Brussels on 12 November 1964 recommended a deployment route of Kleine-Brogel, Belgium; Wheelus Air Base, Libya; and Stanleyville. This was based on Belgian insistence that the staging be from outside the Congo. On 12 November, however, the US State Department instructed the American Ambassador in Brussels that overriding political considerations precluded use of Wheelus as a staging area. Planning should proceed instead on the basis of the use of Ascension Island (UK), the Canaries (Spain), and fields in the Congo for this purpose. ¹⁸⁷

(u)(TS) The Belgians were so informed by the American Embassy, Brussels, and the operation plan sent by USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval on 14 November recommended the following route: Kleine-Brogel, Belgium; Torrejon or Moron, Spain; Las Palmas, Canary Islands; Ascension Island; and Kamina, in the Congo, before final assault move in Stanleyville. ¹⁸⁸

(u)(TS) Planning therefore went forward on the basis that Ascension would be made available; and the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Spaak, on 17 November obtained during a luncheon meeting with the British Foreign Minister, then Mr. Gordon Walker, final and specific British approval for prepositioning the Belgian paratroops on Ascension. ¹⁸⁹

(u)(TS) The facility used at Ascension was part of the Atlantic Missile Range under US control through a Pan American contract agency. This facilitated both security and availability and placed the airlift force within 36 hours' flying range of the target area. British officers at Ascension cooperated actively in maintaining security throughout the operations. ¹⁹⁰

French Participation

(u)(TS) A joint State/Defense message of 16 November 1964 to Paris, France, requested the American Ambassador to inform the French Foreign Minister in very general terms of the DRAGON ROUGE contingency plan. He also should make clear that DRAGON ROUGE was a Belgian operation, with the United States supplying only logistic support. It was to be emphasized at the same time that the evacuation of foreign nationals held as hostages by rebels was the only objective of DRAGON ROUGE and was not an operation in support of the Congo Government. ¹⁹¹

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(u) (TS) Since this action should be taken only in close coordination with Belgians, the American Embassy in Brussels should inform the American Embassy, Paris, of any steps already taken by the Belgian and French Governments. The American Ambassador in Paris, on the basis of information received from Headquarters USEUCOM and the American Embassy, Brussels, was to conduct with the Belgian Ambassador to France or his Charge d'Affaires, parallel approaches to the Government of France. All information given to the French Foreign Minister should be passed on a highly confidential basis. This should include the fact that the United States would use certain aircraft from Evreux Air Base. The object of such an approach was not to request French permission to use C-130s but to inform the French that the departure of the C-130s would be handled through normal Evreux clearance procedures with French area controllers. 192

(u) (TS) A message from USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, sent at 1518Z on 17 November, stated that no formal notice of political clearances had been received at Headquarters US European Command by 1445Z. The unified headquarters had been advised, however, that the French Government was being informed by the American Embassy in Paris of flight plans for operation DRAGON ROUGE. CINCUSAFE therefore was directed by US-CINCEUR to proceed with all flights of DRAGON ROUGE according to plan. 193

(u) (TS) At 1703Z, 17 November, the American Embassy in Brussels forwarded to USCINCEUR information from the Belgian Foreign Office that the French Embassy in Brussels had called at the Foreign Office that morning to offer the use of French bases in Africa for the transit of Belgian forces to the Congo, if they were needed to protect the foreign community at Stanleyville. The Belgians expressed appreciation and said they would be in touch with the French Embassy later in the day. 194

(u) (TS) It was planned that high-level Belgian officials would inform the French Embassy in Brussels of DRAGON ROUGE before luncheon on 17 November. The American Embassy in Paris would "lift the veil" with the French during the afternoon, following Belgian initiative with the French in Brussels. It was stressed by the Belgian Foreign Minister that the approaches in Paris must be made at very high level, since the French Embassy in Brussels would be told to keep all information out of normal traffic. In light of the French offer of bases in Africa for transit purposes, the Belgians anticipated no trouble with the French. 195

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(u)(S) In interviews with embassy officials at the American Embassy in Paris, the command Historian, USEUCOM, was informed that in the afternoon of 17 November, US State Department representatives had to proceed with the French in a complicated fashion, since they did not know exactly what had taken place in Brussels. When they discussed the matter with the French Foreign Office they assumed the French already knew about the operation. It was explained to the French that the aircraft were leaving from Evreux and asked on what basis the planes should be cleared since they were going not just to Kleine-Brogel, in Belgium, but further.¹⁹⁶

(u)(S) The French said not to worry about the clearance business, and one hour after this US conference the Foreign Office called the American Embassy and cleared the planes. By this time, in accordance with their schedule, the aircraft already were airborne for Kleine-Brogel, so French clearances arrived informally and after the fact.¹⁹⁷

(u)(S) The French in these discussions seemed relieved that the force was going on to Ascension Island. They seemed to be afraid that they might be asked to place one of their bases in Africa at United States or Belgian disposal. Apparently at some phase in the planning the use of French bases in former African colonies had been envisaged by the French and Belgians, but nothing had come of this particular approach. The French obviously did not wish to ask an African chief of state for such a privilege, since this would be unthinkable in his relations with other African chiefs of state.¹⁹⁸

Spanish Participation

(u)(TS) When it was made clear by the US State Department that Wheelus Air Base in Libya would not be available, DRAGON ROUGE planners included in the route the Spanish bases of Torrejon and Moron, and Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. According to the Headquarters USEUCOM Special Operations Plan 319/64, the aircraft would not refuel at Kleine-Brogel but would proceed through the en route refueling bases, with 00:15 interval flow, allowing two hours on-ground time for refueling at a Spanish base (Torrejon or Moron, at USAFE option) and at Las Palmas.¹⁹⁹

(u)(TS) A message dated 16 November 1964 from the Secretary of State to USCINCEUR informed the unified commander that it had been decided to preposition a Belgian airborne battalion at Ascension Island, pending a joint US/Belgium decision to execute the operation plan. Twelve USAFE

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C-130Es carrying that battalion from Belgium to Ascension would require overflight and refueling privileges at Torrejon or Moron (at USAFE option) as well as Las Palmas. The estimated time of arrival for Torrejon or Moron was the night of November 17/18. 200

(U)TS) USCINCEUR therefore was instructed to approach the Government of Spain as soon as possible for agreement to overflights and landings. A normal request should be made through the Chief of the Joint US Military Group Spain (JUSMG) to a high Spanish general via a staff channel. The matter also should be handled in such a manner that there would be no risk of disclosing the absolutely secret nature of the operation. The Spanish Foreign Minister should be informed at the same time of US/Belgium plans, with a similar emphasis on the necessity for complete secrecy and leaving no doubt that a leak could lead to the loss of American or European lives. Prompt Spanish cooperation was expected in granting clearance for such an humanitarian mission. 201

(U)TS) CINCUSAFE was instructed by USCINCEUR at 0136Z on 17 November to submit as soon as possible detailed overflight clearance requests, appropriately classified with exclusive distribution mailings to the American Ambassador in Paris and the US Charge d'Affaires at the American Embassy, Madrid. 202

(U)TS) A joint State/Defense message received by USCINCEUR at 0337Z, 17 November, revised the operational requirement for DRAGON ROUGE by eliminating Las Palmas as a stopping point for the C-130s carrying troops. The support aircraft (C-124s) carrying equipment, still would use both Torrejon and Las Palmas. No need therefore would exist for special security arrangements at Las Palmas for the support planes, since the story would be that this was a normal flight carrying cargo for Kamina. 203

(U)TS) The American Embassy, Madrid, informed USCINCEUR at 2253Z, 17 November, that this matter had been discussed in the morning with the Spanish Foreign Minister, who immediately had given his assurances that the Government of Spain would cooperate to the fullest extent. At the same time he had reminded the American Ambassador that these bases in Spain were for joint US/Spanish use, and a decision thus would be much easier if DRAGON ROUGE could use the air facilities in Las Palmas, or any other area in Spain than Torrejon or Moron. The American Ambassador then had emphasized the unusual nature of this mission and expressed his

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personal hope that the Spanish response would be favorable. The Foreign Minister had replied that the matter must be referred to the Chief of State, but a prompt reply could be expected. As the message said, the Spanish Foreign Ministry already was aware generally of the DRAGON ROUGE requirement, since Chief JUSMG already had submitted a request on the same subject to the Chief of the Spanish High General Staff.²⁰⁴

(u)(TS) Answers had been received by the American Ambassador to Spain and Chief JUSMG early in the afternoon of 17 November. The Ambassador also suggested in his subsequent message to USCINCEUR that if Spanish facilities were required for further airlift of non-US troops, Las Palmas be used, if it were operationally feasible. This would be more palatable to the Government of Spain, and it was believed that Spain had the capacity to provide adequate security measures there. The Spanish Foreign Minister also appreciated the necessity for complete secrecy and had stated that the United States could depend on Spanish cooperation in a cover story if one were needed.²⁰⁵

(u)(S) In accordance with the revised operation plan, the troop-carrying C-130Es did not use Torrejon or Las Palmas; they transited Moron Air Base for refueling on 18 November and proceeded directly to Ascension Island. The first six C-124 support aircraft bypassed Torrejon and Moron and proceeded from Evreux Air Base via Las Palmas to Ascension, with the exception of one aircraft which diverted for a delay of two hours and thirty minutes into Torrejon with autopilot, propeller synchronization, and radio trouble. The Talking Bird aircraft also transited Las Palmas.²⁰⁶

Redeployment Problems

(u)(TS) A message of 1644Z, 26 November, from USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the US Secretary of State; American Embassies, Paris, Madrid, and Brussels; and the Joint US Military Group, Spain, stated that plans were being developed for the redeployment of DRAGON ROUGE forces to home bases in Belgium, France, and Germany. The planned route of redeployment was from Congo bases to Ascension Island, Las Palmas, Moron/Torrejon, and to home. En route bases might be overflowed, if fuel permitted. In accordance with telephone conversations between the Political Advisor, Headquarters USEUCOM, and the American Embassy in Paris on 21 November, USCINCEUR also assumed that diplomatic clearances granted on 17 November in support of the first phase of DRAGON ROUGE were applicable to return DRAGON ROUGE flights. He therefore

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planned to direct USAFE to submit requests for operational flight clearances to the countries concerned in a normal manner for the return movement of DRAGON ROUGE aircraft. 207

(U) (TS) If this assumption were not correct, USCINCEUR requested that Headquarters USEUCOM be advised immediately so that planning for the return flights could be based on the time required to revalidate diplomatic clearances granted on 17 November. 208

(U) (TS) Secretary Rusk on 27 November informed the American Embassies in Leopoldville and Brussels that landing and overflight clearances for Las Palmas and Torrejon/Moron were being sought through military channels for the C-130s carrying the Belgian paratroops and for other US planes carrying equipment. The two ambassadors were instructed to make a political demarche to the Government of Spain if the request through military channels encountered difficulties. 209

(U) (TS) The 322d Air Division wired the US base commander on Ascension Island at 1700Z, 28 November, that except under emergency conditions no aircraft involved in DRAGON ROUGE or related support flights would overfly or land in Spain; the route between Las Palmas and European bases would be adjusted accordingly. The US State Department and JUSMG Spain on 28 November also informed the DRAGON ROUGE air-lift commander that no DRAGON ROUGE aircraft would be allowed to overfly or land in Spain. 210

(U) (TS) The prime mission DRAGON ROUGE flow therefore returned to Brussels from Kamina, Republic of the Congo, via Ascension Island and Las Palmas, and then Belgium. 211

(U) (TS) It should be noted in this matter of Spanish overflight clearances for redeployment of DRAGON ROUGE that Chief JUSMG sent a message to USCINCEUR on 26 November concerning recent US aircraft deployment into Spain in support of the Congo operation. This deployment, in Chief JUSMG's opinion, indicated that certain US agencies were not aware of, or disregarded, the fact that Chief JUSMG Spain had sole responsibility for clearance of aircraft into Spain and its territories and was the single point of contact with the Chief of the Spanish High General Staff for the purpose of consulting on such deployments. 212

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(u)(s) The most recent incident was a JCS-directed deployment of C-130 squadron from Pope Air Base in the US to Moron Air Base, Spain. Chief JUSMG first learned of this movement at about noon on Sunday, 22 November, through the 16th Air Force. Later that day he was informed officially by message. Acting on 16th Air Force information, JUSMG-MAAG staff officers immediately sought Government of Spain clearance through the High General Staff. At this time the aircraft already had been launched from the United States. Spanish High General Staff officials clearly were puzzled by the fact that the United States was not adhering to the precepts established in the exchange of notes between the Spanish Foreign Minister and the United States Secretary of State dated 26 September 1963.²¹³

(u)(s) Chief JUSMG wished to emphasize, therefore, that joint bases in Spain were under Spanish sovereignty, flag, and command. A last-minute, or after the fact, request for aircraft clearance gave the impression that the United States paid only lip service to Spanish sovereignty and completely disregarded the fact that the US, through the cited notes of September 1963, was obligated to consult with Spain prior to deployment. The American Ambassador to Spain had concurred in this JUSMG message.²¹⁴

(u)(s) Comments and recommendations on Operation DRAGON ROUGE sent by USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 1965 state: Ambassadorial approaches to the French and Spanish Governments for diplomatic clearances were not made until too late. To meet required mission timing, aircraft were launched on normal flight plans before French concurrence with the operation was received. Spanish concurrence was received only shortly before the first aircraft penetrated Spanish air space. Spanish sensitivity was aggravated later by the deployment of the FULL STRIKE aircraft to Spain without proper clearance.²¹⁵

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CHAPTER VI
PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS

Planning Phase

(u) TS) According to the USCINCEUR plan of 14 November 1964, the US would employ twelve C-130E aircraft to transport a Belgian airborne battalion of approximately 545 Belgian paratroopers, eight jeeps, and twelve AS-24 motorized tricycles from Kleine-Brogel Air Base, Belgium, to Stanleyville, Republic of the Congo. The USEUCOM C-130s were to proceed from Evreux Air Base, France, to Kleine-Brogel, where all motorized equipment would be loaded for air-landing; troops and light weapons, however, would be air-dropped. 216

(u) TS) The original concept (later modified) was for all aircraft not to refuel at Kleine-Brogel but to proceed through en route refueling bases with a 00:15-interval flow, allowing two hours on-ground time for refueling at a Spanish base (Torrejon or Moron, at USAFE option) and at Las Palmas, in the Canary Islands, and thence to Ascension Island. Arrival of all aircraft at Ascension would be timed to occur during daylight hours, with twelve or more hours provided at Ascension for refueling and crew and paratrooper rest. Because of limited accommodations at Ascension, all personnel would be prepared to sleep in the immediate vicinity of the airfield in improvised facilities. 217

(u) TS) The plan also called for the aircraft to depart Ascension with 00:30-interval flow time, to arrive at Kamina during the hours of darkness. Refueling operations at Kamina, prior to departure for the assault phase, were to be conducted through a combination of two small pump trucks (bowzers) shuttling from bulk storage tanks, plus drum-pumped fuel, as feasible. To supplement these existing refueling facilities, USAFE was to make available two US fuel trucks for expedited airlift to Kamina via C-124. A C-124 would be dispatched with the trucks and necessary operator personnel at the time of decision to execute or as soon as possible thereafter. The US fuel trucks then were to be positioned prior to the arrival of the C-130Es from Ascension, while the remaining payload capability of C-124 aircraft would be used to transport C-rations for use of the civilian refugee operation at Stanleyville.

(u) TS) To establish maximum flexibility for the assault staging from Kamina and also to insure against refueling breakdown or mechanical trouble,

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the basic USCINCEUR plan called for CINCSTRIKE (who would assume command of the overall operation at Ascension or Kamina) to have Joint Task Force Leopoldville (JTFLEO), a USSTRICOM unit, position four AFSTRIKE in-country C-130Es at Kamina, refueled prior to the arrival of USEUCOM C-130Es from Ascension. 218

(U)(TS) A message sent by USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE on 15 November stated that the possibility existed of limited execution of the deployment phase of Operation DRAGON ROUGE, to include deployment of the task force from Kleine-Brogel to Ascension Island on 17 November. It was possible, however, that the force would be held at Ascension for a period of four or five days prior to final execution. If this were to occur, the capability of Ascension facilities to accommodate approximately 550 Belgian troops and 100 US air crew and maintenance personnel would become a critical unknown factor. Since available information concerning actual facilities at Ascension was limited, a reply could not be made to the Belgian General Staff's request for advice concerning what additional equipment should be provided if such a delay occurred. 219

(U)(TS) USAFE therefore was requested to determine what facilities were available at Ascension and what additional equipment and supplies would be needed for an "austere" accommodation of the DRAGON ROUGE force for five days. The unified command also wished to know how many additional aircraft were required, the most desirable source of the necessary equipment and supplies, and whether these should be furnished by the US or by Belgium. USAREUR was asked in this same message to assist in determining the quantity of and to provide C-rations and field equipment peculiar to the army command if the USAFE course of action so required. 220

(U)(TS) Information was received from the Air Force Logistic Command on 16 November that 750 men could be billeted for six to eight days on Ascension if they brought with them sleeping bags and tents, neither of which was available at Ascension. The problem of providing food could be met by the existing new mess hall, using extended serving periods. The food supply on hand also was adequate, although resupply must be expedited to fulfill requirements after completion of the operation. With rationing (and no baths), the water supply on Ascension also would be sufficient for the operation. 221

(U)(S) USAREUR moved with equal promptitude and informed USCINCEUR on the same day that in logistic support of the operation 20,000 pounds of combat rations would be assembled at Rhein-Main for forwarding by air freight. These supplies would arrive not later than 1500 hours, 16 November.

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(u)(s) An additional USAREUR requirement in support of this plan was to provide seven days' combat rations for 650 persons, 650 canvas cots, and 100 stable brooms. (This requirement later was amended to include an additional 100 cots and 400 general-purpose tents, with pins and poles.)²²²

(u)(s) Ten C-124s of the 52d Air Transport Squadron, based at Rhein-Main, were assigned the task of furnishing airlift support to move vital equipment and supplies to en route stops. Four C-124s carried the two fuel trucks, and three were loaded with tents, cots, and rations. A maintenance support C-124 and two spare aircraft, one at Evreux and one at Torrejon, Spain, completed the support group.²²³

(u)(s) CINCUSAFE designated the Commander, 322d Air Division (MATS), Detachment I, as airlift commander and assigned him two officers from Headquarters, 322d Air Division, as staff assistants. Two officers and five airmen from the 5th Aerial Port Squadron were utilized as a small, mobile airlift control force. This extremely small staff was directed to insure security for a highly classified and politically sensitive mission. Elements of the 464th Troop Carrier Wing (776th and 777th), on rotation duty at Evreux, provided the actual airlift force, which initially consisted of fourteen mission C-130Es and a Talking Bird. Twelve of these aircraft were assigned to the airlift, one constituted a maintenance aircraft, and one was a spare.²²⁴

Deployment Phase

(u)(s) A Talking Bird, assigned to the operations to facilitate communications, was airborne from Evreux via Las Palmas to Ascension at 1410Z. After a brief delay because of short notification, the first C-130E of the basic airlift departed Evreux for Kleine-Brogel at 1655Z. The move to Kleine-Brogel of the fourteen aircraft was without incident, and the arrival took place during the hours of darkness, as scheduled, the last plane arriving at 1915Z.²²⁵

(u)(s) No United States personnel were present to meet the aircraft, and loading might have become a major problem if the Belgian paratroop battalion had not been an exceptionally well-trained unit. Although the departure had been planned for 1858Z, the first C-130E aircraft did not depart Kleine-Brogel for Ascension via Moron, Spain, until 2130Z. This delay was based on the establishment of a State Department cover plan for the operation (see Chapter III).²²⁶

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(u)(s) As the delay in launching was extended into the 17th, actions were taken to extend crew duty time to 24 hours for basic crews. For the four aircraft carrying the two F-6 refueling trucks, authority was granted by USAFE to waive all provisions of MM 55-1, as required, to reach destination as close to the determined schedule as possible. At 0300Z approval was received from Headquarters USEUCOM and USAFE to preposition six C-124 aircraft to on-load at Evreux; at the same time, the movement of three support aircraft (with tents) to Torrejon, Spain, was approved. These aircraft were to depart at 30-minute intervals, beginning at 0500Z, 17 November; but the first C-124 actually was airborne at 0715Z. Four prime and two backup aircraft were loaded and held at Evreux for JCS approval of the operations. 227

(u)(s) Crews could not be put on crew rest but were briefed, clearances filed, and instructions given to get as much rest as possible. Release of the prime mission aircraft (C-130Es) at 1540Z, 17 November, also released the C-124 aircraft. The first successful departure took place at 1635Z, and the last departure with the F-6 units was at 2095Z. Chalk 3 was moved to Chateauroux to act as backup. Chalk 5, with 4,215 pounds of rations, departed at 2105Z, following the flow, to support the aircraft carrying the refuelers. Chalk 4, carrying a refueler trailer, was diverted into Torrejon, however, with auto-pilot propeller synchronization and radio trouble, arriving there at 2000Z. 228

(u)(s) Chalk 10 was launched from Rhein-Main to pick up this mission, but the crew of Chalk 4 decided to hand-fly the aircraft and departed after a delay of 2 plus 30 hours ground time. Chalk 10 then proceeded to Torrejon in a backup capacity. Since Chalks 1 and 4 were delayed by maintenance and could not get in and out of Ascension in daylight, that restriction was waived by the 322d Air Division at 2130Z. 229

(u)(s) All prime mission C-130E aircraft passed through Moron Air Base, Spain, for refueling. A MATS aircraft controller, who had been sent from Torrejon to assist in the processing of air crews, arrived at Moron ahead of the flow. The first arrival of C-130Es at Moron was at 0125Z, 18 November, and the last at 0440Z, constituting a pattern of fourteen arrivals in 3 hours and 15 minutes; ground time averaged 1 hour and 15 minutes. Arrival at the Ascension auxiliary air base from Moron began on schedule at 1305Z, with daylight arrivals being made by all but three aircraft delayed by repairs. The prime flow to Ascension was completed by 2125Z, 18 November. 230

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(u)(S) The airlift commander later reported that the Ascension Island base commander knew something of the operation, but the arrival of fourteen C-130Es came as a surprise to local officials. Hurried but effective arrangements were made for parking, billeting, and feeding personnel. Air crews were billeted in standard rooms, gymnasiums, the fire house, quonset huts, and tents; the Belgian troop unit established a tent city. Feeding arrangements were excellent, and even Belgian troop units were fed hot meals. ²³¹

(u)(S) He also stated that no USAF personnel knowing of the mission were at Ascension when the primary fourteen aircraft arrived except for the USAFE Twilight Net and Talking Bird, which had landed at 0500Z, 18 November but were not in operation because of primary fuel pump problems. ²³²

(u)(S) Unsuccessful attempts were made to place a US airlift controller at Las Palmas ahead of the four aircraft carrying the F-6 units, plus the backup. Crews maintained the flow, however, with a minimum ground time of 1+05 and a maximum of 2+00 hours. At Ascension some confusion existed over the requirement for clearance to over-fly Angola, and an airlift control force was not yet in place. Ground times remained acceptable, varying from 3+10 to 4+20. Backup aircraft were held at Ascension for use as directed after the refuelers had departed. ²³³

(u)(S) Three C-124 aircraft with basic crews were prepositioned at Torrejon to await release of the mission by the JCS, minimum crew rest, and daylight arrival at Ascension. These aircraft transited Las Palmas without difficulty using 3 hours ground time. Four C-124 aircraft with refueling units off-loaded at Kamina on 19 November and proceeded to Leopoldville; the C-124 aircraft with tents, cots, and rations arrived at Ascension between 0620Z and 0710Z, 20 November. Tents and cots were erected and used by Belgian forces; airlift control forces from the 5th Aerial Port Squadron became operational and off-loaded 56,255 pounds from C-124 aircraft landing at Ascension. ²³⁴

(u)(S) A 20 November message from the 322d Air Division to USCINCEUR answered a question as to why tents and shelter for Belgian units had arrived at Ascension after the troops. It stated that four aircraft of the C-124 support mission airlifted two F-6 refueling units to Kamina, while three airlifted tents to Ascension for shelter during the staging period; three others were used as backup for the prime mission. Success of the overall operation depended on position refueling support.

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The 322d Air Division had provided augmented crews and waived all crew duty time restriction for aircraft carrying the refueling units. (Normal crew duty time for augmented crews is 27 hours, and these missions required approximately 58 hours.) Further restrictions concerning maximum weight for takeoff and daylight operations at Ascension also were waived for these missions, if such measures were required. ²³⁵

(U) (S) Chalks 7, 8, and 9, the C-124s assigned to carry the tents, were operated with service crews, since these could not be augmented without completely exhausting air crew resources available within the theater. If all missions had been augmented there would have been no backup capability to support the primary missions and no capability for possible follow-on support requirements, which remained fluid throughout the entire operation. ²³⁶

(U) (TS) The message further explained that in accordance with the last available verbal and written instructions, authority to launch the C-124s from Rhein-Main, to hold at Evreux and Torrejon, was received from USAFE at 0300Z, 17 November. Chalks 1 through 9 were set up to depart Rhein-Main at 30-minute intervals starting at 0500Z, 17 November; and Chalks 7, 8, and 9 were scheduled to depart at 0800, 0830, and 0900, respectively. ²³⁷

(U) (TS) Three conditions dictated launch time of the C-124s from Torrejon: (1) receipt of an execution order, (2) daylight arrival at Ascension Island in accordance with the basic USCINCEUR operation plan, and (3) completion of crew rest. The first C-130E of the primary mission was launched from Kleine-Brogel at 2135Z, 17 November, and arrived at Ascension at 1320Z, 18 November, or approximately seventeen hours prior to the arrival of the tents. ²³⁸

(U) (TS) The message also pointed out that the C-124 is a much slower aircraft than the C-130. In coordinated airlift operations this factor had to be given primary consideration during the planning stages. As early as 1100Z, 16 November, the 322d Air Division had requested authority to start movement of the C-124 aircraft to an en route air base in Spain. This request was made to Headquarters USAFE, which advised that the request had been rejected by USCINCEUR; additional requests were made during the night of the 16th.

(U) (TS) In this connection, it is noted that a message was sent from USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE at 0301Z, 17 November, directing (inter alia)

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the onward deployment of these support aircraft "as soon as practicable." This was rescinded by a second message of 1340Z (same-date) which directed deployment of the C-124s "as directed by USAFE." 239

(U)TS On 20 November 1964, a liaison officer from CINCSTRIKE arrived at Ascension Island during the early morning hours, and at 1453Z operational control of the fifteen C-130E aircraft passed to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. USCINCEUR, however, was directed to provide support for the forces at Ascension as required. 240

Employment Phase

(U)TS At 1830Z, 21 November, the order was received from CINCSTRIKE for the move to Kamina. One hour and 20 minutes later the prime mission air stream began, with C-130E aircraft departing at 10-minute intervals. The airlift commander decided that no flight plans should be filed, no HF position reports made, and no African territory overflown other than the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Chalk 11 aborted for a pressurization problem, and its load was transferred to the spare aircraft (Chalk 13). The aircraft with pressurization trouble became the spare and proceeded to Leopoldville with the load programmed for the spare. Command and control team personnel moved on Chalk 1 and aircraft control force personnel on Chalks 3 and 13. The force was instructed to hold at Kamina until directed by the JCS but to maintain a constant ready status. 241

(U)TS The prime mission aircraft arrived at Kamina on 22 November, as planned. The mission was met by CINCSTRIKE's Commander, Joint Task Force, Leopoldville (JTFLEO), who assumed operational control. Refueling of aircraft, establishing final planning for the air assault, and last preparations occupied the day. 242

Support for Supplemental Rescue Operations

(U)TS On 21 November USCINCEUR published a supplemental plan which established the concept for additional assault and hostage evacuation of missions at Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa (nicknamed DRAGON BLANC, DRAGON NOIR, and DRAGON VERT). These operations would require additional support flights from USEUCOM. It was estimated in the supplemental plan that a minimum capability must be developed to support two company-sized assaults, involving the air-drop of two companies of paracommandos, plus

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the air-landing of motorized equipment. The Belgian paratroop battalion therefore would need an additional 400 personnel parachutes (200 per company, assuming that the planned air-landed force for Stanleyville had been required to air-drop, thus deploying their 192 parachutes), eight additional armored jeeps (four per company assault), and four additional radio jeeps (two per company assault). An availability of the foregoing equipment was essential to any subsequent assault to liberate hostages in other areas following the Stanleyville attack. The timing of the airlift of this equipment from Belgium (Beauchevain Air Base) to Leopoldville would be the controlling factor in scheduling these assaults. To provide a minimum assault capability, the plan called for four C-124 or C-130E tactical airlift sorties, depending on type available in the theater. The departure of these sorties from Belgium must take place 72 hours prior to the desired drop lines on additional objective areas. ²⁴³

(u)(TS) CINCUSAFE in this plan was directed to provide as soon as possible four C-124 (or C-130E) aircraft to airlift eight armored jeeps, four radio jeeps, 400 personnel parachutes, two additional droppable radios, fifty complete sets of restraint and release rigging, and A-22 extraction chutes which would come from USAREUR's St. Andre depot, plus a surplus of ammunition and rations airlifted from Beauchevain Air Field to Leopoldville. This supply would be in support of DRAGON BLANC and DRAGON NOIR. USAFE and the 322d Air Division would process operational flight clearances for this movement, with the assumption that definitive clearances from France and Spain as well as base authority with Belgium and the United Kingdom, as applicable in the first phase of the operation, still applied. USAFE also was authorized "pickup and loading" coordination with the Belgian military authorities on arrival at Leopoldville. The aircraft commanders of this movement would report to COMJTFLEO, off-load cargo, and redeploy back to home base. ²⁴⁴

(u)(S) A message from the USAFE command post which was received by USEUCOM on 22 November informed USCINCEUR that preparations were under way to launch four C-124s in support of the initial requirements for the DRAGON ROUGE supplemental plan. Estimated departure period from Rhein-Main to Beauchevain was 0130Z to 0300Z, 22 November. ²⁴⁵

(u)(TS) On 23 November the 322d Air Division informed USCINCEUR that four C-124 aircraft would on-load the specified cargo at Florennes, Belgium, instead of Beauchevain, which was closed by weather, and off-load at Leopoldville. The flow had begun at 1320Z, 22 November, with the

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following itinerary: Rhein-Main, Florennes, Torrejon, Las Palmas, Ascension, Leopoldville, and return by the same route.²⁴⁶

(U)(TS) A requirement for the movement of chutes and rigging also was received from Evreux, and one C-124 aircraft first was held for classified material at Rhein-Main, then proceeded to Evreux for on-load at 0720Z, 22 November. All five aircraft proceeded through on-load to Torrejon for crew rest.²⁴⁷

(U)(TS) These five 322d Air Division C-124s which went into Torrejon late on 22 November, carrying armored jeeps, personnel parachutes, ammunition, rations, and air-drop rigging for the DRAGON BLANC, DRAGON VERT, and DRAGON NOIR operations, completed crew rest and began movement on 23 November. Three C-124s of the group departed Torrejon for Las Palmas between 1030Z and 1221Z; a fourth was delayed because of maintenance problems and departed at 1605Z on the 23d. The fifth aircraft also was delayed at Torrejon, after difficulty with one propeller, and a C-130E was dispatched from Evreux to pick up its load. (Because of greater air speed, this aircraft arrived at Kamina one hour ahead of schedule.)²⁴⁸

(U)(TS) One of the first three C-124s which had departed Torrejon on 22 November had engine trouble between Las Palmas and Ascension and was diverted into Dakar, Senegal, at 0001Z, 24 November. A second C-130E which was serving as operational backup at Torrejon was dispatched to pick up its load. Three C-124s of this supplementary support force arrived at Ascension on 24 November, proceeded to Leopoldville, and landed there on 25 November. The aircraft which had been diverted to Dakar departed there on 24 November and arrived in Leopoldville at 0800Z on 25 November. A last aircraft departed Ascension Island at 2003Z, 24 November, and flew directly to Kamina as directed by COMUSJTFLEO.²⁴⁹

Assault Phase

(U)(TS) At 1910, 23 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the execution of the final assault phase of Operation DRAGON ROUGE. The first five C-130E aircraft took off on 24 November at minimum intervals beginning at 0045Z. Two aircraft carrying the four armored and four radio jeeps, respectively, launched thirty minutes later, as planned. The C-130E carrying armored jeeps and 13 paratroopers suffered structural

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damage caused by blowout of a life raft and inflation bottle and returned to base. The cargo spare also did not check out, because of failure of the ramp hydraulic actuation valve. The personnel spare was reconfigured, and only 50 minutes ground time were required to launch this aircraft from Kamina, reloaded with the armored jeeps and paratroopers. The last five C-130Es of the prime mission launched at minimum intervals, one hour after the first launch, in accordance with planning, commencing at 0145Z, 24 November. ²⁵⁰

(U)TS) At 0616, 24 November, NMCC relayed to USCINCEUR coded advice that the paradrop had been completed at 0400Z and that vehicles and personnel of the paracommando force had been landed successfully at Stanleyville airfield. ²⁵¹

(U)S) At 2309Z, 25 November, the JCS directed the execution of DRAGON NOIR, the follow-up operation to DRAGON ROUGE. This involved the capture of Paulis airfield, evacuation of approximately 300 more hostages (including seven US nationals), and a rapid withdrawal. The operation was conducted on schedule at 0400Z, 26 November, and the force consisted of 256 Belgian parachute troops which were transported by four C-130E aircraft, with three follow-on aircraft to land and off-load vehicles. ²⁵²

(U)S) The final refugee figures as of 28 November were 191 personnel evacuated by DRAGON ROUGE aircraft from Stanleyville and 376 from Paulis. ²⁵³

Redeployment

(U)S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed at 1724Z, 26 November, that redeployment to Belgium of the DRAGON ROUGE force was to begin Saturday, 28 November, and be completed as soon as possible. The planned route of deployment from Kamina and Leopoldville would be Ascension, Moron, Torrejon, Brussels National Airport, and Evreux. Based on coordination with the Belgian authorities, priorities for return of equipment would be as follows: Priority I, paratroops and rolling stock (jeeps and motorized tricycles); Priority II, used parachutes, signal and medical equipment, motors and spare parts; Priority III, unused parachutes, rations, and ammunition. ²⁵⁴

(U)S) It was estimated that USEUCOM aircraft now in the Congo and Ascension, plus two CINCSTRIKE aircraft (C-130Es) temporarily assigned

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under CINCUSAFE operational control during the Congo mission, would be required to effect redeployment. These two additional aircraft would be used to transport USSTRICOM communications equipment from Leopoldville to the United States. As authorized by NMCC on the request of STRICOM, two C-130E aircraft were selected to depart from Moron, via Ascension, to Leopoldville at 0330Z and 0400Z, 27 November. ²⁵⁵

(u)(TS) The last aircraft carrying Belgian troops departed Paulis for Kamina at 0330Z, 27 November, while redeployment plans proceeded. The concept was that all forces would close Ascension by 1600Z, 29 November. The troops were to be lifted from Ascension on ten C-130Es followed by support aircraft carrying cargo. In order to facilitate ceremonies scheduled in Brussels for 1 December, the troops would arrive on that day at 0900 (local). Five aircraft would arrive between 0900 and 0940, the next five starting at 1220, and the troop lift was to be completed by 1300 (local). ²⁵⁶

(u)(C) The Belgians informed COMJTFLEO that they would leave twelve armored and three radio jeeps for use by Colonel Vanderwalle. This would reduce the C-130/C-124 loads, and it thus was possible that all equipment could be brought out with available aircraft. JTFLEO originally had estimated that two or three additional C-124 sorties would be required to move USAFE/Belgian equipment. CINCSTRIKE/JTF would retain six C-130s in the Congo for future support, including the four STRICOM C-130s already deployed prior to the operation and two STRICOM C-130s recently deployed to the Congo. CINCSTRIKE also requested permission from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to retain the USAFE F-6 refueling units at Ascension Island on a permanent basis for contingency operations. ²⁵⁷

(u)(S) A message was dispatched to CINCSTRIKE by USCINCEUR suggesting that he request the assistance of the Belgian paratroop contingent in striking the tent camp, since sufficient US personnel were not available on Ascension. Subsequent messages also informed CINCSTRIKE that in answer to his request the F-6 refueling units would remain at Ascension for as long as he required. Talking Bird, however, would return to home base upon completion of the redeployment airlift. ²⁵⁸

(u)(S) At 0800Z on 28 November the airlift commander, his staff, and the airlift control force met to coordinate loads and flight schedules for redeployment from Kamina. The main force was scheduled to depart from Kamina at 0500Z, 29 November, at 10-minute intervals. Loading was completed before the Belgian commander received instruction to off-load

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and leave behind the armored and radio jeeps. This caused minor loading problems, but loads were revised and completed by 2330Z. 259

(U)S) The Belgians and an advance echelon of the airlift control force personnel departed at 2100Z on 28 November to Ascension to make arrangements for the main flow on 29 November. One C-124 proceeded from Leopoldville to Kamina to pick up a refueling trailer, while a second moved from Ascension to Leopoldville to pick up two refueling tractors and return to Ascension. 260

(U)S) Prime mission aircraft began redeployment to Ascension at 0500Z, 29 November, at 10-minute intervals. DRAGON ROUGE aircraft arrived on schedule and were in position and ready to go by 1800Z. Loads then were adjusted to insure that all Belgian troops would be on the first ten chucks as requested. On 30 November tents and cots were struck, and three C-124s were loaded with tents, a communications van, and rigging gear. Two other C-124s arrived with the refueling tractors and ramp extensions to be left at Ascension. 261

(U)S) The aircraft departed Ascension on 30 November for Las Palmas, the flow beginning at 0945Z with departures at 30-minute intervals. At Las Palmas the interval was reduced to ten minutes to compress arrival at Brussels. At 2355Z, 30 November, the first group of six C-130Es was en route to Brussels from Las Palmas. After the ceremonies in Brussels on 2 December, DRAGON ROUGE airlift forces returned from Brussels to Evreux.

(U)S) The final support missions departed Ascension for the European Theater on the 3d of December, moving airlift control force personnel, tents, rigger gear, and an Air Force communications van. 262

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CHAPTER VII

PUBLIC INFORMATION CONCEPT

Planning Phase

(u)(TS) USCINCEUR on 17 November 1964 issued guidance for public information aspects of the Congo relief expedition. This stated clearly that United States military public information responsibility would consist only of obtaining appropriate documentation and reporting US activities, such as provision of airlift for Belgian troops, evacuation of refugees, and events incidental to that evacuation. The Belgian Government would be responsible for reporting activities of its troops. 263

(u)(TS) CINCUSAFE was directed to provide an information team of one officer (major or captain) and two photographers, one for still and one for moving pictures. Both would deploy with equipment and ten days' photo supplies. The Public Affairs Officer, American Embassy, Leopoldville, would have overall responsibility for the release of information on the US phase of operations in the Congo. USAFE information personnel were to come under operational control of CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA on arrival in the Congo and provide support as directed. 264

(u)(TS) USCINCEUR was to be responsible for Phase I of the PAO concept; i.e., operations from Brussels to the point of launching the assault operation in the Congo. CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA had responsibility for PAO matters of Phase II, operations at the point of launching the assault from Kamina including objective areas. 265

(u)(TS) The mission of the USAFE information team was to maintain strict security from marshalling phase through assault phase. Immediately after initial public announcement of the operations, the USAFE team also would provide the PAO at the American Embassy in Leopoldville and media representatives on the scene with a rapid, factual, and full account (within security limits) of the US effort in connection with the rescue of civilians. The team was given by USCINCEUR the additional responsibility for written and filmed documentation of events as they occurred, to be used either as news releases or for historical purposes. 266

(u)(TS) In order to provide maximum security for the operation, no information would be given concerning the number of US aircraft participating or the number of Belgian troops involved. Stopover points would not be discussed, and no media representatives would be transported to the

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Congo on USAF aircraft employed in the operation. All queries received by component commands would be referred to Headquarters USEUCOM. 267

(U)TS Further guidance for the USAFE PAO team was received at Headquarters USEUCOM on 18 November from CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA. In this concept of information operations, PAO USEUCOM, in accordance with first instructions, was responsible for information activities during Phase I. The information office of the Joint Task Force Leopoldville, operating under policy guidance issued by the PAO, American Embassy, Leopoldville, remained responsible (as in USCINCEUR's directive of 17 November) for the information program in Phase II (the assault phase) of the operation. The USEUCOM information team was directed in this plan to accompany the force and air-land in the objective area to accomplish written and photographic documentation in the airfield vicinity. The information officer JTFLEO was to deploy initially to Leopoldville, effect coordination with the PAO of the American Embassy, and remain there to coordinate Phase II information activities under embassy supervision. He also would direct the activities of all subordinate US military information officers in the Congo. 268

(U)TS The USCINCEUR information group on its arrival in the objective area was assigned the task of documenting evacuation activities at the Stanleyville airport, while establishing contact with and feeding spot reports to the JTFLEO information officer in Leopoldville. 269

(U)TS A message to USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, late in the evening of 18 November (2304Z), stated that "in view of the unique nature of DRAGON ROUGE, public affairs plans developed by USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE appeared adequate for historical purposes." This message emphasized, however, that the over-all objective of a public information program for this particular operation was to "minimize and limit visibility" as completely as possible for the entire mission. This guidance applied particularly to the United States role in the operation. Every effort must be made, therefore, to avoid contact of any sort between United States military personnel and the press. US policy would be that responsibility for release of any still or motion pictures for all public information would remain with the PAO, American Embassy, Leopoldville. All press agencies' inquiries should be referred to that office, and the Department of State would provide its Leopoldville PAO with guidelines on the release of pictures and handling of press inquiries.

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This message clearly stated that PAO, American Embassy, Leopoldville, would not and could not act until full clearance had been received from Washington. The same message informed its addressees that no DRAGON ROUGE public information personnel were to leave the immediate vicinity of the aircraft, and PAO plans should be revised accordingly. This information was relayed on 19 November (0155Z) by USCINCEUR to the commander of the airlift force DRAGON ROUGE, already at Ascension Island. 270

(U)TS The American Embassies at Brussels and Leopoldville and USCINCEUR received on the morning of 19 November further instructions from the Secretary of State concerning the information program. In this he stated that every effort would be made to coordinate public affairs aspects of DRAGON ROUGE operations with the Government of Belgium, if time permitted. Close liaison was suggested between the PAO, American Embassy, Leopoldville, and his Belgian counterpart as a useful practical step to help effect such coordination. 271

(U)TS Desire to keep at a minimum the United States' role in DRAGON ROUGE again was stressed when the Joint Chiefs of Staff cabled CINCSTRIKE and USCINCEUR on 19 November that in view of the highly sensitive nature of DRAGON ROUGE every effort should be made to "minimize" the appearance of the US role. This would be particularly true in the Stanleyville area, where it became imperative that US personnel avoid fire-fights and mob or riot actions. They must not leave the airfield for any reason. 272

(U)TS Further instructions from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy, Brussels, and the American Embassy, Leopoldville, on 20 November developed the USIS concept for public information for the Congo operation which was to discipline the entire information picture. Secretary Rusk stated that if the operation were executed, the major emphasis for USIS public information must be on the strictly humanitarian nature of that mission. This involved preventing the rebels from causing further harm to civilians, whether Congolese or non-Congolese, and providing evacuation for those who needed or desired it. Supporting media coverage of evacuees, especially Africans, was required whenever feasible. The second USIS major emphasis was to be on maintaining at an absolute minimum the visibility of military aspects of the mission. Planes and troops naturally could not be ignored, but United States information output should focus on evacuees and medical help and avoid the military angle whenever possible. USIS also was instructed to coordinate with JTFLEO to insure the type of still and moving picture coverage needed from photographers and cameramen assigned the mission for historical purposes. 273

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(U)TS) CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, on the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assumed command from USCINCEUR of the DRAGON ROUGE air-lift forces at Ascension Island on 20 November. In the evening of the same day (1931Z) the new commander issued additional public affairs guidance to the force. It was pointed out again that the PAO, American Embassy, Leopoldville, would have complete responsibility for the total information output concerning US participation, but he would need military assistance to report military events. There were no military information resources existing in the Congo other than those brought in to augment JTFLEO.

(U)TS) The job of the military information personnel, therefore, was to maintain strict security from marshalling through the assault phases and keep to a minimum the visibility of the entire mission and its role. This was particularly essential since DRAGON ROUGE would attract worldwide attention, and the entire national press would converge on the Congo to supplement the thirty or forty newsmen already resident there. 274

(U)TS) The USEUCOM team, under CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA command, would accompany the force and air-land in the objective area to procure written and photographic documentation in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft only. 275

(U)TS) The information officer for JTFLEO would go to Leopoldville and receive guidance from the PAO, American Embassy, in that city. The JTFLEO information officer also was responsible for the conduct of the military information effort under embassy supervision and would direct activities of all subordinate US military officers in the Congo. JTFLEO information officer had the additional duty of arranging with USIS for photographic documentation of aircraft recoveries in the Leopoldville area. 276

(U)TS) The USEUCOM team of one officer and two cameramen, on its arrival in the objective area, was to document evacuation activities at the Stanleyville airport, while establishing contact with and feeding spot reports to JTFLEO in Leopoldville.

(U)TS) The PAO of the American Embassy, Leopoldville, was the sole releasing authority, while military officers assigned to the information teams were to play documentary and advisory roles only. These military information personnel also would avoid all direct press contacts and refer inquiries to the Embassy PAO who held the responsibility for release of all still and moving picture coverage. The exposed moving picture footage would be forwarded by the fastest means possible to OASD (PA). 277

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Employment Phase

(U) (TS) On 24 November the Belgian paracommando battalion, air-dropped or air-landed successfully at Stanleyville by the C-130Es of the US DRAGON ROUGE force, established control of the necessary areas and evacuated refugees. Two days later a second air-landing was made at Paulis to free additional Americans and Europeans held captive by the rebels. 278

(U) (C) On 26 November the American Embassy at Leopoldville reported to the US Secretary of State that the Embassy PAO had emphasized and re-emphasized to the press representatives in the Congo that the Belgian para-troops had imposed a minimum of casualties on rebel forces and had urged them to report this fact. Where possible, shock grenades were used instead of fragmentation grenades; and no military objective was taken and held except the airfield, which was necessary for operations. The DRAGON ROUGE force did not carry on any joint operations with the Congolese National Army or the mercenary forces attached to that army, retiring from the airport less than twelve hours after landing and after a major part of the mission was accomplished. Press personnel had indicated that they found it hard to report such stories second hand and had asked the embassy again to provide a lift so that they could see for themselves. This the embassy had refused to do.

(U) (TS) The report further said that there was no reason to think that any representatives of commercial news media had been to Paulis for that operation, since US and Belgian authorities had done their best to keep all aircraft out except the C-130Es of the DRAGON ROUGE force. 279

(U) (C) On 26 November the American Ambassador to the Congo stated in a message to the US Secretary of State, CINCSRIKE, and USCINCEUR that "thoroughly professional is the description of the Stanleyville operation from the beginning to the end." The Belgian troops had conducted the operation throughout as a humanitarian effort. They moved rapidly to areas where non-Congolese were concentrated, liberated and formed the rescued into columns, and moved them rapidly to the airport under guard. As soon as approximately 80 percent of the non-Congolese groups were at the airport (about 1400Z, 24 November), the Belgians withdrew to the airport. There they guaranteed security of the strip to permit an effective evacuation. At no time did the Belgians conduct the operation on the basis of securing military objectives.

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(U/C) The ambassador further said that United States support of the rescue operation also was highly professional. This was confined to providing air transport, plus two air-to-ground controllers and two radio operators. The presence of these four US military personnel on the ground at Stanleyville was vital to the safety of the aircraft and their crews and to the success of the rescue operation. The US C-130E crews showed discipline and outstanding courage in spite of growing fatigue and in the face of enemy fire.

(U/C) The ambassador finished his message by saying that he felt proud to have played a small part in the operation. 280

Redeployment Phase

(U/C) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in a message dated 28 November, gave public affairs guidance to CINCSRIKE and USCINCEUR concerning the return to Europe of aircraft participating in the operation. The following simple statement was to be used: "The US C-130s involved in the Congo airlift have been returned to normal operations." 281

(U/FOUO) The Chief, MAAG Belgium, with the concurrence of the American Ambassador to Belgium, recommended to the Chief of Staff, Headquarters USEUCOM, on 28 November 1964 that some form of joint unit citation be considered for presentation at a suitable future time to Belgian and US units participating in DRAGON ROUGE. This would cement further the excellent relationships currently existing between Belgian and US forces. It was suggested that this award be initiated either by Headquarters USAF or by the US Department of Defense, whichever was deemed more appropriate. 282

(U/C) USCINCEUR, also on 28 November, forwarded to the Secretary of Defense his public affairs guidance for DRAGON ROUGE for the concurrence of OASD (PA). This guidance applied to the return of the aircraft employed on the DRAGON ROUGE operation to Belgium and subsequently to their normal bases of operation. "Normal operation" in this plan was to be defined as providing operational and logistic support within the European theater of operations under the operational control of CINCUSAFE. Aircraft and personnel therefore might be identified as assigned to the 322d Air Division, a MATS organization whose headquarters was located at Chateauroux, France. 283

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(U) (S) If queried by outside news sources, the facts regarding the airlift prior to departure for the Congo from Ascension would not be discussed, nor would specific numbers of aircraft used in DRAGON ROUGE be divulged. The answer "more than ten" was to be given if such a question were asked. ²⁸⁴

(U) (S) In this Headquarters USEUCOM redeployment information plan stress would be laid on the fact that US aircraft and personnel participated in the logistic support of a humanitarian rescue operation which had been requested by the Government of the Republic of the Congo. All requests for information concerning the numbers of Belgian paratroops carried or participating in the operation would be referred to the Belgian Government. Interviews by the press of participating personnel might be granted, but this would be kept to a minimum and monitored in each case by qualified PAO personnel. Specific numbers of US personnel participating in this operation were not to be revealed in these interviews. ²⁸⁵

(U) (S) It was suggested that on arrival in Brussels the airlift commander would serve as spokesman for the group and participate in any ceremonies, as directed by the American Ambassador, Belgium. There also would be no objection to the photographing of US aircraft and personnel upon their arrival at Brussels. ²⁸⁶

(U) (S) The American Embassy in Paris had no objection to acknowledging the normal base of operations of the aircraft involved, nor that clearances for overflight had been granted by the French Government. ²⁸⁷

(U) (S) On 29 November DRAGON ROUGE forces departed the Congo for appropriate European bases, via Ascension Island. USCINCEUR assumed operational control through the 322d Air Division on departure of the aircraft from Ascension Island. ²⁸⁸

(U) (S) A press reaction to the Stanleyville and Paulis operations should be mentioned in this chapter. The American Embassy at Leopoldville informed the Secretary of State on 30 November that international press representatives at Leopoldville expressed to the Embassy on the afternoon of 28 November their amazement that further rescue missions by Belgian paratroops had been called off. A United Kingdom national reporting for the Daily Express stated his belief that other nations with nationals remaining in rebel-held areas must be protesting, informally but strongly, against abandonment of a humanitarian rescue mission while "at least 1,000 Europeans and non-Africans" remained at the point of death in rebel hands.

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(u)(C) The Time-Life reporter compared the situation to a shipwreck in which the search for large numbers of survivors was inexplicably called off. 289

(u)(C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 November forwarded OASD (PA) approval of the USCINCEUR public affairs guidance sent to Washington on 28 November. The JCS message stated that specific public affairs guidance would be provided, and stipulated that US personnel might participate in arrival ceremonies if the invitations were extended by the Belgian Government; but US personnel must remain in the background. 290

(u)(S) Public recognition for their services was given in Brussels by the Belgian Government and people to the US and Belgian participants in the DRAGON ROUGE operation on their return to Belgium on 1 December 1964. At noon on that day all available air crews and support members attended a joint formation, at which time the King of Belgium addressed all DRAGON ROUGE participants, and the airlift and airborne commanders were decorated personally by the King with the Order of Leopold II. On 2 December 1964 DRAGON ROUGE airlift forces returned to Evreux. 291

(u)(FOUO) Final guidance concerning public information aspects of DRAGON ROUGE operations was given by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to USCINCEUR and CINCSRIKE on 5 December 1964. This message supplemented telephone conversations between PAO, Headquarters USEUCOM, and OSD. In this, OASD (PA) stated that it was not the intention of the United States to seek publicity on US participation in the Congo airlift. It was unrealistic, however, to assume that world interest in the rescue operation would not generate media requests for information regarding the participation of US military units and personnel. In view of the return of participating aircraft and crews, therefore, the following public affairs guidance was furnished: 292

(u)(FOUO) Home-town news releases concerning individual participants were authorized, but identification of the unit was not authorized until after that unit had returned to the continental United States. Locations of units in Europe would not be identified. Previous guidance given concerning interviews remained in effect until the individuals involved had returned to the continental United States. After that, requests for interviews should be channeled to unit commanders and responsible public information officers at home stations for clearance with STRICOM. 293

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(u) (FOUO) While unit and personnel decorations awarded as a result of the Congo airlift might be acknowledged, it was stressed further that military participants should be encouraged to give interviews. This was applicable particularly to those on home leave; but if such interviews were approved, the interviewee must be briefed thoroughly in advance on the US position, and a public affairs officer must be present. ²⁹⁴

(u) (C) A message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 December requested CINCSTRIKE to initiate recommendations for appropriate awards to appropriate units or individuals participating in the DRAGON ROUGE operation. The US Air Force Military Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base wired USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE on 17 December 1964 that actions had been taken to afford recognition of personnel and units participating in DRAGON ROUGE. STRICOM had recommended the award of the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award to the 1st Parachute Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, Belgian Army, and the following US Air Force units: Headquarters 464th Group Carrier Wing (TAC), all attached Air Force operational elements during the operation, and three MATS units to share an award (Det 1, 322d Air Division; 5th Aerial Port Squadron; and 58th Air Rescue Squadron). Headquarters 464th Wing (not the complete wing establishment) was recommended by STRICOM because most air crews were drawn from several squadrons of the wing, and many component units of the wing did not participate in the operation. If the recommendations were approved, sharing MATS units would receive a streamer for their flag, and attached personnel would be entitled to the individual ribbon. ²⁹⁵

(u) (FOUO) STRICOM also advised that Colonel Clayton M. Isaacson, Commander of JTFLEO, and Colonel Burgess Gradwell, commander of the airlift task force, had been recommended for the Legion of Merit. STRICOM had recommended, as well, through the JCS to the Department of Defense, that the Legion of Merit be awarded to Colonel Charles Laurient, who commanded the Belgian paratroopers. Joint Service Commendation Medals would be or had been awarded to certain members of STRICOM, and Department of the Army had received from STRICOM a recommendation that air medals be awarded to certain members of Company A, 1/23 Infantry. ²⁹⁶

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CHAPTER VIII
COMMUNICATIONS

(U) TS In accordance with USCINCEUR Special Operations Plan 319/64, published on 14 November, CINCUSAFE was to deploy one USAFE Talking Bird communications package to support DRAGON ROUGE as required. A cryptographically secure circuit was to be established into the DCS station at Wheelus Air Base or San Pablo, Spain, and an unclassified voice SSB circuit into the USAFE Twilight net. CINCUSAFE was directed at the same time to make necessary preparations to displace Talking Bird on order and to re-establish communications on an arrival at a new location. CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA was tasked in the same plan with providing progress reports of the operations, as available; the Talking Bird supplied by USCINCEUR would assist in meeting this requirement. ²⁹⁷

(U) TS Ambassador MacArthur, in Brussels, informed the US Secretary of State on 16 November 1964 that the American and Belgian Ambassadors to the Congo would transmit their recommendations for the final assault drop phase to their governments through US channels of communication, with a reply coming through the same channels. The reason given by Mr. Spaak to Ambassador MacArthur for selection of the US system was that the Belgians understood US communications to be more rapid and efficient than theirs. If the assault were recommended, minutes rather than hours would be important in saving the lives of the hostages. The US Secretary of State on 16 November approved the use of US communications channels for any further movement of the US/Belgian force beyond Ascension. ²⁹⁸

On 16 November (2311Z) USCINCEUR, in accordance with the plan, directed CINCUSAFE to deploy one Talking Bird communications package to Ascension Island by the most expeditious route to provide communications support to the DRAGON ROUGE force through the completion of the operation. CINCEUR further instructed the airlift commander that on his arrival at Ascension he would establish communications with USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCSTRIKE, Commander Joint Task Force Leopoldville (COMUSJTFLFO), and the JCS (NMCC). He also was to provide Headquarters USEUCOM and CINCUSAFE with progress reports en route. During the stay on Ascension Island the airlift commander would submit daily situation reports to the unified headquarters, and information copies would be forwarded to CINCSTRIKE, CINCUSAFE, and COMUSJTFLFO. ²⁹⁹

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(u)(TS) CINCSTRIKE in a message to USCINCEUR dated 16 November stated that a CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA task in the coming Congo operation would be to provide flash precedence reports to all addressees upon arrival of the airlift at Kamina. This would include launch of the assault element and progress reports of the operation. CINCSTRIKE therefore requested clarification as to what communications USCINCEUR would require and also wished to know what communications USCINCEUR planned to install and operate from the objective area to Leopoldville. Joint Task Force Leopoldville currently was capable of providing voice links only from Kamina in support of the operation. 300

(u)(TS) USCINCEUR answered on 17 November that the only USEUCOM communications link planned for insertion into the Congo was one AN/URC-44 Talking Bird communications package. This would accompany the airlift to Ascension, set up, and operate into San Pablo, Spain, Wheelus, or other appropriate DCS entry point. When assault aircraft launched to the Congo, Talking Bird was to proceed to Kamina and re-establish communications from that point. Communications resources of JTFLEO and Belgian forces engaged also would be used as feasible and necessary. 301

(u)(TS) STRICOM on 17 November requested the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, in view of extremely limited in-country communications, to augment the support proposed by USCINCEUR with a secure teletype link between Kamina and Leopoldville. STRICOM would provide AN/TSB-15SSB radios, with K-53 secure teletype terminals. Deployment of two AFSTRIKE C-130 aircraft to Leopoldville was proposed at the same time, with movement to take place after the launch of the assault airlift force from Kleine-Brogel, Belgium, to Ascension. STRICOM also recommended retention of one AN/TSC-15 radio terminal to Leopoldville, the second radio terminal to be transported to Kamina with the movement of JTFLEO C-130 aircraft. This proposed radio link would provide essential alternate communications from Kamina into DTS/DCS via the American Embassy in Leopoldville as well as an initial communications link between Leopoldville and Ascension Island. 302

(u)(TS) CINCUSAFE on 17 November instructed the 322d Air Division to fulfill the USCINCEUR requirement for a Talking Bird communications facility to Ascension Island in support of DRAGON ROUGE. The Talking Bird would establish long-haul voice and secure teletype communications between Ascension Island and Wheelus Air Base. It also was to set up a Twilight station for entry into the USAFE commander's radio net. Talking Bird would be deployed to arrive at Ascension Island no later than 1200Z,

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18 November, and the communications team would establish their facility immediately. The Talking Bird was to be followed in approximately three hours by an airlift task force in support of DRAGON ROUGE, and the communications facility then would come under the operational control of the airlift commander. 303

(u)(TS) The flight crew and communications personnel were to maintain a four-hour alert posture during the deployment to permit an immediate no-notice redeployment, if so directed by USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, or the DRAGON ROUGE airlift commander. The duration of this deployment was not known, but Talking Bird was directed to deploy with a self-sustaining capability for 14 days' operation (24-hour day). There also was the possibility of a subsequent redeployment into the Congo area (possibly Kamina). This last would be at the direction of USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, or the DRAGON ROUGE airlift commander. 304

(u)(TS) The instructions from CINCUSAFE stated further that in accordance with communications security, the nickname DRAGON ROUGE would not be transmitted in the clear or associated in any way with the deployment in clear text transmissions. Information concerning the destination of the Talking Bird was to be handled as "For Office Use Only," and the normal Talking Bird call sign would not be used in any way which would reveal its location. For the period of the operation the static voice call sign of Talking Bird was to be "Baldwin," and the Twilight call sign would be "Twilight Eleven." 305

(u)(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff queried USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE on 17 November on communications concept for DRAGON ROUGE. Was the Talking Bird to communicate from Ascension to Wheelus or San Pablo or some other entry point? (The JCS preferred Wheelus.) Were frequencies established, and was a listening watch to be maintained at primary and alternate locations? How would communication be established with Stanleyville from Kamina and Leopoldville during successive stages of the operation? Would this include voice and secure teletype, and was it planned to move Talking Bird to Stanleyville at any time during the operation? 306

(u)(S) At 1235Z, 17 November, USAFE requested the 322d Air Division to obtain normal clearance for Talking Bird through Las Palmas. This clearance was obtained by representatives of the Joint US Military Group (JUSMG), Spain, at Torrejon at 1300Z, and the Talking Bird was airborne from Evreux on C-130E Number 21846 via Las Palmas to Ascension Island at 1410Z. 307

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(u)(TS) The aircraft arrived at Las Palmas at 2010Z, 17 November, refueled, and proceeded to Ascension Island, landing at 0547Z, 18 November. Off-load at Ascension began at 1100Z, with control monopole antenna up by 1055Z. The transmit log periodic antenna and receive log periodic antenna both were in position by 1130Z. An initial Twilight contact was attempted at 1300Z, but contact was not established until 1400Z. The first two-way voice contact was made with Wheelus Air Communications Station at 1631Z, 18 November, and the teletype circuit was secured and going to traffic at 1645Z of the same day. 308

(u)(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 November granted CINCSTRIKE the authority to deploy three C-130 aircraft to Leopoldville with two AN/TSB-15 and one AN/TSB-38 radio terminals with minimum essential operating personnel. No overflight of other African countries was authorized. The AFSTRIKE C-130s would redeploy after off-loading its equipment at Leopoldville. One AN/TSC-15 was to be sent to Kamina in the JTFLEO C-130 when the Joint Task Force moved to that city in accordance with the operation plan. 309

(u)(TS) On 18 November CINCSTRIKE instructed CINCAFSTRIKE that three C-130 aircraft were to depart MacDill Air Force Base with communications support equipment and personnel. In accordance with instructions, one C-130 with AN/TSC-15 would be positioned at Ascension, and the two remaining aircraft were to off-load at Leopoldville and return to the United States. The C-130 with AN/TSC-15 and communications personnel would remain under the operational control of CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. If the DRAGON ROUGE force deployed to Kamina, the C-130 also was to deploy there and come under control of COMUSJTFLEO.

(u)(TS) CINCSTRIKE informed the JCS late on 18 November that these three C-130 aircraft had left MacDill Air Force Base with STRICOM communications support element equipment and personnel and would arrive Ascension Island on 20 November. The STRICOM liaison officer also had left for Ascension. 310

(u)(TS) A message sent on 19 November from USCINCEUR to the DRAGON ROUGE airlift commander stated that it was understood that the following communication channels were available for TOP SECRET messages from the DRAGON ROUGE airlift commander into Europe: An off-line encryption from Talking Bird at Ascension, via Ascension AFE-83, to Kennedy AFE-71,

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thence into CONUS Defense Communications System for relay to European addresses. As an alternate, an off- or on-line encryption from Talking Bird at Ascension directly into Wheelus. Supplementing this, from 20 November on, would be a TOP SECRET capability via STRICOM AN/TSC-15, Ascension, to Leopoldville, thence via State Department systems into Asmara (Ethiopia); or via AN/TSC-38 direct to STRICOM headquarters. This was validated by the commander of the DRAGON ROUGE airlift on 20 November (1713Z).³¹¹

(u/s) The Talking Bird unit received verbal notification of redeployment to Kamina at 0130Z, 22 November. Secure teletype communications were terminated at 0155Z, 22 November, and Twilight was terminated at 0300Z following receipt of a teletype message from CINCSRIKE through the Ascension Island base communications at 0236Z, 22 November. With disassembly and aircraft loading completed, the Talking Bird C-130E departed Ascension Island at 0627Z, 22 November, arriving at Leopoldville at 1348Z, 22 November.³¹²

(u/s) After refueling, the Talking Bird deployed to Kamina, landing at 2017Z, 22 November; following the instructions of COMUSJTFLEO, it was not set up until the morning of 23 November. This delay apparently was caused by a difficulty in site selection resulting from aircraft congestion on the Kamina airfield. As the Talking Bird report states, the STRICOM communications support element already was in operation, having arrived beforehand at Kamina from Ascension Island.³¹³

(u/s) At 0300Z, 23 November, the airlift task force commander asked the Talking Bird team for radio operators to attempt a Twilight contact using aircraft HF-SSB equipment, and at 0330Z on 23 November contact was established with Twilight 6, using Wheelus Air Base as a relay point. The USAFE command post instructed the airlift commander to monitor all Twilight frequencies and establish a secure teletype circuit with the Wheelus Air Communications Station. At Kamina the Talking Bird team set up the conical monopole antenna by 0605Z, 23 November; and initial Twilight contact was made at 0637Z, 23 November. Receive log periodic antenna were set up by the team at 0645Z and transmit log periodic antenna by 0730Z. Long-haul frequency coordination with Wheelus Air Communications Station was coordinated via Twilight throughout the operation, and two-way secure teletype contact also was maintained.³¹⁴

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(u)(s) Long-Haul and Twilight were terminated at 1600Z, 28 November, on receipt of orders on 28 November to re-deploy all Belgian and US airlift forces by C-130 to Ascension Island, following the successful air landings at Stanleyville and Paulis.

(u)(s) The Talking Bird team departed Kamina at 2120Z, 28 November, arriving at Ascension at 0635Z, 29 November, where it set up equipment and established Twilight contact at 1025Z, 29 November; secure teletype contact was made with Wheelus at 1150Z, also on 29 November.

(u)(s) The Talking Bird was used to command the arrival and departure of the entire task force. All personnel were placed on normal shifts, and operations went smoothly. Upon the departure of the C-130s for Brussels, operational control of the Talking Bird reverted to the commander of the MATS liaison detachment, temporarily located at Ascension Island to assist the flow. ³¹⁵

(u)(s) In accordance with USAFE orders received at 1534Z on 1 December, Long-Haul and Twilight were terminated and the Talking Bird team departed Ascension on 2 December for home base. ³¹⁶

(u)(s) The team commander reported to CINCUSAFE that throughout the operation Twilight had received 51 phone patches and originated 26 phone patches. Twilight also had passed 113 outgoing and 103 incoming messages during the same time period, and had maintained a relatively constant contact with Headquarters USAF and CINCUSAFE. With mission coordination largely maintained over this net, it had proved to be the most valuable communications system provided to DRAGON ROUGE. Both launch orders were executed over the above net. ³¹⁷

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CHAPTER IX
INTELLIGENCE

(U) A report by the USAFE intelligence representative for DRAGON ROUGE to USCINCEUR stated that the size of the forces proved adequate for the mission and the selection of Ascension Island as an easily secured staging base was sound. The nature of the location was such that the perimeter of the encampment and aircraft parking area could be guarded without difficulty, outgoing communications could be censored, and training could be conducted without hostile observation. If concealment for an operation must be a requirement over an extended waiting period, there were inherent advantages in the choice of a remote location such as Ascension. 318

(U) In the opinion of the intelligence representative, even if the Congolese rebels or their supporters had possessed information that the DRAGON ROUGE force was present on Ascension Island, this would have been of small value. These forces still possessed the initiative to launch suddenly and unobserved from the selected assault base. .

(U) A major factor within the intelligence problem was the lack of time for tasked personnel to prepare themselves adequately for the mission. This also was true for those who had the responsibility for maintaining proper "need-to-know" controls or devising ways of getting help from outside agencies. The USAFE intelligence representative suggests in his report that a proper use of the Office of the US Air Attache in Brussels, who might have obtained from the Belgian MOD an up-to-date report on Kamina facilities, would have assisted materially the advance echelon of Joint Task Force, Leopoldville. The matter of detailed information concerning armament, strength, behaviour, etc., of the Congolese rebels probably was available through Belgian channels. This would have been very necessary if a pre-assault tactical briefing of air crews and paratroops had been necessary. 319

(U) The Belgian paracommando force commander's facility with English, his geniality, and his general good sense eliminated the need for assignment of a French-speaking US officer to the US airlift and Belgian paracommando forces. This might not be true in other contingency missions, and future planners should consider assigning an officer with a dual language facility to the commander's staff. 320

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(u)(s) The DCS/Intelligence and the CIIC, Headquarters USAFE, were to follow closely the situation both within and without the Congo and forward all source intelligence information to the USAFE intelligence representative with DRAGON ROUGE. This would be relayed to the Belgian and US airlift command. The system worked well except that the TOP SECRET classification originally applied caused a delay in handling and receipt. 321

(u)(s) To protect US sources the intelligence representative copied these reports in longhand before giving them to the Belgian staff. 322

(u)(s) On the morning of 19 November at Ascension Island, the USAFE intelligence representative was briefed for the first time on the status of Belgian information concerning the hostages in Stanleyville and rebel activities there. The Belgian paratroop commander, Colonel Laurient, and his staff had a large-scale 1958 aerial mosaic of the city which had not been annotated with recent urban changes. From this map the Belgian paracommandos had worked out "a simple but effective" plan for securing the airfield and sending two fast columns into the modern quarter of the city to discover Europeans. The Belgian Government had furnished Colonel Laurient and his staff with recently compiled rosters of hostages, arranged by nationality; but there was no current information as to their place of confinement. The Belgians also had in their possession photography from the 6 November RAINDROP mission which showed the Stanleyville runway. Each square centimeter was studied with a magnifying glass, but cloud cover and the distance from which the obliques were taken made the prints virtually useless for the identification of ground defenses or disposition of rebel soldiers. 323

(u)(s) For the above reasons all the information reported in USAFE CIIC situation reports (SITREPS) (including a State Department message of 20 November which referred to a central prison "where a number of Americans and Belgians were imprisoned") were weighed against the tactical plan. These reports were confusing, however, since the information that the hostages had been moved from the city was incorrect. The information about oil drums on the runway, however, was good but only partially correct, since there were wrecks of trucks and other vehicles obstructing the area as well. The DRAGON ROUGE force also had no warning from intelligence information about two heavy machine guns sited at the west end of the runway, or of the presence of armed rebels concealed there and in the wooded terrain to the north of the runway. 324

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(u)(S) From the intelligence viewpoint this general lack of detailed information about the location of the hostages and ground defenses in the vicinity of the airfield might have become a serious matter if the rebels had been present in greater strength. 325

(u)(S) On 19 November at Ascension Island it also was discovered that none of the Belgian paracommando force had been in Stanleyville recently enough to be familiar with building locations and thus qualified to guide the rescue columns. This was contrary to earlier assumptions by the several planning agencies. 326

(u)(S) The USAFE intelligence representative and a Mr. Clingerman, who was assigned as State Department representative to the Joint Task Force and recently had been the US Consul in Stanleyville, therefore drafted an appeal to the US State Department to permit Mr. Clingerman to land with the assault force. 327

(u)(S) While denied at first because of the "no incidents involving US personnel" policy, the request was indorsed by Ambassador Godley at Leopoldville and approved at State Department level on 23 November, just before the assault. 328

(u)(S) The USAFE intelligence representative at the same time requested the US Joint Task Force Leopoldville to prepare in advance, from all information available to them in the Congo, a detailed map showing the latest reported hostage confinements. Since little information was available from the Congolese National Army (ANC) headquarters in Leopoldville or from Colonel Vanderwalle's ANC and mercenary column then approaching Stanleyville, the results produced did not constitute much more complete intelligence than that available at Ascension Island. 329

(u)(S) The RUNNING BEAR aerial photographic missions, begun on 17 November and completed on 20 November, produced a set of oblique pictures on a small scale which were considered to be of acceptable quality. These were not delivered to the tactical forces at Kamina, however. Two sets of prints were sent to Rhein-Main for transshipment to Brussels by C-124; the prints were forwarded from Brussels to Torrejon Air Base in Spain and finally were returned to USAFE. Torrejon apparently never was alerted to the arrival of these pictures or of the USAFE intelligence representative's location. Disposition instructions for the film were being requested by Torrejon as late as 1323Z, 24 November, one day after the assault on Stanleyville.

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(4)(S) Film and prints, however, had been delivered first to the reconnaissance branch of DCS/Intelligence, Headquarters USAFE, by 1800Z, 20 November, and an interim photo-interpretation report then was transmitted to the USAFE intelligence representative at 2230Z, 21 November. This report again cited the oil drums on the runway and pointed out the more serious obstacles in the form of wrecks scattered over the airfield, although no detailed information could be supplied on possible ground weapons, location of rebel forces, or confinement of hostages. 330

(4)(S) At the time this message was received, Talking Bird was packing all gear for its move to Kamina, and the responsibility for current intelligence was passed from the USAFE representative to JTFLEO. 331

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CHAPTER X
WORLD OPINION

(U)(C) A memorandum prepared for Deputy USCINCEUR by the Director of Intelligence, J-2 Division, Headquarters USEUCOM, pointed out that understanding and support for the Congo rescue operations were widespread among West European governments. Public statements, however, released by the West German, Austrian, and Scandinavian governments suggested only lukewarm support. Greece and Turkey expressed informal approval of the move, while France, the United Kingdom, and Spain cooperated in the operation by permitting overflight and landing rights in their home territories and overseas possessions. 332

(U)(S) The reaction of France, as the host country for Headquarters, United States European Command, is of particular interest. A representative of the American Embassy in Paris stated in an interview with the Command Historian of USEUCOM that the French Foreign Ministry approved of DRAGON ROUGE in the sense that "it had to be done." They also considered Tshombe to be political poison to all the other African states, both north and south of the Sahara. It thus might be said that all categories of French opinion consented to the operation but without approval.

(U)(FOUO) The American Embassy in Paris therefore considered noteworthy a statement made on 16 November to the Security Council by the French Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

(U)(F) This statement said that (1) France refused to engage in "unilateral accusations" and to associate itself with "biased condemnations"; (2) the Belgo-American operation was duly authorized by a government which "like it or not" was the legal government of the Congo; (3) the operation permitted "liberation of the majority of all hostages unjustly held and threatened," including forty-odd French; (4) this was a "humanitarian aspect" of initiative which was not without drawbacks or risks but "achieved to a large extent, and with minimum possible damage, the specific limited results expected by public opinion of states whose nationals were in danger"; (5) accusations and recriminations were useless and the Congo situation required "long, patient effort by all" to extirpate the root of evil; (6) Congolese problems must be solved by Congolese, but France still hoped that other African states "naturally interested in having the Congo find its feet" would do their utmost to help re-establish its domestic peace and tranquility. 333

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(u) American Embassy representatives further pointed out that C. L. Sulzberger's article on foreign affairs in the 4 January edition of the New York Times probably stated accurately de Gaulle's personal attitude toward the Congo operation. This says in paragraph seven that General de Gaulle "didn't disapprove of US/Belgian intervention to save white hostages but argues this did nothing to settle the basic situation. It only helped the surviving hostages who are much better off in Belgium than in the Congo. On the fundamental problem (Western interference in Congo politics - the very nature of the Congo is anarchic and will not alter) de Gaulle feels very reserved." 334

(u) These statements are supported by a message sent on 30 November by the American Ambassador in Paris to the Secretary of State which said that the Foreign Minister's cabinet director (M. Beaumarchais) had informed American Embassy representatives that M. Couve de Murville strongly supported the Congo hostage operation. He also was annoyed with the French "chitchat" criticizing the rescue mission. When appreciation was expressed for French Foreign Office assistance, M. Beaumarchais again repeated the real Quai d'Orsay position in the matter. 335

(u) A confidential telegram from the American Embassy in Paris to the State Department, dispatched on 3 December, stated that Le Monde's handling of the Stanleyville operation had not been altogether hostile to the United States. In spite of press treatment and occasional "snide" remarks by officials, the American Embassy considered the role of the Government of France in the Stanleyville rescue operation both significant and helpful. (1) The French had joined in appeals to Prime Minister Kenyatta for OAU and International Red Cross presence in the Congo. (2) The French also might have been instrumental in securing a certain amount of support from Senegal, Upper Volta, and Malagasy for appeals which focused world opinion on rebel treatment of hostages. (3) French authorities were helpful in the staging and overflight of US aircraft (as the embassy telegram pointed out, this last fact must be "closely held"). 336

(u) While the French press had stressed opposition by various African countries to the Congo rescue mission, it was probable that the French Government was happy to escape African anger. The message concluded by saying that the Government of France, while following its own course on the Stanleyville operation, was cooperative once given the complete details of the situation. The State Department's decision to keep the Government of France informed therefore seemed to have been productive. 337

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(U)C In regard to Soviet Bloc reactions and the attitude of Yugoslavia, the J-2 memorandum of 3 December stated that the joint operation was strongly condemned. The Soviet Union and several satellite states protested sharply, but no threat of military action was involved. The Soviet position apparently represented a "pro-forma" protest by which Moscow hoped to take credit for the subsequent withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo. India and Pakistan took somewhat equivocal positions, expressing "surprise and concern" and calling for early withdrawal of the forces. Malaysia voiced disapproval, and Indonesia strongly condemned the action. Latin American sentiment generally was sympathetic to the US position, and a number of governments stated either publicly or privately their approval of the operation. 338

(U)C Communist China protested strongly, and large demonstrations were organized throughout the country - a not-unexpected reaction. 339

(U)S A State Department Research Memorandum issued on 4 December 1964 summarizes very well African reactions to the Stanleyville and Paulis operations.

(U)S This states that "African reactions to the Stanleyville and Paulis air-drops were predominantly adverse, although the wide latitude in the vehemence of responses made generalizations difficult." A few states were sympathetic, but a greater number remained publicly silent. In State Department opinion, the latter should be considered a favorable reaction. The majority were critical; but within this group significant differences emerged in the quality and motivation of the responses. 340

(U)S Nineteen African states thus went on record as opposing the Stanleyville-Paulis rescue operation. These the State Department divided into two main groups: the "Radicals," and the "Moderates." 341

The "Radicals" included Algeria, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Egypt (UAR). These were countries which "more or less consistently had approved or actually lent support to active efforts to unseat Tshombe and assist the rebels." 342

The "Moderates" were listed as the Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauretania, Somali Republic, and Zambia. Although several of these had spoken in harsh terms against the

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operation, none was committed to a completely anti-Tshombe and pro-rebel position. Some, for example, qualified public positions with private admissions that Belgian and US deep concern for the fate of the hostages was understandable. 343

Eleven African countries avoided taking a public position. Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya privately informed United States representatives of their misgivings about the air-drops but indicated awareness that the operation was an attempt to cope with a serious problem. These three made it quite clear that if a public stand must be taken, it would have to be in line with "general African consensus" and thus would involve a condemnation of the Belgian/US action. 344

(u)(s) The presidents of Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast, and Niger had expressed privately to United States representatives their approval of the rescue operation, but no public statement to this effect was made. In State Department opinion, these states apparently were attempting to moderate African reactions, since their United Nations representatives were instructed to oppose Algerian efforts for Security Council action. 345

(u)(s) Cameroon, Gabon, Malawi, Ruanda, and Sierre Leone officially remained silent. President Mba, of Gabon, privately approved the rescue operation, and the governments of the four other named states also privately expressed approval. It was felt that none of these would oppose an African majority favoring a strong condemnation.

(u)(s) Two states, Senegal and Togo, gave qualified approval. Senegal admitted that circumstances might justify such an operation but disapproved of intervention in principle; the President of Togo conceded that a state might have the right to call for outside assistance in an emergency. 346

(u)(s) The President of the Malagasy Republic and the Foreign Minister of Nigeria made "strong and unequivocal statements" supporting the rescue mission. 347

(u)(c) The J-2 memorandum cited in the first paragraph of this chapter stated that it was believed that both President Nyerere of Tanzania (listed among the "Radicals" by the State Department paper), and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (a "Moderate" state), had been forced by circumstances to adopt more radical positions than those they favored personally. 348

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(U) (FOUO) State Department Circular 1025 of 24 November 1964 also had said that Emperor Haile Selassie expressed privately to American representatives in his country that he understood why the operation was necessary, but knew that the rest of Africa would see it as a neo-colonialist venture. 349

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254. Msg, JCS 002330 EC IN 94591, JCS to CSAF, 26
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CHRONOLOGY

8-9 November

Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Paul Henri Spaak, visits Washington for talks with US State Department officials on critical Congo situation.

10 November

M. Spaak informs Ambassador MacArthur (Brussels) of Belgium's agreement to carry out contingency planning for use of Belgian paratroopers, carried by US aircraft, to rescue hostages held by rebels.

11 November

JCS authorizes USCINCEUR to send three planners from USEUCOM to Brussels for contingency planning with Belgians.

14 November

USCINCEUR Special Operations Plan 319/64, "USEUCOM Assault/Evacuation Support, Congo (TS)" (nickname DRAGON ROUGE), completed and sent to JCS for approval.

HQ 322d Air Division advised of impending major operation.

15 November

1605Z - USCINCEUR OPLAN DRAGON ROUGE received at HQ 322d Air Division.

16 November

DRAGON ROUGE planning meeting of USAFE and HQ 322 Air Division representatives at Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany.

322d Air Division DRAGON ROUGE battle staff placed in full operation.

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17 November

0480Z - JCS approves USCINCEUR Special OPLAN 319/64.

1410Z - Talking Bird airborne from Evreux Air Base, via Moron and Las Palmas, to Ascension Island.

1450Z - Action Officer HQ USEUCOM directs launch of prime mission C-130Es from Evreux Air Base to Kleine-Brogel, Belgium.

1655Z - First prime mission aircraft airborne from Evreux to Kleine-Brogel.

2130 - First prime mission aircraft airborne - Kleine-Brogel; Moron, Spain; Ascension Island.

18 November

0547Z - Talking Bird arrives Ascension Island.

2125Z - Prime flow of C-130E aircraft completed to Ascension Island.

19 November

Four C-124 support aircraft from Rhein-Main off-load two F-6 refueling units at Kamina, Republic of the Congo, and proceed to Leopoldville.

0620-0710Z - Three C-124 aircraft with tents, cots, and rations arrive Ascension Island.

20 November

1457Z - JCS informs USCINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFA and USCINCEUR that operational control of DRAGON ROUGE airlift force will pass to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA on receipt of message.

Government of Belgium releases public announcement of transfer of Belgian troops in US planes to Ascension Island.

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21 November

1721Z - JCS directs CINCS TRIKE to launch DRAGON ROUGE force to Kamina as soon as possible.

1950Z - Air stream Ascension to Kamina begins at 10-minute intervals.

22 November

DRAGON ROUGE airlift force and Talking Bird arrive Kamina - operational control for CINCS TRIKE assumed by Commander USJTFL EO.

23 November

1910Z - JCS directs execution of final assault phase on Stanleyville; D-day, H-hour, 24/0400Z.

24 November

0045Z - First prime mission aircraft airborne for target area.

0400Z - Preplanned assault on Stanleyville under way.

25 November

2309Z - JCS directs execution of DRAGON NOIR, follow-up operation to seize Paulis airfield and evacuate foreign nationals; D-day, H hour, 26/0400Z.

26 November

0400Z - Operation DRAGON NOIR begun on schedule.

DRAGON NOIR mission completed; all aircraft returned to Kamina.

28 November

2058Z - Redeployment of DRAGON ROUGE forces from Kamina to Ascension.

2120Z - Talking Bird departs Kamina for Ascension Island for purposes of communication linkage and relay.

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29 November

1659Z - All USCINCEUR C-130Es, including Talking Bird, arrive Ascension Island from Kamina.

30 November

1000Z - Prime mission C-130E aircraft depart Ascension via Las Palmas to Brussels. Command passed from USCINSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to USCINCEUR on departure.

1 December

1200 (local) - All available US air crews and support members attend joint formation in Brussels, at which time the King of Belgium addressed all DRAGON ROUGE participants. Airlift and airborne commanders decorated by the King with the Order of Leo II.

2 December

DRAGON ROUGE airlift forces return to Evreux from Brussels.

2320Z - Talking Bird arrives home base from Ascension.

3 December

Final DRAGON ROUGE support mission departs Ascension for home base, moving ACF personnel, rigging gear, and an AFSTRIKE communications van.

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CY #51

DATE 14	TIME
MONTH Nov	YEAR 64

RELEASE

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Plans, J-3

Appendix A

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FROM:

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19978

secure the Stanleyville airfield; (b) locate and liberate non-Congolese residents of Stanleyville being held as hostages by rebel forces; (c) escort non-Congolese nationals desiring evacuation to Stanleyville airfield; and (d) evacuate such nationals by air to Leopoldville (N'Djili) airport for further disposition as arranged by individual national diplomatic representatives. Execution of this plan will be ordered only after US/Belgian governmental agreement.

Situation: The town of Stanleyville is in Congolese rebel hands and non-Congolese population (approximately 800 persons, including approximately 20 US civilians and 5 US consular officials) is being held as hostage against Congolese attack on rebel held city — particularly against air attacks by Congolese B-26 and T-28 aircraft. Rebel captors have threatened to take lives of certain (or all) of these hostages if an attack is mounted against Stanleyville; meanwhile, abuses against hostages continue. Congolese national forces are mounting attacks along ground access lines to Stanleyville from the South and West. As these forces advance, the safety and survival of hostages may be threatened to point that extraordinary measures are required by mobile external forces to liberate and evacuate hostages prior to arrival of Congolese national forces; or, it may be necessary to take similar protective measures in event of extreme danger to hostages associated with arrival and attack by Congolese forces. The primary avenue of attack on Stanleyville by governmental forces is from the South where a force commanded by Col Van der Walle is on right bank of Congo River expected to resume its move north from Punia approximately 17-18 November. This force planning to reach Stanleyville about 22 November. The

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USCINCEUR

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governments of the US and Belgium have agreed that, for urgent humanitarian reasons, they should conduct combined military contingency planning to develop a capability for paratroop assault on Stanleyville in order to liberate, protect, and evacuate non-Congolese hostages to Leopoldville. The inter-governmental agreement presently provides for combined planning only; a decision to execute, if made, will be by separate inter-governmental agreement and action. The US has committed itself to planning for the use of USEUCOM based C-130 aircraft and required support for transport of a Belgian paratrooper unit from Belgium to Stanleyville and for emergency evacuation of non-Congolese nationals from Stanleyville to Leopoldville. Belgian government has committed itself to planning for the use of airdropped and airlanded Belgian troops and equipment for the assault on Stanleyville as required to secure airfield and liberate hostages. Combined conferences between US and Belgian military planners took place in Brussels on 12-13 November to produce the following plan for US airlift support of the Belgian airborne operations. At termination of planning session, Belgian participants announced that their government did not anticipate any possibility of an execution order requiring deployment prior to 17 November.

Concept of Operations: (See Planning Time Outline, Appendix A). A. Enroute Phase — The US will employ twelve (12) C-130E aircraft to transport a Belgian airborne battalion of approximately 545 Belgian paratroopers, 8 jeeps, and 12 AS-24 motorized tricycles from Kleine-Brogel (KB) Air Base, Belgium, to Stanleyville in accordance with detailed schedule that follows (Appendices B and C). USEUCOM C-130Es will proceed from

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FROM:

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Evreux AB, France to Kleine-Brogel, with 00:15 separation between aircraft for loading troops and equipment. All motorized equipment will be loaded for airlanding; only troops and light weapons will be airdropped. Aircraft will not refuel at Kleine-Brogel and will proceed thru enroute refueling bases with 00:15 interval flow, allowing two hours on ground time for refueling at Spanish base (Torrejon or Moron, at USAFE option) and at Las Palmas, Canary Islands. Arrival of all aircraft at Ascension will be timed to occur during daylight hours. Twelve or more hours will be provided for refueling, crew and paratrooper rest at Ascension. Due to limited accommodations at Ascension personnel will be prepared to sleep in immediate vicinity of airfield with improvised facilities. Initial briefing on air assault operation and chalk number assignments for all personnel will be conducted by US airlift commander and Belgian airdrop commander prior to departure from Ascension.

Aircraft will depart Ascension, with 00:30 interval flow, timed to arrive Kamina AB, Congo, during hours of darkness. Refueling operations at Kamina prior to departure on assault phase will be conducted through combination of two small pump trucks (Bowzers) shuttling from bulk storage tanks, plus drum-pumped fuel, as feasible. To supplement existing refueling facilities, USAFE will make available one (1) US fuel truck for expedited airlift to Kamina via C-124 to supplement limited pump rate (40 gal per minute) of Bowzers. USAFE will dispatch C-124 with truck and necessary operator personnel at time of decision to execute, or as soon as possible thereafter, positioning US fuel truck prior to arrival of C-130Es from Ascension (remaining payload capability of C-124 will be utilized to transport C-Rations

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FROM:

CINCEUR

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for use in civilian refugee operations at Stanleyville.)

To insure maximum flexibility for assault staging from Kamina and to insure against possibility of refueling breakdown, mechanical trouble, etc., CINCSTRIKE will be requested to have JTF LEO position four AFSTRIKE in-country C-130Es at Kamina and refueled prior to arrival of USEUCOM C-130Es from Ascension. (Belgian officials will arrange for maximum possible security of the airfield area during entire on-ground period at Kamina to preclude presence of Belgian regular forces from becoming known.) In event refueling problems at Kamina appear disabling, airlift commander will have alternate plan to arrange for off load of Belgian personnel at Kamina, proceed to Elizabethville airport for fuel, returning to Kamina to make good assault staging schedule out of Kamina. No Belgian personnel should accompany aircraft to Elizabethville.

Assault Phase: Final briefings by airlift and airborne commanders and in-country intelligence officers will be conducted at Kamina. Aircraft chalk number loads and departure schedules will be as indicated in detailed schedule attached. (Appendix C). Chalk numbers one thru five with airdrop element (320 troops) will depart with minimum interval for enroute trail formation to initial point. Motorized equipment and crews, in chalk numbers six and seven will depart 00:30 after air drop element in order to be available in immediate area of Stanleyville airport for airlanding radio equipped and armored jeeps immediately upon being advised that airstrip is suitable for airlanding. This advice will be by radio, primary — green pyrotechnics, secondary. Chalk six and seven will adhere to the route as assault element to maintain spacing behind assault

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element. Chalk numbers eight through twelve will depart one hour after the initial assault element, planning an airlanding if the airfield is cleared. The troops in chalk eight, nine, and eleven will be prepared to airdrop on a designated area (golf course or airfield, as instructed) in event additional airdropped element is required.

Chalk ten, with twelve motorized tricycles (AS-24s) and drivers, and chalk twelve with medical supplies, rations, and addition ammunition will plan to circle in the immediate area until airfield clearing operations permit airlanding. A fuel decision time for orbiting aircraft will be provided by the airlift commander.

The initial assault element will proceed to an initial point approximately one hundred miles downriver (west) of Stanleyville, at Basoko (01°17"N — 23°38"E). At this point, a B-26 (or 2 B-26s, as available) will rendezvous with the assault element and provide a report on weather in the Stanleyville area, based on a wide peripheral recce run around Stanleyville, well out of earshot of the city. The B-26(s) will then escort chalk one to drop zone, remaining in immediate area of dropzone throughout airdrop operations. The B-26(s) pilots will be instructed to withhold offensive fire unless ground weapons pose a threat to transports or paratroopers, in which case they will be instructed to fire for immediate effect on source of rebel fires, or to provide random suppressive fires on suspected areas if unable to determine exact source. The B-26(s) will be supplemented by T-28s, as available, throughout the assault phase; these aircraft will be instructed to avoid immediate area of Stanleyville until the assault phase is underway, but be immediately available for

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suppressive fire in the area thereafter. Initial arrangements for these aircraft will be made by in-country Belgian Air Force representatives; however, final details will be coordinated at Kamina prior to take-off of assault phase.

Belgian paratroop commander plans to drop on Stanleyville golf course — just north and east of the airfield. Run-in will be up-river from west to east from initial point described above. Chalks will be in-trail, one minute interval between aircraft, with planned drop altitude of 1200' above the terrain (minimum Belgian airdrop altitude is 700' in emergency) and airspeed 120 knots. Presently, it is estimated that the drop zone will accommodate a 10-12 man stick through each C-130E door; thus, three passes over the drop zone will be conducted by each air-drop chalk number.

Airlift commander in chalk one will remain airborne in immediate area throughout subsequent airborne/airlanding operations.

Belgian paratroop commander presently plans for air assault element to form into three groups to accomplish initial tasks as follows: A - Block and control road leading to airport; B - Clear and occupy tower and Sabena guest house; C - Clear airfield. Two US radio sets will be provided to initial assault element and bi-lingual personnel trained in their use during enroute phase. Utilizing these radios, paratrooper commander will communicate airfield condition and special requests to airlift commander as required throughout the assault phase. Immediately following airstrip clearing and arrival of radio and armored jeeps, paratroopers will proceed into city proper to other known areas of stage imprisonment. As additional personnel and motorized

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equipment are available, he plans to broaden his penetration into city and consolidate his initial probing action. He plans to reestablish the control tower at the airfield and use it initially as a central point of communication.

To assist in evacuation, if required, chawks two thru five will remain overhead until ordered by airlift commander to proceed to Leopoldville for refueling and crew rest.

Airlanding/Evacuation Phase: It is estimated that no more than three C-130Es can be parked on Stanleyville airport at any one time; therefore, aircraft commanders of chawks eight, nine, and eleven — with airlanded troops — should plan on expedited offload and departure to permit maximum on-ground time for off-loading equipment in chawks six, seven, ten and twelve. Refugee evacuation on chawks eight, nine and eleven will be on a random basis. Following equipment off-load, chawks six, seven and ten will be utilized as primary aircraft to conduct initial evacuation of non-Congolese personnel immediately available at the airfield. Chawks six, seven and ten will remain on the airfield with engines running at ground-idle for 1:00 to 1:30 (fuel permitting) to on-load initial refugee flow prior to proceeding to Leopoldville. Up to 96 refugee personnel will be carried on each of these aircraft, if necessary. Chalk twelve will delay on-ground from 1:00 to 1:30 and will be the primary aircraft for evacuating any drop zone injuries and will have a US medical officer aboard with basic medical kit; this aircraft will also be used for refugee evacuation on a space available basis.

When the airfield is secure and the initial evacuation capability of the chawks is utilized; subsequent evacuation on D-Day will be planned through C-130E in-country resources of JTF

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LEO at Kamina. One pre-planned JTF LEO C-130E will depart Kamina at 0600Z on D-Day carrying C-Rations airlifted to Kamina with refueling unit in C-124. This C-130E will shut down, off-load C-Rations to Belgian airhead control team for consumption by refugees, and conduct evacuation of maximum number of refugees to Leopoldville. Also, aircraft commander will make positive contact to ascertain status of communications capability of Belgian paratroop commander with Kindu or Kamina, anticipated voluntary evacuation requirements remaining, and desired schedule for on-loading subsequent refugees from Stanleyville. This information will be relayed to JTF LEO commander and US Embassy officials at Leopoldville in order that additional evacuation missions can be planned, as required.

No involuntary evacuation of non-Congolese will be conducted — any matters concerning non-voluntary evacuation will be referred to diplomatic representatives.

Upon landing Leopoldville, airlift commander will provide narrative report (flash precedence) concerning actual conduct of assault and evacuation phases this operation to all addressees of this OPlan. Commander JTF LEO will assist in expediting this message and in providing gross info on evacuation situation at Leopoldville.

Following recovery of chalks one thru twelve at Leopoldville refueling and necessary crew rest, aircraft will prepare to return to home station via Wheelus. Airlift commander will report readiness for redeployment. Execution order for redeployment will be issued separately.

Friendly Forces;

A - State Department: 1) Obtains enroute, staging, and

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overflight rights as required for planned operations; 2) Assumes responsibility for US civilian evacuees from Stanleyville upon arrival at Leopoldville; 3) Arranges for appropriate diplomatic representatives to assume responsibility for non-US evacuees upon arrival at Leopoldville.

B - Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1) Issues execution order for this operation when required; 2) Authorizes assault airlift element and paratroop commander access to best available current intelligence on objective area.

C - United States Air Force: 1) Provides air-sea rescue facilities as may be required as result of emergencies occurring during planned operations during deployment and redeployment; 2) Positions one SAR aircraft at Ascension Island during deployment operations; 3) Provides enroute weather briefings and support, as required; 4) Arranges for required enroute air base support (Appendix D) for planned operations through Ascension Island, including best available messing and billeting facilities for US crews and Belgian paratroopers.

D - CINCSRIKE/USCINCMFAFSA: 1) Provides assistance in the Congo through facilities and capabilities of Chief, US Military Mission and JTF LEO as required to facilitate success of planned operation; 2) Directs deployment of four JTF LEO C-130Es to Kamina for emergency spare support of assault phase as outlined in concept of operations; 3) Provides US current intelligence briefing for crews and airborne commander at Kamina prior to assault phase; 4) Provides one JTF LEO C-130E for subsequent D-Day evacuation sortie as outlined in concept of operations; 5) Provides JTF LEO support for recovery and redeployment of chalk one through twelve at

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Leopoldville; 6) Provides flash precedence reports to all addressees this OPlan upon arrival chalks Kamina; launch of assault element from Kamina; progress reports of this operation, as available.

Tasks:

A - CINCUSAFE: 1) Assume over-all mission responsibility for this operation and designate airlift force commander for conduct of the enroute airlift support operations described herein; 2) Arrange for necessary enroute air base support (Appendix D, Estimate) from supporting commands and friendly forces; 3) Provide 12 C-130E aircraft, operating crews and enroute maintenance support for the assault and evacuation operations in the Congo. Adjust inter-command airlift requirements and expedite maintenance schedules as necessary to provide maximum availability of C-130Es from receipt of this order until execution or recapture of Stanleyville by other forces; 4) Provide minimum of one (1) C-130E spare aircraft through launch from Ascension. Following launch of primary aircraft to Kamina, spare proceeds directly to Leopoldville to assist in recovery and redeployment; 5) Deploy one F-6 refueling unit (or comparable) and operating personnel via C-124 aircraft to Kamina, to arrive in advance of airlift support force. Excess allowable cabin load (ACL) will be used to transport C-Rations for civilian evacuees from Stanleyville. If more refined computations indicate two refueling units are required, deploy two and additional rations. Redeploy refueling units at completion of operation; 6) Provide two (2) airdroppable radios (on loan), pyrotechnics and briefings to Belgian paratrooper personnel to facilitate air-ground communications at Stanleyville; 7) Provide one medical officer

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with emergency aeromedical kit to accompany chalk twelve, as outlined in concept of operation; 8) Provide best and most current intelligence information available on Stanleyville area situation to airlift commander and Belgian paratroop commander. Request urgent waivers on classification, as required.

B - CINCUSAREUR: 1) On call, provide an 8th Infantry Division airborne officer, who is knowledgeable on details of this plan and on C-130E airborne operations to assist Belgian paratrooper commander with unanticipated planning problems; 2) Provide C-Rations for civilian refugee use as required to fill out C-124(s) ACL as described in para A5, above.

General Considerations:

A - Only C-130Es are capable of conducting this mission; consequently, the sixteen C-130Es in USEUCOM must be scheduled carefully during the vulnerability period for execution of this plan to preclude inability to mount mission. If necessary, C-130As could be used to transport paratroopers from Kleine-Brogel to Torrejon/Moron, substituting C-130Es prior to Spanish departure. If C-130E availability drops below minimum of 12 primary and one (1) spare available by departure from Spanish base, external support must be requested immediately. Should C-130As be used on Evreux-Kleine-Brogel-Torrejon/Moron legs, they should be out-loaded only with personnel to facilitate substituting C-130Es at refueling stops.

B - Due to priority nature of mission and urgent humanitarian aspects of actions contemplated, crew-days will be unusually long on legs from Evreux-Ascension (26:00) and Ascension-Assault-Leopoldville (28:00); consequently, crews should avail themselves of all opportunities for enroute rest on

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both mission legs. Directive to execute this mission constitutes authority to adhere to extended crew days.

C - Political/military considerations involved in the Stanleyville situation are such that first launch from Kleine-Brogel is not expected prior to 1840Z, 17 November; however, possibility of necessity to execute in the 7-10 day period following that date is great.

D - Security of this operation is unusually critical; thus, Belgian forces require a minimum of 12 hours notification prior to night time load and launch from Kleine-Brogel, even with warning; US forces require daylight landing for all aircraft in Ascension. These factors, plus desirability of going through Spanish base refueling during hours of darkness for additional security against compromise, dictate a first launch time from Kleine-Brogel of 1840Z. Therefore, an execution decision made after 0640Z of any given day would require a delay in launch until 1840Z of the following day.

E - It has been arranged by agreement between the planning representatives of the US and Belgian military authorities that:

- 1) The refueling and general security at Kamina (Baka) is the responsibility of the Belgian Air Force Detachment there;
- 2) The enroute decisions concerning the mission are the responsibility of the airlift commander -- the decisions concerning the actual drop will be the responsibility of the paratroop commander;
- 3) Whenever possible, decisions affecting the mission will be through mutual discussion and agreement of the two commanders; however; (a) The Belgian Commander will provide an experienced paratroop officer in the cockpit of each assault aircraft to make individual decisions concerning the drop zone,

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greenlight, etc. — and the Belgians will accept the responsibility for the drop, (b) The responsibility for the airlift operation from Kleine-Brogel to drop zone rests with the US airlift commander; 4) Pre-drop area recce, and close air support if required, will be arranged for by the in-country representative of the Belgian Air Force with the FAC (Congolese Air Force) at Kamina. The Belgian AF officer participating in the operation will brief FAC pilots; 5) All concerned recognize the extreme criticality of surprise in this airdrop operation and the necessity to avoid any detection of aerial activity in the Stanleyville area prior to actual airdrop operations. Close air support aerial fires will be rendered when needed, but only when needed; 6) The mission of the US C-130Es in support of the paratroop operation will come to an end when (a) all that is to be delivered is delivered and (b) the evacuation of civilians is completed to the satisfaction of US and Belgian political authorities in-country; 7) The execution order will be transmitted by the highest military authorities of both governments and that, at the latest, 12 hours before directed first launch from Kleine-Brogel at 1840Z.

F - In event assault operation cannot be accomplished after airlift force airborne from Kamina, Belgian planners consider base security at Kamina offers far greater capability to maintain secrecy and prevent compromise during delayed assault phase. Belgians acknowledge Leopoldville support facilities better. Pre-assault decision to abort, and selection of missed-drop recovery base, should be taken by agreement between airlift commander and paratroop commander considering: 1) Pre-assault support and refueling experience at Kamina, 2) Location and circumstances at time decision becomes necessary, 3) Degree

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of possible exposure presence and intention of assault force.

If refueling support Kamina acceptable and mission not considered completely compromised, pre-drop abort recovery base should be Kamina. In event of abort, subsequent air assault drop would not be planned earlier than 0400Z of the following day. Belgians desire to adhere to 0400Z drop timing, regardless; paratrooper commander and majority subordinate officers personally experienced in Stanleyville, consider daybreak best.

G - Belgian cover story for use in the event of premature compromise or unavoidable disclosure, admittedly weak, is "joint US/Belgian long range airborne training exercise. US forces involved should avoid any statements concerning this operation to personnel not known to be cleared by responsible commander for access to this information.

Special Instructions:

A - The Belgian paratroop commander selected 0400Z (daybreak, 0600 local) as his desired drop time on Stanleyville.

B - Unclassified nickname of this operation, assigned by Belgians, is "DRAGON ROUGE". Code designators for bases involved assigned as follows:

Kleine-Brogel	STOP ONE
Torrejon or Moron	STOP TWO
Las Palmas	STOP THREE
Ascension	STOP FOUR
Kamina (Baka)	STOP FIVE
Stanleyville	STOP SIX
Leopoldville	STOP SEVEN

C - At this time, agreed emergency common frequency for use in contacting B-26(s), T-28s will be 118.1 mcs (Congo

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tower common); this, however, will be reviewed for possible change at Kamina assault briefing. The need for change is based on possibility that Stanleyville tower, in rebel hands, may be operating. Mercenary pilots manning B-26s and T-28s probably Cubans and bi-lingual.

Command and Control:

- (1) U.S. and Belgian forces will remain under respective national command at all times during this operation.
- (2) USCINCEUR will pass operational control of the assault airlift force to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA upon arrival at Kamina.
- (3) CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA will pass operational command of assault airlift force to USCINCEUR upon redeployment from Leopoldville enroute Wheelus.
- (4) Due to the particular way in which the combined planning for this operation was conducted, any desired deviations from the timing, concept of operations, or agreements between the planning representatives of the US and Belgian governments, except in cases of emergency, must be referred to the JCS, info USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE.
- (5) The airlift commander will inform CINCSTRIKE, info USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE when he is prepared for redeployment from Leopoldville.

Approval and Execution: This plan is submitted for urgent consideration by the JCS; meanwhile it will be utilized for initial planning purposes by friendly forces and task organizations. Belgian planning is proceeding in accordance with concept and schedules contained herein. Execution of this plan will be as directed by the JCS.

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Attachments - This special OPlan has four (4) Appendices
as follows:

- A - Outline Time/Distance Planning Table.
- B - Deployment Time Table.
- C - Employment Time Table - Assault Phase.
- D - Estimated Enroute Base Support Requirements.

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Appendix A to USCINCEUR OPLAN 319-64 (DRAGON ROUGE)

	<u>Distance (NM)</u>	<u>Time</u>
From Evreux AB to Kleine-Brogel (STOP ONE)	235	1+00
From Kleine-Brogel to Torrejon/Moron (STOP TWO)	730	2+50
From Torrejon/Moron to Las Palmas (STOP THREE)	1,010	4+00
From Las Palmas to Ascension (STOP FOUR)	2,350	9+00
From Ascension to Kamina (STOP FIVE)	2,405	9+15
From Kamina to Stanleyville (STOP SIX)	550	2+15
From Stanleyville to Leopoldville (STOP SEVEN)	680	2+45

NOTE: 1. Distances approximate.
2. Times based on 270 KTAS — no wind plus allowance for climb.

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Appendix B to USCINCEUR OPLAN 319-64

DEPLOYMENT TIME TABLE

CHALK NO	DEPLOYMENT LOAD	KLEINE BROGEL		TORREJON		LAS PALMAS		ASCENSION		KAM- INA ETA
		ETA	ETD	ETA	ETD	ETA	ETD	ETA	ETD	
6	4 Jeeps + 13 troops (Recon)	1640	1840	2140	2400	0430	0630	1530	0630	1630
7	4 Jeeps + 8 troops (Radio)	1655	1855	2155	0015	0445	0645	1545	0700	1700
	12-AS-24's+12 troops	1710	1910	2210	0030	0500	0700	1600	0730	1730
1	57 troops	1725	1925	2225	0045	0515	0715	1615	0800	1800
2	57 troops	1740	1940	2240	0100	0530	0730	1630	0830	1830
3	57 troops	1755	1955	2255	0115	0545	0745	1645	0900	1900
4	57 troops	1810	2010	2310	0130	0600	0800	1700	0930	1930
5	57 troops	1825	2025	2325	0145	0615	0815	1715	1000	2000
8	56 troops	1840	2040	2340	0200	0630	0830	1730	1030	2030
	57 troops	1855	2055	2355	0215	0645	0845	1745	1100	2100
11	57 troops	1910	2110	0010	0230	0700	0900	1800	1130	2130
12	57 troops	1925	2125	0025	0245	0715	0915	1815	1200	2200

NOTE:

1. Jeep wt. 3900 lbs each (Recon).
2. Jeep wt. 4070 lbs each (Radio).
3. Troop wt. 260 lbs.
4. AS-24 wt. 880 lbs.
5. All times are ZULU.
6. See appendix C for employment time table.

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Appendix C to USCINCEUR OPLAN 319-64.

EMPLOYMENT TIME TABLE - Assault/execution phase

CHALK NO.	EMPLOYMENT LOAD	KAMINA ETA ETD	02/12 ETA	N'DJILI ETA
1	64 troops (Air Drop)	1800 0100	0400	Not pre-planned
2	64 troops (Air drop)	1830 0101	0401	"
3	64 troops (Air drop)	1900-0102	0402	"
	64 troops (Air drop)	1930 0103	0403	"
5	64 troops (Air drop)	2000 0104	0404	"
6 *	4 jeeps + 13 troops (Air land)	1630 0130	0430	"
7 *	4 jeeps + 8 troops (Air land)	1700 0131	0431	"
8	64 troops (Rigged for A/D but A/L if possible)	2030 0200	0500	"
9.	64 troops (Rigged for A/D but A/L if possible)	2100 0201	0501	"
10.	12 A1-24's + 12 troops (AirLand)	1730 0202	0502	"
11	64 troops (Air Land)	2130 0203	0503	"
	Ammo/rations/med supplies (Air land)	2200 0204	0504	"

* Be prepared to orbit if airfield not yet secure and clear, land
on signal from ground troops (green smoke or radio).

NOTE:

1. Air drop 1 min. in trail.
2. 12 mm sticks; side door exit; 3 passes required.
3. Green light "on" over visual release point as determined by
Belgian "dispatcher" on flight deck who will give steering
instructions and "green light-on" to pilot.

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Appendix D to USCINCEUR OPLAN 319-64

ENROUTE BASE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. Fuel (JP — prim./AvGas — Alt):

- a. Kleine-Brogel none
- b. Torrejon/Moron 75,000 gal.
- c. Las Palmas 30,000 gal.
- d. Ascension 90,000 gal.
- e. Kamina 36,000 gal.
- f. N'Djili as required

2. Quarters (crew rest):

- a. Ascension — 96 crew members, 545 Belgian troops.

(1) Crew members must be prepared to use own sleeping bags.

(2) Belgian troops will be prepared to use own sleeping bags.

(3) Folding cots inside hanger or other suitable shelter should be provided for troops if possible. If sleeping bags without cot are necessary, covered shelter such as hanger or other appropriate building is required.

- b. N'Djili — 96 officers/airman crew members.

3. Messing:

- a. Kleine-Brogel None
- * b. Torrejon yes (96 crew only)
- c. Las Palmas None
- d. Ascension yes (96 crew plus 545 Belgian troops)
- e. Kamina yes (96 crew only)

Belgian troop commander will make own arrangements for

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troop feeding at Kamina.

* Mobile canteens should be available at plane side.

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DOES NOT APPLY.

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TO: JCS

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

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SECSTATE

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
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Info: CINCAFSTRIKE LANGLEY AFB VA Info cont'd: ANMCC
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 AMEMB BRUSSELS BELGIUM NECPA
 AMEMB LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO
 JTF LEO, LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO
 BALDWIN TACTICAL COMM STA ASCENSION
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 REF: A. JCS 001921, 16 Nov; B. ECJCA 19978, 14 Nov; C. JCS
 001984, 18 Nov.

Subj: Supplemental Planning for Phase Two, USCINCEUR
 SPECIAL OPLAN 319/64, Title: USEUCOM Assault/Evacuation
 Support - Congo (TS), Nickname - DRAGON ROUGE.

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Nov	1964

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R. E. DOUGHERTY, BGen, USAF		RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY	
PHONE 8013		Brigadier General, USAF	
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Appendix B

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1. (U) (TS) Mission:

a. To plan for assault and evacuation airlift in support of Belgian paratroop attacks on rebel forces in Bunia, Paulis and Watsa, Democratic Republic of Congo, and other objective areas that may be designated. These assaults are designed to (1) secure the airfields in Bunia and Paulis and secure the city of Watsa; (2) locate and liberate non-Congolese residents held hostage by the rebel forces in these areas; and (3) escort these foreign hostages to evacuation points from which they can safely be evacuated to Leopoldville for further disposition as arranged by individual national diplomatic representatives.

b. To plan for tactical airlift support required to return the Belgian paratroopers and essential battalion equipment, deployed to the Congo in support of Operation DRAGON ROUGE, and this supplement thereto, to Belgium upon completion of DRAGON ROUGE and the follow-on operations described herein. (NOTE: Execution of this supplemental plan will be ordered only after US/Belgian governmental agreement. It is expected that US and Belgian diplomatic representatives in the Congo will provide latest information on hostage situation.)

2. (U) (TS) Situation: (see USEUCOM Special OPLAN 319/64, ref B)

a. In their action on USEUCOM OPLAN 319/64, the JCS approved the plan and executed the deployment phase of Operation DRAGON ROUGE to Ascension Island on 16 Nov 64. Execution of the assault phase of Operation DRAGON ROUGE from Ascension, via Kamina (Baka) Air Base, to Stanleyville is the subject of separate US/Belgian governmental agreement. Once the US and Belgian governments have agreed to launch Operation DRAGON

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ROUGE from Ascension, subsequent go no-go decisions concerning the assault phase will (except for unanticipated emergency situations concerning the safety of flight of the airlift support force) be made by the senior Belgian commander of the DRAGON ROUGE task force. It is anticipated that maximum danger to the hostages in Stanleyville will occur as the column of mercenaries and Congolese Army forces under Col Van der Walle (VDW) (now moving north out of Punia) launches the final stage of its attack northward to Stanleyville from approximately Lubutu. Expected arrival of VDW at Stanleyville is approximately 23-24 Nov.

b. Operation DRAGON ROUGE is designed to minimize the danger to non-Congolese hostages in Stanleyville and to provide for their liberation and evacuation, either in conjunction with or prior to the VDW assault on Stanleyville. Other hostages, however, are known to be held captive throughout the area of northeast Congo; their safety is also threatened by the northward push of the VDW column toward Stanleyville and the Maj DeCoster column moving north along the eastern Congo border. The major concentrations of these hostages are thought to be in the Bunia, Paulis and Watsa areas.

c. To expand the rescue and evacuation mission of DRAGON ROUGE to encompass these additional areas, military and political authorities of the US and Belgium have agreed to have their representatives conduct planning in Brussels to determine additional resources required in the Congo.

d. The combined planning effort was conducted on 18-19 Nov and this supplemental plan is the result of planning agreements made by representatives of the US and Belgium. This plan is submitted to the JCS for approval; a similar plan is being submitted

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by the Belgian representatives to their General Staff for approval.

3(4)(TS) Concept of Operations and Planning Considerations:

(NOTE: A combined planning concept for the conduct of these supplemental assaults on Bunia, Paulis, and Watsa was essential in order to determine resources required. Also, certain planning assumptions had to be made concerning time phasing and sequencing of these assault missions to schedule preparation of equipment in Belgium and necessary airlift to the Congo. These are planning repeat planning concepts and assumptions only - it is recognized that actual assault planning will be accomplished in-country and it is not intended that this planning concept be directive on the DRAGON ROUGE Task Force, JTF LEO, or the Belgian military representatives.)

a. General Considerations:

(1) The Belgian paratroop battalion will conduct its assault on Stanleyville on D-Day/0400Z. It will be at least forty-eight hours before this battalion can mount additional air assaults on other objective areas. If the VDW column arrives in Stanleyville during this forty-eight hour period, it will then be possible for Col Laurient (Belgian Paratroop Commander) to mount a maximum of two assault missions involving one company each. An isolated air drop of less than company strength would not be planned. Under all circumstances, the Paratroop Battalion would maintain the staff and one company in reserve at Stanleyville to man the central base for these additional missions, to provide an "on call" reserve force of platoon size to reinforce company sized assaults, and to serve as a focal point for resupply and command of the assault effort.

(2) To insure a minimum capability to support two

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of these company-sized assault missions involving airdrop of two companies and airlanding motorized equipment, the Paratroop Battalion will require an additional 400 personnel chutes (200 per company, assuming that the planned airlanded force for Stanleyville had been required to airdrop, thereby deploying their 192 parachutes), eight additional armored jeeps (four per company assault), and four additional radio jeeps (two per company assault). The availability of the foregoing equipment is essential to any subsequent assault to liberate hostages in other areas following the Stanleyville DRAGON ROUGE attack; therefore, timing of the airlift of this equipment from Belgium (Beauvechain Air Base) to Leopoldville is the controlling factor in the scheduling of such assaults. To provide this minimum capability for additional assaults, four C-124/C-130E (dependent upon type available in theater) tactical airlift sorties are required. Departure of these sorties from Belgium will be required at least 72 hours prior to desired drop times on additional objective areas.

(3) For planning, it is assumed that the Belgian Paratroop Commander would attempt to drop so as to optimize surprise at first light of day (0400Z), and to take advantage of good visibility, minimum wind, thermal lifting, and cumulus activity. Drop zone information on the possible areas throughout the entire northeastern Congo is presently in the possession of the Paratroop Commander.

(4) The guiding concept is that airlift support for the DRAGON ROUGE task force - oriented as it is to humanitarian rescue operations - should be separate from that being provided Congolese Army and the Congolese-supported mercenary columns for both political and practical reasons.

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(5) Problems of specialized equipment, and personnel requirements in-country, precludes rigging motorized equipment for airdrop. Therefore, no airdrops of jeeps or other heavy equipment is planned.

b. Specific Objective Area Concepts:

(1) Bunia Assault Concept - Assault Nickname "DRAGON BLANC." Of the three most important concentrations of hostages, Bunia is considered to be the primary target area for the follow-on assaults. Hostages in that area are numerous and include the women and children of families formerly in the Watsa area and now reported to be confined in Mongbwalu, just north of the city of Bunia. Bunia has a 6,000 foot, hard-surfaced runway, presently obstructed with oil drums, which will permit airlanding motorized equipment and rapid evacuation of hostages via air once it is secured and cleared. If only one company-sized attack can be mounted from Stanleyville, it should be planned against the airfield and city of Bunia. This assault could be conducted a minimum of 48 hours after the DRAGON ROUGE drop on Stanleyville if additional parachutes and jeeps are available. The planning concept for this operation involves:

(a) Four C-130E's, carrying 200 personnel parachutes, to move from Leopoldville to Stanleyville before darkness on the day following Stanleyville drop (D+1). One of the C-130E's remains at Stanleyville, prepared to drop a platoon of reinforcements if needed. Three of these aircraft would airdrop one company on Bunia at 0400Z on D+2 and then return to Leopoldville. This involves take-off from Stanleyville on an unlighted runway in hours of darkness; while not routine, this is acceptable under the circumstances.

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(b) Two other C-130E's from Leopoldville would depart with four armored jeeps and two radio-equipped jeeps, timed to arrive over Bunia airstrip at 0430Z on D+2, airlanding jeeps as soon as the airfield is clear and landing requested by the company commander. Once the jeeps are unloaded, these two C-130E's will remain on the ground at ground-idle until all Bunia evacuees and drop casualties are aboard or until reaching a fuel-decision point for safe return to Leopoldville. It is estimated that at least 2:30 hours of ground-idle time would be available.

(c) The one C-130E holding at Stanleyville with the reserve platoon would remain "on call" in the event rapid reinforcement of the Bunia company were required and would not be released until the paratroop commander is assured of the ability of one company to hold the objective area.

NOTE: This immediate "on-call" C-130E at Stanleyville is a specific requirement of the Belgian paratroop commander throughout initial phases of any company-sized assault mission.)

(d) On D+3 a C-130E from Leopoldville would schedule an en route stop at Stanleyville, on-load resupply rations, munitions, and a paratroop battalion officer and proceed to Bunia. At Bunia, the resupply would be airlanded, residual hostage evacuation completed, and definite arrangements for future resupply would be coordinated. Continuing resupply would be accomplished, insofar as possible, utilizing Belgian AF DC-6's based at Kamina, as an extension of the recurring Kamina-Stanleyville resupply flights.

(2) Paulis Assault Concept - Assault Nickname "DRAGON NOIR." The second priority assault objective has been selected because of the concentration of hostages in the area and a

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capability to airdrop personnel on the airfield, followed by the possibility of airlanding armored and radio jeeps in a sequence identical to the assault concept for Bunia. The airfield (elevation 2644 feet) has a 4,199 foot compact earth runway which has routinely supported C-47 commercial operations in the past. In the event of heavy rains, the runway surface may not be usable; however, this determination must be made in-country before executing an assault, with the best advice and experience available on Congo airfields.

The end of the rainy season is approaching and the runway should be adequate for this operation. The alternative to airlanding involves introducing into Leopoldville or Kamina a capability to do heavy rigging and loading C-130E's for vehicle air drop, plus the necessity to commingle US and Belgian airdrop equipment. Since C-124's would probably be used to transport these vehicles to the Congo, a rigged load transfer capability (fork lifts, low boys, etc.) would be required to off- and on-load at Leopoldville or Kamina. Also, if unable to airland, the evacuation of hostages would have to be done overland without lorries. The east-west railroad

through Paulis may be subjected to frequent rebel ambush. If airlanding motorized equipment is not considered feasible and urgent rescue is required, an airborne alternative would have to be devised by the DRAGON ROUGE task force in-country or rescue delayed until lorry and/or railroad access is possible. (NOTE: The deputy paratroop commander advises that his airborne company would suffer serious loss of capability without radio and armored jeeps and he would not advise an isolated objective airdrop without these vehicles.) In summary, the Paulis airborne/airlanded operation may be feasible and sufficient personnel parachutes (200) and six jeeps (four armored and two radio) should be provided from

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Belgium to take advantage of this possibility.

(3) Watsa Assault Concept - Assault Nickname
"DRAGON VERT."

(a) This area is known to have a group of male hostages (women and children have reportedly been removed to Bunia area) in considerable jeopardy of reprisal action. It is not possible to conduct airlanded operations since the airport is only 2,400 feet, earthen runway, with 3,000 foot elevation. An airborne assault would require airdrop of personnel and motorized equipment and continuing aerial resupply. Immediate hostage evacuation by air is not possible from this area. While airdropping heavy vehicle loads are not impossible problems, the complexities involved in rigging Belgian motorized equipment, changing loads to C-130E's from C-124's in the Congo, commingling equipment, and the time and airlift factors involved in transporting necessary handling gear add up to the planning judgment that a completely air-dropped assault, with vehicles, is not feasible.

(b) The alternative course of action to liberate hostages in Watsa is to provide sufficient 3-ton Belgian lorries to the Bunia assault company to permit overland movement to Watsa (Approximately 125 miles). After Bunia has been assaulted and secured, the Bunia assault company, reinforced by a platoon from Stanleyville, could send a force by lorry to Watsa. With a mobile column en route to Watsa, a personnel airdrop could be conducted on Watsa to secure the town, liberate hostages and await the column for evacuation via lorry to the airhead at Bunia. Belgian 3-ton lorries carry eighteen fully equipped personnel (empty weight 8,190 pounds) and the Belgian planners have requested a minimum lift of eighteen lorries from Belgium to a central distribution point at

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Stanleyville for their Battalion mobility. If eight of these were given priority shipment to Bunia, they could be utilized to carry an augmented platoon overland from Bunia to Watsa, making it possible to attempt to liberate and evacuate the Watsa hostages within 24 hours after the lorries are available. A capability of aerial resupply for the lorry-transported element by C-130E aircraft would be established at Kamina or Stanleyville and available as required.

(4) Repatriation of the Belgian Battalion: Definitive

Planning schedules for return of the Battalion from Congo to Belgium could not be made due to uncertainties of operations and requirements; however, a concept for the redeployment was agreed. In-country recovery would first be to Kamina AB. Here, the Battalion could be maintained with minimum adverse political effect and exposure to urban areas. Upon request of the paratroop commander following the liberation and evacuation of hostages, this in-country recovery would be effected by JTF LEO from whatever dispersed areas the Battalion had entered. Once all elements are recovered to Kamina, administrative airlift for Battalion paratrooper personnel would, whenever possible, be accomplished by Sabena charter; US tactical airlift would be required to recover the battalion military equipment not readily transportable by commercial charter. The redeployment to Belgium would commence on request of the Belgian government. Assuming no major personnel lift, presently estimated US tactical airlift requirements for recovery and redeployment of all vehicles and parachutes, would be sixteen C-130E (equivalent) sorties.

(4) (TS) Planning Agreements on Priorities of Airlift Support from Europe to the Congo:

a. First Airlift Priority. If subsequent assault operations

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are contemplated after Stanleyville, then the present battalion basic load of ammunition (with DRAGON ROUGE task force and pre-stocked at Kamina) must be resupplied with one additional basic load of eighteen tons (two C-124 equivalents) delivered to Kamina. Due to urgency of requirement and adaptability of this cargo to Sabena jet (707) loading, the Belgian planners would attempt to obtain a civilian charter flight for this requirement immediately upon approval of this plan. This additional basic load should be in place en route on D-Day at Stanleyville. US airlift should not be programmed unless requested.

b. Second Airlift Priority. To mount assault on Bunia and Paulis (as indicated above) four C-124's (or C-130E's) are required from Beauvechain Airfield, Belgium to Leopoldville with eight armored jeeps, four radio jeeps, 400 personnel parachutes, 1000s ACL (estimated 1400 pounds C-124) surplus of ammunition and rations. These four sorties should be dispatched as soon as available in USEUCOM resources following approval of this plan, since each of these two subsequent assaults are contingent upon the arrival of this cargo in Leopoldville at least eighteen hours prior to desired drop time on the objective areas. In-Congo requirements for simultaneous assault drops and airlanding motorized equipment on Bunia (DRAGON BLANC) and Paulis (DRAGON NOIR) are six C-130E's for assault elements of two companies; four C-130E's for airlanding motorized equipment and initial evacuation of hostages; one C-130E at Stanleyville for "on-call" platoon reinforcement. (If Bunia and Paulis air assaults were sequential (24 hours) rather than simultaneous, the in-Congo requirement of C-130E's is reduced to six; however, twelve C-130E DRAGON ROUGE aircraft are available, thus a simultaneous assault

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capability was planned.)

c. Third Airlift Priority. To support Watsa assault (DRAGON VERT) four C-124/C-130E's from USEUCOM resources with eight 3-ton Belgian lorries from Beauvechain Airfield to Leopoldville. In-Congo requirements are for four C-130E's to deliver lorries to Bunia and one C-130E to provide possible platoon air assault in conjunction with the lorry transported column moving to Watsa.

d. Fourth Airlift Priority. Transport complete fresh uniform and other clothing items, shoes, etc., to the DRAGON ROUGE Force (12,000 pounds) ACL surplus of mortars, rations, and ammunition. This change of clothing is essential after one week from D-Day on Stanleyville, thus sortie is required from Belgium no later than D+3. Belgian planners will attempt to arrange a Sabena civilian charter for this requirement and US airlift should not be programmed unless requested.

e. Fifth Airlift Priority. Five C-124/C-130E's from Beauvechain AB, Belgium to Leopoldville to transport ten 3-ton lorries. This is the remainder of minimum Belgian requirement of eighteen lorries in the objective area for essential evacuation activities in outlying areas and to provide mobility in objective areas. This requirement is an "as soon as possible" after satisfaction of foregoing priorities one through four.

5. (u)(TS) Friendly Forces:

a. State Department, Same as in Ref B, plus providing information to commander JTF LEO, Leopoldville, concerning location of in-country hostages and priority for liberation and evacuation of these hostages.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Same as in ref B.

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c. CSAF: Same as in Ref B.

d. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCEAFSA.

(1) Exercises operational control of all in-Congo airlift support operations required by the JCS execution order. Provides in-Congo airlift support for missions outlined in this supplemental plan in accordance with JCS execution order;

(2) Redeploys all DRAGON ROUGE C-130E aircraft not required for execution of this supplemental plan after execution of DRAGON ROUGE assault on Stanleyville; and

(3) Provides flash precedence reports to all addressees and info addressees of this message concerning assault executions and post-attack reports. Provides summary progress reports to all addressees. AMEMB Brussels should be requested to pass to Government of Belgium.

6. (4) (TS) Tasks:

a. CINCUSAFE.

(1) Assumes mission responsibility for the USAFE airlift support of the operations between Europe and the Congo involving deployment and redeployment of the Belgian equipment and personnel to the Congo;

(2) Upon execution of this supplemental plan, coordinate loads and onload bases with Belgian military authorities and be prepared to dispatch airlift support aircraft (C-124 or C-130E) as soon as possible to Congo destination, reporting upon arrival to the Commander JTF LEO;

(3) When requested, provide airlift required for redeployment of the Belgian battalion that exceeds the capability of in-country resources available for such redeployment; and

(4) Provide two additional air droppable radios (on

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loan) to the Belgian paratroop commander for use in these subsequent operations; dispatch these on the first available aircraft.

b. CINCUSAREUR. Provide USAFE fifty complete sets of restraint and release rigging and extraction parachutes for A-22 container drops for possible use in Belgian aerial resupply missions. (NOTE: Commander at Kamina will receive 6000 pounds of Belgian, 1-ton, aerial resupply parachutes via DC-6 departing 20 Nov for Congo.)

7. (U) (TS) Command and Control.

a. US and Belgian forces will remain under respective national command at all times during this operation; however, after US/Belgian agreement has been reached on execution of this supplemental mission, individual go no-go mission decisions concerning assault operations will be the responsibility of the Belgian paratroop commander; Commander JTF LEO will be responsive to such decisions, subject only to normal aircraft commander's prerogative in unanticipated emergency situations affecting the safety of his aircraft and passengers.

b. CINCSTRIKE will exercise operational control over all US personnel and aircraft operating in the Congo in support of this operation. USCINCEUR will pass operational control over USEUCOM personnel and aircraft upon their arrival in the Congo.

c. CINCSTRIKE will pass operational command of USAFE assigned airlift aircraft upon redeployment from the Congo.

8. (U) (TS) Approval and Execution.

This supplemental plan is submitted to the JCS for approval; meanwhile, it will be utilized by friendly forces and task organizations for preliminary planning purposes. Belgian staff planning is proceeding along these lines. Execution of the support

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airlift and the assault airlift operations in this plan by US forces
will be as directed by the JCS.

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Ref: DJSM-1893-64, 3 Dec 64.

SUBJ: Operation DRAGON ROUGE (U)

1. (U) The following comments and recommendations are submitted in accordance with reference.

2. (U) GENERAL

a. DRAGON ROUGE had certain unique features:

(1) There was a wide separation of the two unified command headquarters involved, from each other and from the scene of operations.

(2) A foreign government furnished the assault troops which were carried in US aircraft.

(3) Four governments besides the US and Belgium were involved in various aspects of the operation.

(4) The operation was urgent and politically sensitive.

b. DRAGON ROUGE provided valuable experience in planning and conducting a rapid-reaction, contingency operation

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MONTH Jan	YEAR 1965

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	PHONE 8015	PAGE NR. 1	NR. OF PAGES 7		Colonel, USAF	
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in conjunction with another unified command, the NMCC, State Department, and the diplomatic and military forces of allied nations.

3(4)(5) PLANNING

a. USEUCOM representatives approached the initial planning conference with the primary objective of achieving early agreement on a basic plan of action involving minimum necessary forces and equipment. Although initial guidance specified a

company size effort, it soon became apparent that a force of at least battalion strength was required. US planners proceeded on the basis of supporting an airborne battalion as authorized by Ambassador McArthur who informed the State Department.

b. In view of the sensitivity of the operation, participation in initial planning was limited to three representatives (one each from this headquarters, USAFE, and USAREUR). In addition, the JCS and the Belgians were represented. STRICOM was not a participant although CINCSRIKE requested representation.

Subsequent developments indicated that the presence of a STRICOManner at the Brussels conference would have been desirable.

c. It was decided that a single US-Belgian OPLAN should be developed which could be:

(1) Coordinated with the Belgian staff.

(2) Submitted to the military and political elements of both governments in sufficient detail to permit understanding of agreed points.

(3) Executed, after approval, by fragmentary orders of both governments without requiring additional formal planning at lower levels.

The plan met each of these objectives and only minor changes

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were subsequently required.

d. In recognition of the absence of an established US/Belgian doctrine, US planners were instructed to follow the Belgian lead and adapt to their desires. This proved effective and enhanced Belgian acceptance of US suggestions.

e. Conference objectives were to devise methods which would permit force deployment on a secure and timely basis, yet preserve the element of surprise during the employment phase.

Among the problems encountered were:

(1) Belgian political sensitivities precluded early alerting and dispersal of the airborne force prior to a decision to execute.

(2) There was no pattern of combined US/Belgian airborne exercises which might serve as a cover for alerting and loading Belgian airborne troops aboard US aircraft.

(3) The peacetime movement of military aircraft within Europe, without specific diplomatic clearance, is limited to NATO-associated military activities. Movement of DRAGON ROUGE aircraft was not possible without political cognizance and approval of the countries involved.

(4) Use of Wheelus AB, Libya, as an enroute base was denied, which dictated the use of Spanish bases and the UK Ascension Island facility. This endangered security of the operation and the flight phase was lengthened substantially. The route and bases required for DRAGON ROUGE emphasize the need for acquisition and maintenance of US bases and base rights in strategic locations.

f. Due to the lack of an existing plan for the operation and lack of time prior to execution, extensive cover and deception planning

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was not possible. General security and the military discipline of the forces were relied upon to prevent leaks. Maximum use in deployment planning was made of the cover afforded by darkness, remote bases and avoidance of populated areas. Rapid movement of forces to Ascension Island was planned, allowing only minimum rest enroute. A cover plan based upon these considerations was proposed by USEUCOM late on 16 Nov 64. On 17 Nov 64 a State Dept cover plan was received which involved fictitious flight plans and U.K. cover flights. The status of this plan versus the USEUCOM cover plan was undetermined when the mission was ordered executed the afternoon of 17 Nov. The existence of conflicting cover plans and last minute direction from JCS not to proceed until fictitious flight plans called for in the State Dept plan were filed, resulted in confusion and a delay in takeoff from Klein-Brogel. The rationale for filing false flight plans is unknown, however, false aircraft clearances cannot be filed without at the same time filing true flight plans for the actual route. Air traffic congestion over western Europe and safety of flight for our own and other aircraft demand that valid flight plans be acted upon by air traffic control agencies.

4 (4/5) DEPLOYMENT

a. Diplomatic flight clearances from France and Spain were a problem in the initial deployment phase. Mission decision was received only a short time before mission execution was required. Ambassadorial approaches to the French and Spanish governments for diplomatic clearances were not made until too late. To meet required mission timing, aircraft had to be launched from Evreux on normal flight plans before French concurrence with the operation was received. Spanish

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concurrence was received only shortly before the first aircraft penetrated Spanish airspace. Spanish sensitivity was aggravated later by the deployment of the FULL STRIKE aircraft to Spain without proper clearance.

b. Limited theatre airlift dictated use of a mixed C-124 and C-130 force. The shorter range, slower speed and lower maintenance reliability of the C-124 were magnified by the distances involved and, even though their departure was ordered as early as possible, they did not arrive at Ascension until approximately 16 hours after the assault force. The assault airlift personnel spent the first night at Ascension without the tents and cots which the C-124's carried. Subsequent support operations with the C-124 over the more than 6000 miles from USEUCOM to the Congo confirmed the operational disadvantages of this aircraft.

c. While extensive precautions were attempted to prevent leaks of information, members of the European news media were aware that the operation was in progress and made every effort to confirm rumors that were spreading throughout western Europe. Speculation in the press resulted in acknowledgement of the operation by both US and Belgian governments. The delay in execution from Ascension provided additional time for news media to continue speculating, despite statements by public-affairs offices that personnel queried had no knowledge of such an operation. The requirement for advanced national PAO planning was demonstrated, and its absence was evident.

5. (4)(S) EMPLOYMENT

a. USEUCOM positioned an airborne communications facility, TALKING BIRD, at Ascension Island to coordinate and

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control USEUCOM forces. Mobile communications were also provided by STRICOM for their use during the assault phase. CINCSTRIKE ordered the USEUCOM TALKING BIRD aircraft to accompany the assault force although CINCEUR had not intended passing operational control of this facility. USEUCOM then authorized transfer of operational control of TALKING BIRD to give all possible support. Mobile communications packages such as TALKING BIRD are considered integral to a unified commander's command and control requirements and should not normally be transferred to operational control of another commander.

b. It is believed that this was the first combat employment of airborne forces in accordance with the TAC-developed "close look" air drop procedure involving single-ship in-trail delivery. (The standard one minute in-trail spacing was modified to 20 seconds for this operation.) The tactic proved successful and was well adapted to the restricted drop-zone available.

c. Lack of adequate intelligence and photo-coverage of the objective area was a handicap during the employment phase. The best available intelligence was passed via TALKING BIRD to the USAFE Intelligence Officer with the assault force to brief US and Belgian forces. Nevertheless, much desired information regarding current rebel defenses and positions, plus actual locations of hostages in Stanleyville and Paulis were not available. No member of the Belgian force was sufficiently familiar with

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Stanleyville to lead the rescue columns to specific locations where hostages were believed to be held, and Mr. Clingerman of the US State Department (and formerly US Consul in Stanleyville) accompanied the assault force to assist in locating hostages.

6. (S) REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment of the EUCOM force elements was completed on 1 Dec 64 without major problems. One minor problem involved denial of Spanish overflight authority which forced enroute refueling of all aircraft at Las Palmas where only limited facilities were available. The desires of the Belgians for a two-hour arrival block at Brussels could therefore not be satisfied. Subsequent adjustments satisfactory to the Belgians were made which permitted closure of the assault force and conduct of Belgian governmental welcoming ceremonies.

7. (U) In summary, Operation DRAGON ROUGE was noteworthy in demonstrating the effective cooperation and coordination which can be achieved with an allied government. Not to be overlooked is the fact that the combat effectiveness of the US and Belgian forces involved resulted in an eminently successful conclusion. DRAGON ROUGE provided lessons in planning, base support, cover and deception operations, diplomatic clearance procedures, intelligence and communications.

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GROUP 4
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APPENDIX D

DRAGON ROUGE/NOIR FINAL STATISTICS AND COSTS*

USAFE Aircraft Employed in Deployment Operations to the Congo

1. C-124 aircraft

4, C-124 carried refueling units and evacuee rations to Kamina;
2, C-124 used as spares for this force.

3, C-124 used for transporting cots and tents to Kamina; 1, C-124 used
as spare for this force.

TOTAL - 10 USAF C-124 aircraft employed for DRAGON ROUGE operation.

2. C-130 aircraft

12, C-130E carried assault forces; 2, C-130E used as spares for this
force.

1, C-130 used as Talking Bird.

TOTAL - 15 USAF C-130E aircraft employed for DRAGON ROUGE operation.

3. HC-97 aircraft


2, HC-97 provided for Air Sea Rescue (ASR) operations during entire
operation.

Airfields Utilized During DRAGON ROUGE Airlift Operation

1. Kleine-Brogel, Belgium
2. Moron, Spain
3. Torrejon, Spain
4. Las Palmas, Canary Islands
5. Ascension, Ascension Island
6. Kamina, Republic of the Congo
7. Stanleyville, Republic of the Congo

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8. Leopoldville, Republic of the Congo
9. Wheelus Air Force Base, Libya
10. Dakar, Senegal (Emergency Field)
11. Roberts Field, Monrovia, Liberia (Emergency Field)

Redeployment Operations from the Congo

1. 10, C-130 with Belgian troops to Brussels.
2. 4, C-130 with Belgian equipment to Brussels.
3. 2, C-124 lifted refueling units.
4. 1, C-124 airlifted remaining USAFE heaving drop items.
5. 1, C-130 Talking Bird departed Kamina for Ascension.
6. JCS directed CINCSTRIKE to deploy a squadron of C-130E aircraft to Moron AFB to augment USCINCEUR in-theater airlift; these aircraft departed Pope AFB (North Carolina) for Moron 221300Z November for this purpose. During Operation DRAGON ROUGE these were used to support flood damage operations in Tunisia. They flew 16 sorties, carrying 7 officers, 47 enlisted men, and 400,000 pounds of cargo. In addition, this force supplied 6, C-130 aircraft to assist in aircraft requirements of DRAGON ROUGE.


Flying Hour Costs

Tabulation of flying hour costs for USAFE airlift support between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo for DRAGON ROUGE (dollar values based on cost tariff of hourly rate IAW AFR 76-28):

C-130	1131 hours	\$462,579.00
C-124	803 hours	220,022.00
TOTAL	1934 hours	\$682,601.00

*Consolidated List of Support Operations Rendered by USEUCOM for 1964 in the Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (MEAFSA) Area for CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMIAFSA (U). Prepared by J-3 Division, Headquarters USEUCOM for Director, J-3 Division, January 1965.

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